Over our dead bodies: Port Arthur and Australia's fight for gun control by Chapman, Simon

OVER OUR DEAD BODIES 
Port Arthur and Australia’s fight for gun control
Simon Chapman
Originally published 1998 by Pluto Press (Annandale, Australia)
This reprint edition published 2013 by SYDNEY UNIVERSITY PRESS
© Simon Chapman 1998, 2013
© Sydney University Press 2013
Reproduction and Communication for other purposes 
Except as permitted under the Act, no part of this edition may be 
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or communicated in any form 
or by any means without prior written permission. All requests for 
reproduction or communication should be made to Sydney University 
Press at the address below: 
Sydney University Press
Fisher Library F03
University of Sydney NSW 2006 
AUSTRALIA
Email: sup.info@sydney.edu.au
ISBN 978-1-74332-031-0 
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication Data available
Cover design by Dushan Mrva-Montoya
3Contents
Foreword to the reprint edition 5
Preface and acknowledgments to the 1998 edition 9
Introduction 15
1. The massacre 31
2. The case for fewer guns 73
3. The campaign for gun control 99
4. The main reforms 117
5. The gun lobby in Australia 153
6. The gun lobby’s arguments . . . and the responses 197
7. The future tasks for gun control 251
Other books by Simon Chapman 275

5Foreword to the reprint edition
The firearm massacre at a primary school in Sandy Hook, Connecticut 
on 14 December 2012 in which a lone gunman armed with three semi-
automatic firearms killed 20 children, six teachers, his gun-owning 
mother and then himself, has stimulated unprecedented momentum 
for meaningful gun controls in the US.
In 2006, with colleagues, I published a report1 that examined what 
had happened to gun deaths in Australia since the implementation of 
comprehensive gun law reforms in Australia, following the Port Arthur 
massacre in April 1996, where 35 people were killed by a single gunman.
On the day of the US massacre, I tweeted a link to that report, 
published in the British Medical Journal’s specialist journal Injury 
Prevention. In the six years since our paper had been published, it had 
been opened online 14,742 times. In the month of December 2012, it 
was opened a remarkable 84,542 times, quite easily the most opened 
paper I have ever published on any subject in 35 years of public health 
research. 
Americans might value reflection on Australia’s recent experience 
in reducing deaths from firearms. The US has 13.7 times Australia’s 
 
1 Chapman S, Alpers P, Agho K, Jones M. Australia’s 1996 gun 
law reforms: faster falls in firearm deaths, firearm suicides, and a 
decade without mass shootings. Injury Prevention 2006, 12: 365–72. 
Available at: http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/12/6/365.
full?sid=4d930b0a-0f5d-484a-8ad4-b5839c7d10c5.
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population, 104 times its total firearm-caused deaths (32,163 in 2011 vs 
236 in 2010), and 370 times Australia’s firearm homicide rate (11,101 in 
2011 vs 30 in 2010). 
Importantly, in the 16 years since the law reforms, there have been 
no mass shootings. While the rate of firearm homicide was reducing 
by an average of 3% per year prior to the law reforms, this increased 
to 7.5% per year after the introduction of the new laws, although this 
failed to reach statistical significance because of the low power inherent 
in the small numbers involved. Our report showed that firearm-related 
suicides in males declined from 3.4 deaths per 100,000 person-years in 
1997 to 1.3 per 100,000 person-years, representing a decline of 59.9%. 
The rate of all other suicides declined from 19.9 deaths per 100,000 
person-years in 1997 to 15.0 per 100,000 person-years in 2005, repre-
senting a decline of 24.5%, and suggesting there was no substitution 
effect. The yearly change in firearm-related suicides in males was –8.7%, 
and the yearly change in other suicides was –4.1%, less than half the rate 
of fall in firearm suicide.
Plainly, there is great interest in Australia’s experience in gun law 
reform.2 I wrote this book after the Port Arthur massacre, to provide a 
record of the events leading up to the law reforms, and the reaction to 
them. The book quickly went out of print and has ever since been very 
hard to obtain, with the publisher Pluto Press, since closing. I am very 
thankful to Sydney University Press for agreeing to republish the book 
in its original form, less the cartoons which were contained in the first 
edition. Unfortunately many of the links are no longer active (being old) 
and cannot be recovered. We recommend that those inclined to do so, 
try their luck finding them in the Wayback Machine.3 
2 See ‘Australia – gun facts, figures and the law’ for specific information and 
updates: http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/cp/australia.
3 http://archive.org/web/web.php.
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My editor Agata Mrva-Montoya, who worked on my previous book 
with Sydney University Press,4 turned this around in weeks. I am very 
grateful to her.
Simon Chapman
5 February 2013
4 Chapman S, Barratt A, Stockler M. Let sleeping dogs lie? What men should 
know before being tested for prostate cancer. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 
2010, http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/6835.

9Preface and acknowledgments to the 1998 edition
This book was written for two main groups of readers. Foremost in my 
mind were Australians who were appalled by the Port Arthur gun mas-
sacre which killed 35 people and who want to understand more about 
the struggle to secure the historic reform of gun laws in the months 
after the incident. For millions, the massacre and the long overdue need 
for reform of gun laws became a major topic of conversation among 
family, friends and workmates. Tens of thousands of you demonstrated 
in support of the new laws, wrote letters to politicians and expressed 
yourselves in public media such as letters to newspapers and calls to 
radio stations. The wisdom and timing of many of these contributions 
were enormously powerful in advancing the debate and convincing 
politicians of the huge community support for gun control, and that 
further excuses for inaction were unacceptable. I wanted to pay a sort 
of homage to this support, which more than one commentator pointed 
out was a wonderful example of non-violent ‘people power’ influencing 
law reform.
I have also written the book for people working to promote gun 
control in other countries. As will become apparent, I believe that it 
was not by mere serendipity that a massacre translated into major law 
reform. There are many lessons for others in how such tragedies can be 
catalysts for radical change. Yet law reform following massacres is not 
inevitable; rather, it requires the planned, strategic use of media and 
other forms of advocacy to convert anger and outrage into action. A 
prerequisite for this change would appear to be a sustained period of 
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public advocacy for gun law reform that keys up communities to define 
soft gun laws as a blight on political courage and an affront to a safe 
community. Gun massacres force politicians to confront an electorate 
outraged at political spinelessness in an area which demands nothing 
less than strong leadership. Much of this book is an attempt to distil 
some lessons out of the chaos that became the day to day of the lives of 
those pushing for gun law reform in the months after Port Arthur.
Along with Rebecca Peters (NSW), Roland Browne (Tasmania), 
Helen Gadsen (Queensland), Tim Costello (Victoria) and Charles 
Watson (NSW) I have been a spokesperson for the Coalition for Gun 
Control, a coalition of associations and individuals committed to 
tightening the regulation of guns in order to reduce gun violence in 
our community. The CGC became incorporated in 1995 in NSW and 
became a national group (thereafter, the National Coalition for Gun 
Control or NCGC) on 15 June 1996, when Rebecca was appointed 
national coordinator. Over 300 organisations from the fields of public 
health, medicine, law, domestic violence advocacy, women’s, religious, 
ethnic and community groups have supported NCGC lobbying activi-
ties. While no longer active in the NCGC, between 1992 and 1996 I was 
one of its main members.
Despite this huge support and the overwhelming weight of public 
opinion in favour of gun control, the NCGC today remains an organisa-
tion run on the goodwill and dedication of volunteers, on the financial 
shoe-strings provided by public donations and on the occasional largesse 
of supportive organisations. Gun control has always been an immensely 
politicised issue. Despite an average of some 560 people who are killed 
by guns in Australia in each of the last six years, there has so far been no 
government with the courage or foresight to support the NCGC with 
little but pats on the back in times of mutual agreement. At one stage 
word was passed from the NSW Labor government that we would not 
be receiving funding because it was plain some of us were connected 
with the Liberal Party. We got the same news from the Federal (Liberal 
Coalition) government, being told that it was obvious the same people 
were Labor supporters. Frequently during the post–Port Arthur debate, 
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people would contact us and make comments that implied we were a 
huge organisation with a fully equipped office, salaried staff and a lot 
of money in the bank. Nothing could have been further from the truth.
We were very honoured that the National Coalition for the Gun 
Control was awarded the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission community award for 1996 (shared with ECPAT, the 
group working to end child prostitution in Asian tourism). Rebecca 
Peters shared the individual award, the 1996 Human Rights Medal, with 
Rob Riley, long-time Western Australian campaigner for Aboriginal 
rights who died during the year.
At the height of the debate and well after it peaked, Rebecca often 
worked 16 hours a day, seven days a week. She was supported by dozens 
of volunteers who helped in many invaluable ways. Roland Browne 
fitted gun control advocacy around his work as a lawyer, and my sab-
batical leave plans were turned upside down. Julia Tsalis worked as the 
NCGC’s Sydney office secretary from May until December 1996, and 
was supported by dozens of volunteers who helped in many invaluable 
ways.
There are countless people who should be thanked for their support 
throughout the months when the new gun laws were being secured. 
Here, I want to give special thanks to several people who assisted me in 
writing this book. The first draft of the book was written between August 
and Christmas 1996. Philip Alpers from New Zealand was invaluable 
in his support. His encyclopedic knowledge of shooting incidents and 
his expertise in technical matters about guns and the gun lobby was 
always just a phone call away. As drafts of chapters were finished, I sent 
them off to Rebecca and Philip for comment. My original hope was for 
Rebecca to coauthor the book, but her concern to give all her amazing 
energy to the implementation of the new laws, to forging links with gun 
control groups in other nations, to the visit of three Dunblane fathers 
in April 1997 and taking up a research position in the United States 
took precedence. I am certain that the book would have been far better 
with her further contribution. But I’m also certain that support for gun 
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control has advanced still further by her decision to put advocacy for 
gun control before writing about it.
Roland Browne, Michael Dudley, Richard Harding, Satyanshu 
Mukherjee and Philip Alpers read and commented on early drafts. 
Roland helped out with Tasmanian material. The Advocacy Institute in 
Washington DC provided quiet space for me to write in July and August 
1996. Thanks go to Michelle Scollo who clipped all gun stories from the 
Melbourne Age for me over five months. And thanks go especially to the 
cartoonists – Michael Leunig, Bruce Petty, Cathy Wilcox, Ron Tandberg 
and Alan Moir – who have allowed their work to be used in the book. 
Finally, I thank Penny O’Donnell, Tony Moore and Sean Kidney at Pluto 
for their calm steerage of the book through many months of unexpected 
difficulties.
Because I live in Sydney, the book reflects a perspective very much 
constrained by my experience of the events following Port Arthur, 
particularly as it unfolded through Sydney’s mass media and political 
system. I make no pretence that this book is in any way a formal history 
of all that happened throughout Australia. Such a book would need to 
be massive. My main interest in writing the book was to capture the 
nature of the public discourse on gun control that the Port Arthur kill-
ings unleashed and which framed the way that the issue came to be 
defined by ordinary people throughout the country and by the politi-
cians who were now forced to act. As all will recall, in 1996 gun control 
was to suddenly become one of the most discussed public issues in 
Australia’s mass media. The 10,000 watt lights of the mass media turned 
on a situation focus the minds of politicians very quickly. This book is 
largely an attempt to peer into those lights and review the sort of light 
that they cast on gun control as a public issue.
I had only occasional contact with staff in the political offices of 
those politicians working to pass and implement the new gun laws. Their 
roles, particularly that of the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination 
(or as it was known during the Port Arthur Period, the Commonwealth 
Law Enforcement Board) in Canberra whose staff played a critical role 
in drafting the legislation and in briefing politicians, are unsung in this 
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book. The behind-the-scenes work of those government officers and 
politicians’ staff who worked to ensure the laws had the best chance of 
passing deserves the highest praise.
All royalties from the sale of this book will go to support an interna-
tional internet-based network that is allowing the rapid communication 
of information and strategy among gun control advocates from many 
nations.
Simon Chapman
Department of Public Health and Community Medicine
University of Sydney
May 1998
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Introduction
On the afternoon of 28 April 1996 a man armed with two military-style 
semi-automatic rifles shot dead 35 people and wounded 18 others in 
and around the historic tourist precinct of Port Arthur, about 100 kilo-
metres from the Tasmanian capital city of Hobart.
Most of those killed were tourists on a Sunday visit to Tasmania’s 
busiest tourist site, ruins of a notoriously cruel prison established in 
1830. Twenty of the 35 were killed inside the Broad Arrow Café after 
the gunman entered, took a semi-automatic weapon from a sports bag 
and began shooting at people eating their lunch. The shooting ram-
page lasted about two minutes, during which time the killer laughed 
aggressively. Most of the remaining victims were shot at an approach 
to the site. A further 18 were injured by bullet wounds, some suffering 
horrific injuries. The gunman was captured the next day and identi-
fied as Martin Bryant, a 28-year-old from a Hobart suburb who had 
no previous criminal record of violence nor any history of diagnosed 
mental illness. The event generated huge media attention, and for the 
next three months the nation witnessed an impassioned debate between 
those who argued that it was unconscionable to allow Australia to con-
tinue to ‘go down the American path’ and those opposed to virtually any 
form of gun control.
The death toll of 35 was almost half the total of all gun homicides 
for the entire country in an average year and equal to Tasmania’s total 
annual gun death rate. The Australian media described the massacre 
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as ‘the worst massacre by a single gunman in Australian history’1 and 
Bryant as ‘the world’s worst lone mass killer’.2 (Note, however, that the 
wholesale slaughter of Aborigines in the 19th century often involved 
far more deaths. For example, about 170 Aborigines were slaughtered 
in the Medway Ranges, Queensland, in October and November 1861. 
There are no records of how many were killed by single individuals.)3
The day after the murders, Australia’s Prime Minister, John Howard, 
who had been in office only 57 days following his party’s 13 years in 
Opposition, announced his intention to introduce the most sweeping 
gun control reforms ever contemplated by any Australian government. 
These reforms were drafted by Attorney General Daryl Williams and 
the Commonwealth Law Enforcement Board, based on the recommen-
dations of the 1990 report by the National Committee on Violence. The 
reforms were detailed in an historic agreement between all nine state, 
territory and Commonwealth governments, announced at an emer-
gency meeting of the Australasian Police Ministers’ Council (APMC) 
on 10 May.
The resolutions committed every state and territory to pass laws 
requiring the following: 
1. A ban on the importation, ownership, sale, resale, transfer, posses-
sion, manufacture or use of: 
•	 all self-loading centre-fire rifles, whether military-style or not
•	 all self-loading and pump-action shotguns
•	 all self-loading rim-fire rifles.
Exemptions for low-powered (rim-fire) self-loading .22s and 
pump-action shotguns would be available to primary producers 
1 Simpson L, Hayes B. ‘Sunday slaughter’, Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), 29 
April 1996: 1.
2 Sutton C, Gilmore H, Kent S. ‘He could have been stopped’, Sun Herald, 5 
May 1996: 1.
3 Elder B. Blood on the wattle: massacres and maltreatment of Australian 
Aborigines since 1788. Sydney: Child & Associates, 1988: 167.
Introduction
17
(farmers) who could satisfy police that they had a ‘genuine need’ 
which could not be achieved by some other means, or by non-pro-
hibited weapons. A further exemption was added later to permit 
some clay target shooters to own a semi-automatic shotgun. No 
other ‘sporting’ or competitive use of semi-automatic long-arms 
was to be allowed.
2. A compensatory ‘buyback’ scheme funded through an increase in 
the Medicare levy, whereby gun owners would be paid the market 
value of any prohibited guns they handed in. Owners of prohibited 
weapons would have 12 months to surrender their guns. After this 
amnesty, penalties for illegal ownership would be severe.
3. The registration of all firearms as part of an integrated shooter 
licensing scheme, maintained through the computerised National 
Exchange of Police Information (NEPI).
4. Shooter licensing based on a requirement to prove a ‘genuine reason’ 
for owning a firearm. Genuine reason could include occupational 
uses such as stock and vermin control on farms; demonstrated 
membership of an authorised target shooting club; or hunting when 
the applicant could provide permission from a rural landowner. 
The APMC agreement explicitly ruled out ‘personal protection’ or 
self-defence as a genuine reason to own a gun.
5. A licensing scheme based on five categories of firearms (A, B, C, D, 
H), minimum age of 18, and criteria for a ‘fit and proper person’. 
These criteria would include compulsory cancellation or refusal of 
licences to people who have been convicted for violence or subject 
to a domestic violence restraining order within the past five years.
6. New licence applicants would need to undertake an accredited 
training course in gun safety.
7. As well as a licence to own firearms, a separate permit would be 
required for each purchase of a gun. Permit applications would be 
subject to a 28-day waiting period to allow the licensee’s genuine 
reason to be checked.
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8. Uniform and strict gun storage requirements.
9. Firearm sales could be conducted only by or through licensed fire-
arms dealers, thus ending private and mail order gun sales. Detailed 
records of all sales would have to be provided to police.
10. The sale of ammunition would be allowed only for firearms for 
which the purchaser is licensed and limits would be placed on the 
quantity of ammunition that may be purchased in a given period.
This agreement represented the single biggest advance in gun 
control in Australian history – and possibly anywhere in the world. 
When enacted in the weeks and months ahead by Australia’s six state 
and two territory governments, these measures placed Australian gun 
laws among the most strict in the world. To gun control activists, the 
Police Ministers’ agreement was an advance of unprecedented propor-
tions, surpassing even the most remote expectations of what might be 
achieved in a single package of reforms.
To Australia’s gun lobby, the resolutions were an unrivalled 
catastrophe. Besides the restrictions brought by the new laws, the killings 
unleashed a conflagration of almost wholly negative media attention 
onto the gun lobby, and especially onto a handful of its key spokesmen, 
who strove relentlessly to block the new gun laws. Never before had 
shooters been subject to such prolonged and overwhelmingly negative 
public examination. Night after night on their televisions, Australians 
saw and heard embittered, belligerent men whose main purpose in life 
appeared to be ensuring that they could keep military-style and rapid-
fire weaponry capable of blowing apart all in its path. This was a far cry 
from any sentimental notions of rustic farmers bagging a few ducks, 
rabbits or kangaroos that many Australians might have visualised when 
the subject of shooting had arisen in the past. At worst, many of these 
men rapidly came to signify a subterranean, angry and potentially 
dangerous side of Australian life.
Bryant’s short rampage at Port Arthur marked a change in the gun 
lobby’s smug and wholly disproportionate political power in Australia. 
It irrevocably changed the way the great majority of the community saw 
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the gun lobby. These men (there were very few women – see Chapter 5) 
were seen to be more determined than ever to maintain their self-styled 
‘right’ to own semi-automatic weapons, without providing the police 
with any record of how many of these or other guns they might be hold-
ing. The contrast between those fixated on this ‘right’ and the horror 
and outrage felt by millions of Australians wanting a safer community 
could not have been more stark. As will be shown, Australia’s politi-
cians united in a rare show of support and responded to the will of the 
great majority of community that action, unprecedented in the history 
of national gun control, should be taken.
Throughout the debate the gun lobby repeatedly claimed that it 
was not to ‘blame’ for the events at Port Arthur; that its members were 
decent, law-abiding citizens who had and would not harm anyone; 
and that attempts to control guns were ‘attacking the wrong end of the 
problem’ while ignoring the ‘real causes of violence’, such as media glo-
rification of violence and the breakdown of ‘the family’. ‘Legitimate’ gun 
owners, they argued, were being punished and made to feel guilty for 
the actions of a madman. ‘Ordinary shooters’ repeatedly stated that they 
were highly affronted at being considered a potential danger to them-
selves and the community. The gun lobby insisted that the only people 
who should be denied firearms were those who could be predicted to 
commit violence (see Chapter 6). Everyone else – all ‘ordinary shooters’ 
– should be allowed open access to guns. On Monday 29 April, while 
the Port Arthur emergency was still in progress – with Martin Bryant 
keeping police at bay at the Seascape Guesthouse – a Tasmanian gun 
lobby representative spoke on national radio defending the free avail-
ability of military weapons in Tasmania.
Gun control reform
This book has two main and closely related goals. The first is an attempt 
to answer the question: ‘Why did politicians from all main parties, many 
of whom had previously opposed gun law reform, suddenly come to 
unite behind the Prime Minister’s determination to reform Australia’s 
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gun laws?’ A short and superficial answer to this question would be to 
conclude simply that Port Arthur alone justified Howard’s conviction: 
that ‘it took an act of savagery unprecedented in peacetime to produce 
a coalition of interest unprecedented in peacetime – in its breadth, its 
depth and its strength of resolve’.4 Quite obviously, the special APMC 
meeting would not have been convened, nor its task made so urgent, 
had Port Arthur not occurred.
The second goal is to give a detailed account of the ways the dis-
course on gun control was conducted in the mass media across Australia 
during the main advocacy period, lasting three months after the mas-
sacre. The main question addressed here is: ‘How did protagonists and 
opponents of gun control seek to frame or define the debate on gun 
control?’ Port Arthur made gun control almost undeniable as a political 
response because the preceding years of advocacy for gun law reforms 
had succeeded in positioning them as sensible, easily understood and 
above all the course that any decent society committed to public safety 
should adopt. When Port Arthur occurred, the seeds sown during these 
years of advocacy erupted out of an angry community who made it 
plain they would countenance no more of the political equivocation 
that had characterised gun control in the past. Suddenly, the debat-
ing frames that had been set and continually repeated throughout the 
preceding years became politically compelling, entering into countless 
public statements made by citizens and by politicians now keen to side 
with gun control. The core success of gun control arguments having 
seized the dominant debating frames, the gun control position was sus-
tained in the face of many and prolonged attempts by the gun lobby to 
recapture the debate by defining it according to the catalogue of gun 
lobby arguments about the desirability of an armed society.
Certainly there were some signs of hope before Port Arthur. The 
Federal Government had banned the importation of military style 
semi-automatic weapons in 1991, but tens and possibly hundreds of 
thousands of these guns remained in circulation. In the absence of gun 
4 Gordon M. ‘Savagery unites an unlikely coalition’, The Australian, 11 May 
1996.
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registration in three states, no-one knew where they were. A month 
before Port Arthur – and only 33 days after his election – Federal 
Attorney General Daryl Williams told The Australian, ‘I intend to 
pursue [uniform gun laws. These are] really very important. You can’t 
have one part of Australia tightly controlled only to have another part 
with lax controls.’5 Williams had previously advocated tighter gun con-
trol in his home State of Western Australia, with particular reference 
to the problem of rural youth firearm suicide. Williams may well have 
vigorously pursued national gun law reform as an early priority, but he 
would not have been the first politician to do so. Nor, most likely, the 
first to fail.
The massacre then, was almost certainly a necessary condition 
enabling Howard and Williams to smash through the political timid-
ity about gun lobby backlash that had long infected Australian politics. 
But a massacre is rarely if ever sufficient cause for wholesale legislative 
reform – as government responses to previous massacres in Australia 
and elsewhere have shown. There is a great deal of advocacy work that 
must take place before, immediately after and then well into the critical 
post-massacre period to ensure that community and political grief, out-
rage and anger translate into policy and law reform.
Some commentators suggested that the sheer magnitude of the 
Port Arthur slaughter tipped it over a critical edge and made law reform 
inevitable. By this argument, massacres involving say, four, eight or ten 
people may be horrifying and highly newsworthy, but not cataclysmic 
enough to prompt major law reform. By this view, 35 deaths lie beyond 
some macabre number that marks the boundary between political iner-
tia and action.
I reject this idea. Each year there are dozens of avoidable tragedies 
in different parts of the world involving the deaths of many people. 
These often involve airline, rail, boat or road safety; fires or building col-
lapses; major industrial explosions or mining disasters. Often the death 
toll from such events surpasses the number killed at Port Arthur, or 
previous records for numbers killed in particular circumstances. And 
5 Taylor L. ‘Uniform gun laws pursued’, The Australian, 28 March 1996.
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in many such cases, little if any real change in law or policy is made 
afterwards to reduce the chances of these events reoccurring. Where 
change does occur, it is often precipitated by such disasters. But a more 
penetrating analysis has to ask what distinguishes the social and polit-
ical climate around a disaster that leads to law or policy reform from 
the far more usual outcome: disasters leading to little or only superficial 
change.
All over the world annual death tolls caused by firearms owe little to 
mass killings. The overwhelming majority of deaths are single suicides 
and homicides, followed by dual murder-suicides and homicides. For 
example, in NSW between 1968 and 1992, there were 2,321 homicide 
incidents involving 2,544 victims – an average of 1.09 victims per inci-
dent.6 Yet internationally, major advances in gun control depend largely 
on relatively uncommon but more dramatic killings, particularly when 
these occur in public places and the victims are unknown to the per-
petrator. These infrequent events can therefore be considered critically 
important to possible advances in gun control policies. They raise ques-
tions about how gun control advocates should prepare for the dreadful 
inevitability of such incidents and, when they do occur, how advocates 
should respond to achieve a positive outcome.
Disaster plans advocacy
Hospitals and public health agencies routinely develop plans that allow 
them to respond effectively to major disasters involving large numbers 
of victims or where there is imminent threat to communities. Hospitals 
have disaster plans for contingencies such as transport crashes, major 
fires, and warfare. In public health, the disaster plan concept has been 
extended to cover hazardous events such as exposure to pathogenic 
agents, major chemical spills and leaks, the emission of toxic industrial 
gases and the inadvertent release of biologically or chemically contam-
inated food.
6 Gallagher P, Huong MTND, Bonney R. ‘Trends in homicide 1968 to 1992’, 
Crime and Justice Bulletin, 1994, 21: 1.
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I have been intrigued at the possibilities for applying the notion of 
a disaster plan in the area of advocacy, as well as in its present applica-
tion in treatment and early intervention. Major, potentially preventable 
disasters, whether they be chemical spills, vehicle pile-ups at black 
spots on the roads, building fires or collapses or – as here – violent gun 
incidents, should be anticipated and planned for by those advocating 
preventive measures. The question is, how can advocates exploit to 
advantage the huge public and political interest these disasters generate 
when they occur? How can they move the discourse on gun massacres 
beyond community outrage and on to how such massacres might be 
made less likely to occur? In the jargon of public health, how can the 
debate be moved from ‘downstream’, where the community expresses 
its grief, anger and outrage and desire to comfort victims, to ‘upstream’, 
where those so grieved and angered can feel assured that real efforts at 
prevention are being made?
From 29 April 1996 to the passage of the last new gun law in the 
Northern Territory, advocacy both supporting and attacking the pro-
posed new laws was often unrelenting. This was a critical period when 
both sides realised that enormous gains or losses were within their 
grasp. The NCGC’s efforts to harness advocacy opportunities as they 
arose became concentrated like never before – as did those of the gun 
lobby.
To some, the word ‘harness’ might connote a vulture-like attitude 
to human tragedy, with advocates waiting patiently for disasters or 
gun massacres so they might climb aboard community outrage and 
opportunistically capitalise on the misfortune of others. Some in the 
gun lobby might have even suggested that the appropriate word here is 
waiting ‘hopefully’. Gun lobbyist Roy Smith, of the Sporting Shooters 
Association of NSW, was one who took this view of gun control 
advocates: 
We are sickened by the way these do-gooders will capitalise 
on other people’s tragedies to push their own agenda. As long 
as these anti-gun academics and bureaucrats are prepared to 
use any tragedy involving firearms as a platform from which 
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to chant their anti-gun mantras, we have no chance of deal-
ing with the real problem.’7
But only those opposing gun law reform or the most politically 
myopic could take this view. If we are to learn preventive lessons from 
past disasters, there can be no place for overly respectful meekness by 
advocates when the community is most angered and demanding of 
change. Such times are simply critical to the gun control advocacy pro-
cess and require contingency plans.
The typical pattern of community and political outrage about disas-
ters follows a pattern of shock, anger, condolence to the victims and talk 
of remedial actions, culminating in referral of such plans to bureau-
crats and experts for consideration. As a 7.30 Report journalist put it: 
‘Australian massacres have a dulling familiarity. Public shock and out-
rage is soothed by assurances of tougher gun laws. But as public outcry 
dissipates, often so does political will in the face of the gun lobby.’8 In 
the period between referral to committees and special inquiries and 
the time taken for them to make their recommendations, two things 
almost invariably happen: the passage of time fades the community’s 
memory of how outraged they felt about the incident; and those oppos-
ing change do all they can to lobby governments against taking action. 
Opponents of change also seek to reframe public discourse about the 
way the massacre is defined and talked about, who should be blamed 
for it and what might be a reasonable response. As will be discussed at 
length (see particularly Chapter 6), the Australian gun lobby worked 
strenuously to define what happened in Port Arthur as being wholly 
irrelevant to gun laws. The blame, according to the gun lobby, lay with 
the authorities who had failed to recognise and control Bryant before-
hand. Plans to reform gun laws were, by this definition, entirely unjust 
and misguided. In this and many other respects, its strategy mirrored 
that of the US gun lobby, from which it derives considerable counsel.
7 SSAA. Press release. ‘Shooters slam health department survey’, 22 March 
1996.
8 McGuire F. 7.30 Report, ABC TV, 9 May 1996.
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Community voices
The sheer immensity of what happened at Port Arthur ensured that 
the volume of political and community participation in this discourse 
quite easily surpassed that emanating from the various groups in the 
organised gun control lobby. This was never going to be a routine media 
joust between two single-issue lobby groups. The role played by groups 
like the National Coalition for Gun Control (NCGC), the Australian 
Medical Association (AMA) and the Melbourne-based Gun Control 
Australia (GCA) was greatly overshadowed by the role of ordinary 
Australian citizens and the politicians who climbed out of their closets 
to become strong advocates for gun law reform. The task for the NCGC 
changed: from being virtually the only regular public commentators on 
the need for law reform, it now had to strategically maintain the nation’s 
outrage over what had happened and challenge any possibility of inad-
equate reform.
In the three months after the massacre, the volume of anger against 
the gun lobby remained so intense that whenever a gun lobby initiative 
needed a response, the public was more than obliging. This response 
included everything from ordinary people expressing their heartfelt, 
untutored reactions to gun lobby rhetoric, to those who had particu-
lar personal experiences relevant to the argument. On many occasions 
we read and heard arguments, analogies, and factual perspectives on 
gun control from people who had no connection with the NCGC. 
Frequently, we recognised these as identical to arguments and analogies 
that we and others in gun control had sown in the media in preced-
ing years on issues like gun registration, safe storage and international 
comparisons. Our past media advocacy efforts were bearing fruit in the 
form of articulate and informed public comment.
The NCGC itself was often able to play a key role in the discourse 
on gun control because we were constantly contacted by journalists to 
comment or to participate in debates. From the day of the Port Arthur 
massacre, our lives were dominated for weeks that for some grew into 
months by the media seeking comment and information. We also 
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initiated countless interviews by phoning radio and television stations 
and the press with comments on news, issuing press releases and trying 
to make ourselves constantly accessible to the media. Throughout the 
book I provide accounts of some of the ways we tried to take part in 
these discussions.
The second aim of the book, then, is to provide a detailed analysis 
of how guns, shooters and gun control were talked about in Australia 
during the three months at the height of the debate, when the politi-
cal events on gun control were most acute. This public discourse was 
conducted in the mass media between two broad camps: those who 
supported the changes John Howard sought to introduce, and those 
who were (mostly virulently) opposed to them.
The former group comprised politicians in charge of introduc-
ing and supporting the changes; the various lobby groups advocating 
gun law reform; editors, columnists, broadcasters and cartoonists who 
covered the events; and without doubt, the most powerful group of all 
– the huge section of the public who wrote into newspapers, called up 
radio discussion programs and phoned, faxed and wrote to politicians. 
Among this group were many gun owners who demonstrated either 
their indifference to or support for the new laws by their answers to 
opinion polls, their absence from the gun lobby’s protests and demon-
strations, and their eagerness to surrender their prohibited and other 
guns from the day the buyback schemes began.
Those opposed to change comprised the organised gun lobby in 
Australia, and those who belonged to its various associations or sup-
ported its objectives. Several diverse groups can be loosely grouped 
together as the collective voice seeking to oppose tough gun laws in 
Australia. Chief among these are the Sporting Shooters Association of 
Australia (SSAA) and the NSW-based Shooters’ Party. Both claim to 
be well resourced and to have large constituencies for whom guns are 
plainly a major focus of their lives. Consequently, they have an impas-
sioned and willing network of people who are very determined to 
safeguard their interests. It was these interests which had so successfully 
prevented gun law reform from proceeding after previous Australian 
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massacres. So a major task for gun control advocacy became not only 
advancing support for gun control, but also systematically eroding 
community and political support for the gun lobby and its arguments.
Structure of the book
Chapter 1 examines the Port Arthur massacre and its immediate impact 
on the Australian community, as reported in the mass media. It describes 
how the massacre was reported and what was said about its perpetrator 
in an attempt to place the enormity of this massacre in the context of 
reports of other Australian gun violence of recent times. Aspects of the 
Port Arthur reportage, and particularly of Bryant’s alleged mental state, 
held major implications for the gun control debate which followed in 
the next few months.
Chapter 1 also looks at the role of political leadership in secur-
ing gun control reforms. National reform of gun laws became the 
unplanned first major test of Prime Minister John Howard’s leadership. 
Had Howard followed the example of previous political leaders in their 
dealings with gun massacres, he could have dropped the matter into 
the abyss of the parliamentary committee process or, more predictably, 
responded that gun control was a matter for the state governments. In 
other words, he could have washed his hands of a political controversy 
and left eight state and territory governments to continue to fail to reach 
consensus on gun law reforms. Howard’s position and his determina-
tion to see it fulfilled became one of the most enduring and important 
political narratives in the months after Port Arthur. Chapter 1 reviews 
Howard’s role, and those of other political forces across Australia, 
examining particularly the U-turns taken by some who had previously 
opposed gun law reform.
Chapter 2 briefly reviews the evidence about gun violence in 
Australia and overseas. It examines the two core propositions in gun 
control: that there is a relationship between the number of guns in a 
community and the degree of gun violence in a community; and that 
governments concerned to reduce violence are therefore justified in 
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controlling access to guns. These propositions provided the bedrock on 
which the reforms rested.
Chapter 3 gives a brief history of gun control advocacy in Australia, 
describing the debate in the months prior to Port Arthur.
Chapter 4 examines the reforms agreed on in 1996 by the Police 
Ministers, which mostly passed into law as planned. It first explores the 
reasons each reform was proposed, the gun lobby’s case against each of 
them, and the ways the NCGC, the public and political supporters of 
the changes sought to promote and defend these reforms in the face of 
gun lobby opposition.
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the gun lobby in Australia and its public 
arguments about the folly of gun control. They examine their response 
to the massacre and their repertoire of arguments against gun control.
Chapter 6 analyses the key arguments the gun lobby used to oppose 
the public demand for tighter gun laws. This shows how the gun lobby 
attempted to frame the discourse about gun control, and the alternative 
frames gun control advocates sought to promote. I hope this chapter of 
the book will be most useful to people elsewhere in the world who face 
the task of gaining public and political support for gun control. I have 
set out to document the advocates’ efforts to counter the gun lobby and 
to reflect on how we might have done better.
Chapter 7 reviews examples of how the original APMC resolu-
tions were toned down as the states and territories introduced and then 
amended their legislation. It discusses several cases where state law 
reform fell disturbingly short of the original Howard plan. Finally, the 
chapter reviews two issues for future gun law reform in Australia: the 
storage of guns outside urban homes, and the need for tighter controls 
on semi-automatic handguns.
A note on source material
As mentioned above, one of the main interests in this book is how the 
media contributed to the gun control debate. I obtained a complete set 
of all press coverage on guns for the three months after the massacre 
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from: The Australian, the Bulletin, four Sydney metropolitan news-
papers (Sydney Morning Herald, Daily Telegraph, Sun Herald, Sunday 
Telegraph) and the Melbourne Age. I also obtained a three-month set 
of clips from the West Australian. When possible, I videotaped news 
reports and current affairs programs on the massacre and gun control. 
The collection here is incomplete, but contains some of the key inter-
views and reports. I could not afford even samples of the massive radio 
coverage the issue generated.
I have not attempted an exhaustive analysis. I was not interested in 
formally cataloguing the huge press coverage of the events, but set out 
to chart the dominant themes that unfolded in the discourse on gun 
control. There was a great deal of repetition of many themes and argu-
ments, and I have indicated the range of these with examples. I hope the 
analysis of the factors driving and retarding proposals for gun control in 
Australia will assist in the development of successful strategies in other 
countries.
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The massacre
History is dotted with decisive events that leave indelible marks on 
nearly everyone’s memory. The day wars are declared or end are such 
events, as are the assassinations of major world figures. Most people 
over 40 can recall exactly where they were and what they were doing 
when the news of President John Kennedy’s assassination was first 
broadcast. So momentous was that event, and so intense and prolonged 
was much of the Western world’s attempt to come to terms with the 
meaning of his murder, that it marks a special point in the memories of 
millions. The Port Arthur shootings seem destined to become another 
such event for most Australians. As one newspaper expressed it, ‘The 
cloth of our nation was torn across.’1
About 3pm on 28 April 1996, radio and television programs were 
interrupted by news flashes of a man running amok with a gun at 
Tasmania’s Port Arthur tourist site. Ironically, Roland Browne was at 
home in Hobart holding a meeting of the Tasmanian Coalition for Gun 
Control (TCGC). They were developing a strategy for gun law reform 
including semi-automatic weapons ahead of a meeting scheduled for 
the following Wednesday with the Tasmanian Police Minister. Even 
more ironically, just one month earlier the Hobart Mercury had pub-
lished a letter from Roland Browne pointing out that the Dunblane 
massacre could easily be repeated in Tasmania, because semi-automatic 
weapons were so easily obtainable in that state.
1 Anon. ‘Out of the shadow of the gun’ (editorial), Daily Telegraph, 11 May 
1996.
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I learned of the killings while at home in Sydney, reading and lis-
tening to a radio broadcast of a football match. The early radio reports 
said that several, then ten or more, had been killed. Subsequent reports 
added three, four or five more, with speculation mounting that the 
toll could go as high as 20. As the afternoon progressed, the death toll 
rapidly passed 20, rising to unbelievable levels which could only be 
compared with major bus or train crash figures. By early evening, the 
number of dead was 32. Three more bodies were discovered in the next 
two days at the burnt-out guesthouse which Martin Bryant set alight, 
and where he was arrested.
I sent the following release to all main media outlets at 4.39pm that 
day. The next day, the Coalition for Gun Control did little else but give 
interviews to the Australian and international media.
Media release
PORT ARTHUR MASSACRE
Please feel free to use the following comment regarding the 
Port Arthur massacre.
‘The Coalition for Gun Control has called on the Prime 
Minister to take immediate action and show leadership to 
prevent Australia going further down the American road of 
increasing levels of gun violence. Mr Howard must act to-
morrow to announce national uniform gun registration; a 
ban on private ownership of semi-automatics; steep annual 
licence and registration fees; and far tougher guidelines on 
who can own firearms.
State governments like Tasmania, New South Wales and 
Queensland which have no gun registration are cowering in 
political fear of the gun lobby while the whole community 
waits anxiously for the inevitable incidents like today’s. Bi-
partisan political support for uniform strong gun laws is long 
overdue but unlikely while gutless state politicians keep on 
referring gun slaughter to backroom committees.
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Opinion poll data show that over 90% of the community will 
applaud Mr Howard if he were to act decisively.’
For comment: 
Assoc. Prof. Simon Chapman (phone) Rebecca Peters (phone)
28 April 1996
It is difficult to describe the frenzied interest of the media over 
the following weeks. Those who had been active in gun control were 
besieged with requests for interviews, fielding incessant calls on our 
mobile phones. During the occasional lull, the message bank would call 
and for me, instead of the usual few messages stored, there would be up 
to 20. For several weeks after the massacre, Rebecca was getting virtu-
ally non-stop calls on two mobile phones, a pager and three phone lines. 
Most of these were from journalists seeking information for articles and 
features. On the spot in Tasmania, Roland Browne was inundated with 
calls up to midnight on the day of the massacre, with calls starting again 
with the BBC at 6am the next day.
In the days, weeks and months which followed, the Australian mass 
media devoted unprecedented time and space to the incident and to the 
many aspects of its aftermath. For days afterwards, nearly every major 
newspaper devoted several full pages to the story. The event domi-
nated radio and television news bulletins, with current affairs programs 
devoted entirely to news, background and analysis of the massacre, not 
once but several times.
It was repeatedly stated that the killings represented the worst and 
largest civilian death toll involving a single gunman anywhere in the 
world this century (‘the worst mass murder of civilians in modern 
times’, ‘a grotesque world record’). Comparisons were made with highly 
publicised massacres in the US in recent years and at Hebron, Israel, in 
1994 when Baruch Goldstein shot dead 29 Palestinians.
This massacre was larger, and of all places it happened in the sleepy, 
sylvan backwater of Tasmania, a place psychiatrist Professor Beverley 
Raphael described as an ‘innocent part of Australia’. Because Tasmania 
seemed such an unlikely location, it lent a special sub-text to the phrase, 
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‘these things can happen in the most ordinary of places’. As one news-
paper put it, ‘This is the State where nothing happens . . . this hideaway 
from the worst of the world.’2 Ironically, Tasmania had the worst record 
of gun deaths in Australia and, significantly, the weakest gun laws in the 
country (see Chapter 3).
The perpetrator
From the outset, there was immense interest in the man who had com-
mitted this atrocity. In the days after the murders, dozens of articles 
appeared in the media purporting to provide scoops on Martin Bryant, 
the man accused and later convicted. Elements in the portrait painted 
repeatedly by the media included the claim that he had been left a large 
inheritance by a woman who had herself inherited a fortune; allegations 
of his extravagant and idiosyncratic expenditure and lifestyle; and com-
ments on his upbringing and his relationships.3 Neighbours repeatedly 
described him as variously lonely, quiet or ‘like a normal person’. The 
West Australian’s page 1 summarised these descriptions in its opening 
paragraph: ‘Australia’s worst mass murderer is a rich, lonely, deluded 
29-year-old social outcast, haunted by the memory of his dead father.’4 
On the front page of The Australian on 30 April, a full-colour photo-
graph of Bryant accompanied an article claiming he slept with a pig in 
his bed and that he ‘spooked’ people who knew him.5 The Australian 
subsequently admitted to re-touching Bryant’s eyes in the photograph 
to create an intense, glaring look.
2 Darby A. ‘Nightmare shatters the island of dreams’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(SMH), 30 April 1996.
3 McGeough P, Simpson L. ‘Young, rich and out of control: the portrait of a 
lone gunman’, SMH, 30 April 1996: 1; Sutton C, Condon M, Gilmore H. ‘Silly 
Martin, the boy a town hated’, Sun Herald, 5 May 1996: 14–15; Gora B. ‘How 
to spend a fortune . . .’ Sunday Telegraph, 5 May 1996: 4.
4 Barrass T. Killer. ‘The misfit who had no pity’, West Australian, 30 April 
1996: 1.
5 Fife-Yeomans J. ‘Violent loner spooked locals’, The Australian, 30 April 
1996: 1.
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Any perpetrator of such a crime could have scarcely avoided the 
glare of those parts of the media intent on demonising the killer. But 
journalists seized on particular elements of Bryant’s alleged biogra-
phy in an attempt to match the killer with the enormity of the outrage. 
Anyone who had even the slightest acquaintance with Bryant became 
an unquestionable witness to his character. Dozens of people were 
interviewed, ranging from ex-girlfriends to neighbours and even the 
proprietor of a coffee shop he frequented.
For the purposes of a main focus of this book – analysing media 
discourse on gun control – the picture of Bryant that became the subject 
of countless discussions across the country was that he was insane, had 
given the community many opportunities to notice his eccentricities, 
and could have been ‘stopped’. This theme is taken up in greater detail 
in Chapter 6.
Repeated allegations were made about Bryant’s mental health. The 
Sun Herald claimed Martin Bryant ‘had slipped through the net of 
health authorities and police at least three times before he embarked 
on his killing orgy .  .  .’ The paper alleged he had a record of ‘known 
criminal or anti-social acts . . . stealing, violent mood swings and one 
attempt at self-immolation’. It suggested that Bryant was now suspected 
in previous unsolved and suspicious deaths6 and that a series of com-
plaints about his violent nature had been ignored.7 A Daily Telegraph 
‘investigation’ reported that Bryant had been ‘examined by doctors 
from Tasmania’s Health and Community Services and found to be suf-
fering from a personality disorder and schizophrenia’.8 This diagnosis 
was repeated in a Bulletin article.9 These reports allegedly concluded 
that he was ‘unable to handle his own affairs and would need continuing 
6 Sutton C, Gilmore H, Kent S. ‘He could have been stopped’, Sun Herald, 5 
May 1996: 1–3.
7 McGeough P. ‘Neighbours’ complaints were not recorded’, SMH, 1 May 
1996: 5.
8 Jones W. Bryant ‘Unable to handle affairs’, Sunday Telegraph, 5 May 1996: 3.
9 Murphy D. ‘Terror Australis’, The Bulletin, 7 May 1996: 18–21.
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medical treatment’10 and that the Tasmanian Supreme Court had 
ordered a trustee company to administer his inheritance lest he squan-
der it. As described in Chapter 6, it emerged at Bryant’s sentencing that 
he was not considered unfit to plead, and no details of any previous 
diagnoses of mental illness were revealed.
An illustration of the extraordinary effort the media made to por-
tray Bryant as a disaster waiting to happen was the ABC’s Four Corners 
program on the question of whether psychiatry can predict violence in 
children and young adults. The program had located archival television 
footage of Bryant as a 12-year-old in a hospital bed, having been burnt 
while using fireworks. The program included the following dialogue: 
Archive footage of 12-year-old Bryant
Bryant: I had this lighter and I had this coloured sky rocket 
and I wanted to see if the wick went quick so I lit it and it 
went fast and I tried to make it go out but I couldn’t and I . . . I 
. . . broke the stick trying to get out but I couldn’t and it made 
a hole through my jeans.
Interviewer: Do you think you’ll be playing with fire crackers 
anymore?
Bryant: Yeah.
Interviewer: Don’t you think you’ve learned a lesson from 
this?
Bryant: Yes . . . but I’m still playing with them.
Four Corners journalist: Psychiatrist Dr Rod Milton sees the 
classic signs of a psychopathic or anti-social personality dis-
order even in this short video from when Bryant was 12 years 
old.
Milton: Risk-taking behaviour and not being of much con-
cern over having taken those risks. He didn’t show much 
concern at all .  .  . no suffering .  .  . anything like that. And 
firm determination that he was going to go on and do the 
same thing again.
10 Ibid.
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Four Corners journalist: Fire-setting as a child is one of the 
key indicators Milton looks for when he’s assessing the make-
up of brutal killers.
This brief, commonplace response from a young boy that he would not 
be deterred from using fireworks again by this one incident was thus 
decoded into an ‘obvious’ sign of future psychopathology and brutality. 
If the young Bryant was asked about any pain and trauma he suffered, 
it was not broadcast. Four Corners saw a single reply to one question 
as sufficient material to formulate a diagnosis. In the rush to satisfy 
its line that Bryant’s actions might have been predicted, the program 
did not consider that the 12-year-old’s words might indicate he had 
in fact learnt from the incident and would be more careful in future. 
Apparently only a total swearing away from ever using fireworks again 
would have sufficed as a sign of normality.
This discourse assisted the gun lobby’s argument that those 
involved in gun massacres were mentally unstable, and that authori-
ties should establish a register of such people who should be prohibited 
from owning or using guns (see Chapter 6). The gun lobby also focused 
on the culpability of doctors and the police in not controlling people 
like Bryant: ‘They are going to punish everybody over the actions of 
one man who, if the Tasmanian authorities had done their job properly, 
would not have been on the loose,’ said one Queensland shooter.11
Angry scenes were reported outside the Royal Hobart Hospital 
where Bryant was first treated for burns, as well as failed attempts by 
people to enter the hospital with the presumed intent of harming or 
killing him. The editor of Australian Gun Sports had no patience for 
legal process and invited his readers to: ‘Write in and describe your pre-
ferred method of punishment to be meted out to the accused massacrer 
at Port Arthur.’12 Reporters noted that police sharpshooters had been 
‘prevented’ from shooting Bryant because he had not made any attempt 
11 Barker G. ‘Rural rebels have Coalition on the run’, Financial Review, 11 
June 1996.
12 Galea R. ‘Howard’s hidden agendas?’, Australian Gun Sports, 2 June 1996: 6.
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to escape or avoid arrest.13 These remarks were enthusiastically taken up 
by several talkback radio callers, who argued that in a decent, sensible 
society it would have been natural to shoot such a person.
Advocacy lessons
A ‘wise after the event’ phenomenon frequently follows gun massacres. 
Acquaintances and neighbours of these gunmen often report that they 
had always thought the person ‘acted strangely’ or displayed anger or 
odd behaviour. Reportage of these accounts rarely questions whether 
this behaviour was within the normal range of human behaviour or why 
little was ever done if it was so obviously remarkable. The gun lobby will 
seek to fully exploit the slightest rumour about a perpetrator’s mental 
health, seizing on such reports as if they were credible and official diag-
noses. It is in their interests to promote the view that anyone who acts 
violently with a gun could have been prevented from doing so by the 
vigilance of the community or, more particularly, by doctors and the 
police. This argument attacks solutions to gun violence directed toward 
reducing guns in the community as inappropriate, suggesting that 
authorities are using a sledgehammer to crack a walnut.
Gun control advocates should come to expect reportage that 
describes gunmen as mentally unstable, followed by attempts by the 
gun lobby to fan this into an accepted explanation of the events. While 
some high profile killers have histories of mental illness, it is far more 
common that they do not. Advocates need to be thoroughly acquainted 
with the facts on the relationship between mental health and violence. 
Chapter 6 explores this issue in further detail.
The victims
In the few days after the killings, newspapers began to publish the names 
and biographical sketches of the victims. Most newspapers published 
13 Snell S. ‘The law stopped police from shooting gunman’, Sunday Telegraph, 
5 May 1996: 5.
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whole pages showing photographs of all the victims, or their names 
beneath photographs of bullets.14 In every respect, those killed were 
a cross-section of normal, ordinary citizens. Many articles reviewed 
the impact of the shootings on the victims’ families and friends,15 the 
local Tasmanian community,16 the Tasmanian tourist industry,17 health 
workers and counsellors,18 and Bryant’s mother.19
The Mikac family
Of all the victims at Port Arthur, three were profiled more than any 
others. These were Nanette Mikac and her two daughters, Alannah 
(aged 6) and Madeline (aged 3). They had been killed while hurrying 
away from the main site of the shootings. Bryant first shot Nanette 
Mikac and Madeline and then chased Alannah behind a tree and shot 
her at point-blank range. The pastor at their funeral said Nanette Mikac 
had ‘died trying to protect her children against impossible odds.’20 The 
death of the two children and the circumstances of their murder carried 
a particular poignancy.
Their husband and father, Walter Mikac, who had been playing golf 
nearby when the shootings occurred, came ‘to symbolise the tragedy at 
14 Staff Reporters. ‘They never had a chance’, SMH, 1 May 1196: 1; Anon. ‘35 
reasons why our leaders must act’, Daily Telegraph, 2 May 1996: 1
15 Wainwright R, Connolly E. ‘Dream dies with “gentleman” ’, SMH, 1 May 
1996: 6; Hatfield L, Simpson L. ‘Maybe that is the only blessing . . . they have 
both gone together’, SMH, 1 May 1996: 6; Anon. ‘Birthday party was a date 
with death’, Daily Telegraph, 2 May 1996: 5.
16 McMillan S. ‘Heartbreak in paradise’, Sunday Telegraph, 5 May 1996: 9. 
Condon M. ‘A city cries for the dead’, Sun Herald, 5 May 1996: 2–3.
17 Darby A. ‘Tasmanian tourism dives’, The Age, 1 June 1996: A10.
18 Vass N, Harvey A. ‘Disaster services extended to the limit’, SMH, 29 April 
1996: 5; Overington C. ‘Silence masks the full scale of the horror’, SMH, 29 
April 1996: 5; Kennedy H. ‘Nothing will be the same’, Sunday Telegraph, 5 May 
1996: 5; Snell S. ‘Grieving family forgives’, Sunday Telegraph, 5 May 1996: 5.
19 Jones M, Vincent N. ‘Killer’s mother says I’m so sorry’, Daily Telegraph, 2 
May 1996: 5.
20 Freeman J. ‘1,000 mourn as tragic family is laid to rest’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
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Port Arthur’,21 with his grief at the memorial service the subject of most 
press photographers who attended.22 ‘Don’t let Walter weep in vain,’ 
wrote one woman, describing her own grief.23
Many reports covered the Mikac funeral,24 giving detailed 
descriptions of the family and its life together. A Current Affair, the 
highest-rating TV current affairs program in Australia, sent its anchor 
Ray Martin to the funeral, thus allowing the nation to attend. The words 
of those at the service were repeated in editorials: 
Hold onto your resolve to deal with this menace of unnec-
essary firearms in our society. Listen not to the loud calls of 
the few who want to selfishly keep their weapons, but instead 
hear the cries of those who have died, listen to the quiet sobs 
of those who love, see the majority and stand with them. 
Deliver to us uniform laws that will give our children the best 
possible chance to live without the fear of someone having 
access to violent power that maims and kills.25
Gun law reform thus became a form of community prayer – a 
form of absolution that the community demanded from politicians. 
One report published on the morning of the Police Ministers’ meeting 
opened with: ‘Police Ministers searching for a compelling reason to sup-
port Prime Minister Howard’s call for stronger gun control laws need 
look only at this haunting image of the Mikac family.’26 The illustration 
showed a drawing made by one of the dead girls. Weeks later Walter 
Mikac told the media at a NCGC press conference that after he saw 
the bodies of his family on the roadside, ‘I sometimes feel that maybe I 
should have taken a photo and sent that to [the gun lobby’s leaders] to 
21 Bearup G. ‘How can I keep living without them?’, SMH, 1 May 1996: 7; 
Nolan S. ‘Grief of one spoke for all’, The Age, 10 May 1996: A6.
22 For example: ‘Jones M. ‘Sorrow we’ve never known’, Daily Telegraph, 2 May 
1996: 2–3.
23 Mitchell DE. ‘Paradise lost’ (letter), SMH, 8 May 1996: 16.
24 For example: Freeman J, op. cit.
25 Anon. ‘A victory for the PM and the people’, The Age, 11 May 1996: A24.
26 Dunleavy S. ‘For their sake’, Daily Telegraph, 10 May 1996.
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see if that made any difference. But with their methods of thinking, I 
somehow doubt it.’27
An Age editorial praising the 10 May Police Ministers’ agreement 
concluded: ‘Yesterday our political leaders honoured the wishes of the 
Australian people – and the memory of Nanette Mikac, her daughters, 
and all the other victims of the Port Arthur massacre.’28
Victims and witnesses speak up
Eyewitnesses to the shootings and those injured were also prominent in 
the reportage. Some survivors gave graphic accounts of the shootings.29 
A woman who had much of one arm shot away discharged herself from 
hospital to join a Melbourne gun control march. Her photo accom-
panied a page 1 story in the Age.30 Relatives of the dead spoke to gun 
control rallies in Melbourne,31 Brisbane and Adelaide.
One of the most memorable accounts was from a middle-aged 
nurse, Lynne, who had attended those still barely alive in the devas-
tation of the Broad Arrow Café.32 ABC TV’s 7.30 Report ran a lengthy 
interview with Lynne which was replayed many times and later won an 
award for excellence in current affairs TV. The interview was intensely 
moving and generated many letters to newspapers and extensive radio 
discussion.
27 Darby A. ‘The father who lost all warns of betrayal’, The Age, 20 July 1996: 
A7.
28 Anon. ‘A victory for the PM and the people’, The Age, 11 May 1996: A24.
29 Wainwright R, Freeman J, Pitt H. ‘Man played dead to save two women’, 
SMH, 1 May 1996: 7; Tippet G, Rule A. ‘I felt guilty because I still had 
my man’, Sun Herald, 5 May 1996: 16–17; ‘Gora B. Family’s night of fear’, 
Sunday Telegraph, 5 May 1996: 7; Barrass T. ‘Witness tells of his terror’, West 
Australian, 30 April 1996: 7.
30 Winkler T. ‘Survivor leaves hospital to make her point’, The Age, 3 June 
1996: 1.
31 Dow S. ‘A sister in pain fights the guns’, The Age, 3 June 1996: A4.
32 Anon. ‘Nurse tells of terror’, SMH, 1 May 1996: 6.
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In what were called instances of ‘searing intensity’ and ‘unpractised 
but touching speeches’,33 some of those most personally affected by 
the massacre spoke publicly in support of gun control, against the gun 
lobby34 and commented despairingly about the wavering that took place 
in some states after the 10 May Police Ministers’ agreement.35 After a 
Tasmanian politician joked in the Tasmanian Parliament about bury-
ing guns, speaking about ‘holes all around my garden’, Nanette Mikac’s 
father wrote to a Tasmanian newspaper: ‘I dearly wish that a certain 
gun, used at Port Arthur, had been placed under the ground long before 
we had to place my daughter and two granddaughters in that position.’ 
Not surprisingly, the gun lobby always failed to respond directly to the 
statements of victims and their loved ones, allowing the weight of their 
words to resonate unchallenged.
Virginia Handmer, mother of 15-year-old Dali Handmer-Pleshet, 
who had been shot dead by a bullet from a semi-automatic rifle in 1993, 
near Mudgee in New South Wales, spoke about her daughter’s killing 
at a CGC rally on 4 May at Hyde Park, Sydney. On the three-month 
anniversary of the Port Arthur killings on 28 July, survivors and rela-
tives of the dead laid flowers on the steps of the Victorian Parliament36 
and spoke at another gun control rally in Sydney. Walter Mikac spoke 
at the Sydney rally. Earlier in July, at his initiative, he supported the 
Tasmanian CGC by speaking at a press conference in Hobart when the 
TCGC called for a referendum should the states fail to carry out the 
Police Ministers’ resolutions.37 He later laid roses on the steps of the 
Tasmanian Parliament, while inside some conservative parliamentari-
ans argued for loopholes in the new gun laws.38
33 Darby A. ‘One hundred days of controversy’, SMH, 6 August 1996: 13.
34 Anon. ‘For survivors,friends the pain is still there’, The Age, 10 May 1996: A6.
35 Anon. ‘Mixed emotions and opinions from those close to Port Arthur’, The 
Age, 19 July 1996: A7.
36 Pegler T, Faulkner J. ‘Three months on, the grief of Port Arthur endures’, 
The Age, 29 July 1996: A4.
37 Darby A. ‘The father who lost all warns of betrayal’, The Age, 20 July 1996: A7.
38 Farouque F, Darby A. ‘Owners able to sell guns overseas’, The Age, 24 July 
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Survivors of previous massacres were reported to be distressed by 
the Port Arthur massacre, phoning mental health hotlines at rates of up 
to 30 a day.39 Some were contacted for media statements. For example, 
Frank Carmody, who was shot five times in Melbourne’s 1987 Queen 
Street massacre, said of the new gun laws: ‘I think it’s really wonderful. 
It’s taken a long time, but at least they’ve got it all together.’40
Among the thousands who wrote to newspapers and called talk-
back radio programs were many who had personally suffered from gun 
violence in domestic situations, bank robberies and sieges.41 Typical of 
these was the story of a young man whose mother had been shot dead 
by an armed robber.42 The Sydney Morning Herald was so inundated 
with such letters that as well as publishing several, it ran a feature article 
profiling three of the writers. These included people who had been held 
hostage, women threatened over many years by violent husbands who 
menaced them with threats such as, ‘I’m leaving . . . I’ll shoot the lot of 
you’, and a teacher whose class included a girl shot in the Strathfield 
massacre.43 Doctors wrote about attending gunshot victims44 and about 
patients who had told them of threats of violence from men with guns.45 
Such letters lent not only authenticity to the public debate but also a 
sense that gun violence was not something bizarre that happened only 
to ‘others’.
1996: A3.
39 Anon. ‘Hotlines busy’, Sunday Telegraph, 5 May 1996: 5.
40 Farouque F, McKay S. ‘Angry shooters plan a $1 million protest’, The Age, 
11 May 1996: A6.
41 Maurice S. ‘Lobby defies logic’ (letter), Daily Telegraph, 18 May: 12; Mulligan 
BL. ‘Average lunatic’ (letter), Sunday Telegraph, 19 May 1996: 134.
42 Ryan R. ‘A “silent” majority’, Daily Telegraph, 3 June 1996: 5.
43 Gripper A. ‘The legacy of fear’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
44 Gotis-Graham I. ‘Memories of Strathfield revived’ (letter), SMH, 11 May 
1996: 36.
45 Beveridge H. ‘Police should act on acts of violence’ (letter), The Age, 7 May 
1996: A14
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Advocacy lessons
Politicians, gun control lobbyists and the general public have a great 
deal to say about gun control after massacres. But people who have been 
injured, who lose loved ones and who survive or witness violent incidents 
can bring an invaluable authenticity to such comments. Journalists will 
do all they can to seek out such people. As one said, ‘Experts are fine, but 
they’re not actually a living thing.’ Gun control advocates should seek 
to contact survivors of shootings and relatives and friends of those who 
died. Through their personal tragedies, many of these people become 
passionate advocates for gun control. The Dunblane Snowdrop group 
in Scotland was formed by a group of people including some who had 
friends in and associations with the town of Dunblane. They collected 
more than 700,000 signatures after the Dunblane massacre, and are per-
haps the best example of this. The views of such people on gun control 
will be eagerly sought by the media after public shootings or for policy 
debates. Advocacy groups should keep contact details of such people, 
noting their willingness to speak to the media.
Of course, the gun lobby occasionally convinces victims to support 
its cause, calling for retribution against criminals as the best solution 
to violence. One memorable speaker in support of the gun lobby was 
a former security guard, confined to a wheelchair by spinal injuries 
incurred when he was shot during a robbery. He proclaimed at a Sydney 
rally and on 60 Minutes: ‘I don’t blame the gun – the gun had nothing 
to do with this! I’ve never seen a gun that loaded itself!’ Gun control 
advocates should not therefore assume all victims of gun violence will 
automatically support stricter laws. Many people who have been per-
sonally affected are understandably angry about their loss and suffering 
and become strong advocates for capital punishment and other punitive 
responses. In an arena where clarity of communication is at a premium, 
there is a risk that their hopes for retribution can come to dominate 
their concern for gun control. This can place them in unwitting partner-
ships with the demands of the gun lobby who may seek to build explicit 
or implied alliances with such victims to the detriment of a gun control 
agenda.
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The gun laws
The Port Arthur massacre focused the national and international 
spotlight on Australia’s weak gun laws. This went way beyond an exam-
ination of only Tasmania’s feeble gun laws. In a country where the laws 
are different in every state, the system of gun control is only as strong as 
the weakest link. Two days after the massacre The Australian published 
an article by Rebecca Peters describing the problem: 46
Here’s how weak our weakest guns laws are. In Tasmania if 
you’re an adult without major criminal convictions in the 
past eight years, you qualify for a licence to buy or own as 
many guns as you like. No need to prove you’ve got a legiti-
mate reason to own a gun. No need to show police that you 
have appropriate storage facilities. And your licence lasts for 
life, as long as you update the photograph every 10 years.
Down at the local gun shop, your plain, ordinary gun licence 
entitles you to buy military-style semi-automatic weapons 
designed to mow down enemy soldiers on the battlefield. 
Remember, there’s no limit on the number you can buy.
When you make your purchase, no record is kept by any gov-
ernment department. So if you later had a mind to sell one 
of your guns to a mate who didn’t happen to hold a licence, 
no government department would ever be the wiser. Once 
you leave the gun shop, you can also leave the State. Take 
your gun to the mainland and expose the rest of Australia 
to the danger created by Tasmania’s half-hearted pretence of 
regulation.
Those of us who live in other parts of Australia cannot derive 
much comfort from local ministerial reassurances that their 
States’ gun laws are stricter than Tasmania’s. The fact is we’re 
one country, we travel a lot, guns are easily transportable, 
and bullets rip apart human bodies just as easily, regardless 
of postcode.
46 Peters R. ‘Half-hearted pretence of conflicting gun laws’, The Australian, 30 
April 1996: 15.
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The article outlined three cardinal points needed to improve 
Australia’s gun laws: registration of all guns; proof of reason for gun 
ownership; and a ban on semi-automatics. Ten days later this was the 
core of what was delivered through the Police Ministers’ national agree-
ment. This newspaper article was photocopied and circulated widely 
among journalists and political advisers because it summarised briefly, 
and in plain English, what the legal problem was and how it could be 
solved.
The political response
The Port Arthur massacre presented John Howard – a newly elected 
leader barely settled into the prime ministerial role – with his first seri-
ous challenge. It was one that had been merely hinted at in the electoral 
promises made only weeks before: in Howard’s pre-election televised 
debate with then Prime Minister Paul Keating, Howard had declared 
his wish to control military firearms. There were many political options 
available to Howard, including those taken by previous national and 
state political leaders responding to gun massacres. As all aspects of gun 
law (except importation) are state rather than federal responsibilities, 
Howard could have followed the example of previous prime ministers 
such as Bob Hawke, electing to express outrage, offer condolence and 
predictably urging the states to reform their laws.
In the decade before the Port Arthur killings, there had been 
13 gun massacres in Australia and New Zealand which involved 
the death of five or more people.47 With the exception of the Hawke 
Labor Government’s ban on imports of military-style semi-automatics 
(MSSAs), prime ministers and their governments had taken little action 
beyond urging state reviews of laws and placing gun law reform on the 
agenda of various federal/state committees for discussion. For example, 
47 For full details see http://www.health.su.oz.au/cgc/fp_6_2_2.htm [no 
longer active, 2013; ‘Australia – gun facts, figures and the law’ is a useful 
source of statistical data: http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/cp/
australia].
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the Hawke Labor Government established the National Committee on 
Violence in response to the Hoddle and Queen Street massacres. The 
1990 report from this committee48 recommended 25 reforms, very few 
of which had been taken up by any state or territory by the time of the 
Port Arthur shootings. By late 1995, six months before Port Arthur, the 
Australasian Police Ministers Council had drafted a set of resolutions 
for uniform gun laws which were barely stronger than the existing laws 
in the weakest jurisdictions.49 The resolutions had been decided after 
consultation with relevant ‘interest groups’, namely the gun lobby. No 
consultation had occurred with the public health community or any 
group representing the 80–90% of Australians who have consistently 
supported tighter gun laws.
Not down the American path . . .
Prime Minister Howard convened a press conference the morning after 
the massacre and gave strong hints that his own performance would be 
markedly different to previous gun law reform rhetoric. His personal 
commitment to overseeing gun law reform became explicit within 
days when he announced the emergency meeting of the Australasian 
Police Ministers Council.50 Howard had signalled his interest in gun 
law reform in one of his ‘headland’ speeches, made as Leader of the 
Opposition on 6 June 1995. In that speech he referred to gun violence in 
the United States, saying that Australia needed to ‘learn the bitter lesson 
of the United States regarding guns . . . Whilst making proper allowance 
for legitimate sporting and recreational activities and the needs of our 
rural community, every effort should be made to limit the carrying of 
guns in Australia.’
48 National Committee on Violence. Violence: directions for Australia 
(Duncan Chappell, Chair). Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 
1990.
49 Australasian Police Ministers Council. National Uniformity in Firearms 
Legislation. Draft APMC Resolutions (Final Draft), 26 September 1995.
50 Farr M. ‘PM vows a nation wide ban on rifles’, Daily Telegraph, 2 May 
1996: 4.
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This reference to the United States became a central element of all 
advocacy for the new gun laws: again and again, political leaders, media 
commentators and ordinary people said that Australia ‘must not to go 
down the American path’ of gun culture and violence. Years of news 
reports detailing the US homicide rate, muggings, a seemingly inter-
minable series of gun massacres, and frequent TV documentaries on 
American gun culture had given Australians a strong sense of America 
going down a violent road of no return. People who had lived and 
worked in the US wrote to newspapers describing the mayhem of street 
gunfights they had witnessed.51
The ‘down the American path’ catchcry had been used for many 
years by gun control groups in Australia and now it was picked up again 
by the Prime Minister who, along with editorial writers, made it the 
core explanation of his actions, repeating it many times: 
[This decision] means that this country through its govern-
ments has decided not to go down the American path, but 
this country has decided to go down another path.52
The governments of Australia decided that this country was 
not to go down the American path, that we would strike a 
great blow for the future safety of our suburbs, our provincial 
towns and our cities.53
There is a deep feeling within the Australian community that 
we have a historic opportunity to ensure that this nation does 
not go down the American path and we have an opportunity 
to deliver on that hope and aspiration.54
In the United States a culture in favour of gun ownership 
has allowed firearms to spread out of all proportion to real 
51 Townsend S. ‘Reducing firepower will make us safer’ (letter), SMH, 9 May 
1996: 14.
52 Howard J. ‘Statement at press conference’, ABC TV News, 10 May 1996.
53 Chan G, Gordon M. ‘Howard victory on gun bans’, The Australian, 11 May 
1996: 1; Rees P. ‘Shooters call crisis talks’, Sunday Telegraph, 12 May 1996.
54 Riley M. ‘Howard set for victory on guns’, SMH, 22 July 1996: 1.
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need, putting American society more or less at ransom to the 
menace of the destructive power of . . .55
We were echoing the path of American society and we have 
now turned back on that.56
Australia has taken a far-reaching decision to reject the Unit-
ed States’ approach to gun control.57
The main task is to make sure Australia does not go down 
the route taken by the United States, where the proliferation 
of guns has reached extreme and frightening levels under the 
auspices of a gun lobby that has intimidated many legislators 
into virtual impotence on this issue.58
We’re moving away from the US-style gun culture in our 
community.59
In the USA, we see the consequences of the lack of proper 
gun laws in a 14-in-100,000 murder rate, seven times the UK 
rate. Mr Howard has said he will not tolerate US-style intim-
idation by a too-powerful gun lobby.60
There was perhaps no better sign of just how out of touch the gun 
lobby was with the mood of the Australian people than when it lamely 
sought to turn the tables on the ‘down the American path’ reference 
in December 1996. In an SSAA recruitment pamphlet letterboxed 
throughout Australia, the opening line was: ‘It’s John Howard’s gun 
laws that are taking Australia down the American path.’61 The pamphlet 
55 Anon. ‘Making gun laws work’ (editorial), SMH, 23 July 1996: 12.
56 McLean L. ‘Bans opposition turns to support’, The Australian, 11 May 
1996.
57 Anon. ‘Historic pact on gun reforms’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
58 Anon. ‘The people expect new gun laws’ (editorial), Weekend Australian, 
22–23 June 1996: 20.
59 Dunleavy S. ‘Lobby warns of black market’, Daily Telegraph, 11 May 1996.
60 Anon. ‘Holding the line on guns’, (editorial) The Age, 4 June 1996: A12.
61 SSAA. Gun control: the facts. Is Australian going down the American path? 
Pamphlet, December 1996.
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stated, ‘over 20,000 gun laws in the USA . . . have not worked in reducing 
crime there.’ Curiously, the SSAA failed to mention the primary reason 
why the American laws have failed: they are not uniform between states 
or even between local council areas.
As senior Australian journalist Mike Steketee wrote: ‘The greatest 
achievement that can flow from Port Arthur .  .  . is that the American 
gun culture which is nascent in this country is eradicated; that owning 
a gun is a privilege, not a right; and that reducing the murder rate is 
more important than the contrived objections to disarming the civilian 
population.’62 Chapter 2 describes the extent of gun violence in the US, 
contrasting it with nations like the United Kingdom and Japan, which 
have different policies on gun control.
Leadership
From the day after the Port Arthur massacre, Howard and his Attorney-
General, Daryl Williams, became the central figures advocating gun law 
reform. As an Age editorial expressed it, Howard began by ‘appoint-
ing himself chief spokesman for the anti-gun lobby’.63 Daryl Williams 
– described as ‘studious-looking and quietly spoken . . . not a bar room 
brawler’, ‘too legal, too logical, too polite, too right’ and having the 
gently deprecating nickname of ‘Rowdy’ – had been ‘catapulted into an 
alien world of pump-action shotguns, rim-fire .22s and heavy assault 
weapons’.64 Together, the two men stood like principled and determined 
Davids against the angry and threatening Goliath of the gun lobby.
With immediate and unequivocal support from the Labor party 
(‘The Federal Opposition will do everything it can to support the mea-
sures’65), the Greens and the Australian Democrats (which had both 
62 Steketee M. ‘Culture of violence demands tight controls’, The Australian, 11 
May 1996.
63 Anon. ‘A victory for the PM and the people’, The Age, 11 May 1996: A24.
64 M. ‘Howard’s gun gamble’, SMH, 11 May 1996; Chan G. ‘Pragmatist 
prepares to convince the states on gun control’, The Australian, 10 May 1996.
65 McLean L. ‘Bans opposition turns to support’, The Australian, 11 May 
1996.
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always advocated tougher gun laws), gun control in Australia suddenly 
became a mainstream political priority.
The near-unanimous political support extended well into the 
heartland of the electorate. Many non-Liberal voters expressed their 
admiration for Howard and for the rare political maturity the issue had 
generated: ‘I have voted Labor all my life, but at this time, I have nothing 
but admiration for Prime Minister Howard . . . for once, political differ-
ences are buried by concern for the safety of Australia.’66
It is impossible to overestimate how much the leadership of Howard 
and Williams contributed to the successful outcome. On the night of 
the 10 May Police Ministers’ meeting, Howard reflected: ‘This is an 
agreement I don’t think that anybody would have thought remotely 
achievable three weeks ago or even a few days ago.’ But as his first signif-
icant political challenge, gun control became a test he could not afford 
to lose. This point was repeatedly noted by the media: ‘Mr Howard 
has staked his leadership authority on achieving nationwide gun con-
trol .  .  .’67 Equally noteworthy was his dogged resolve to see through 
the reforms he demanded in the face of the political risks involved. 
Howard’s language, and commentary describing his leadership, were 
spiked with aggressive and militaristic turns of phrase: 
I will not retreat an inch from the national responsibilities I 
have in this issue. Not an inch.68
[Howard had] drawn a line in the sand.69
There was no question Howard had to strike fast.70
It was John Howard’s plan and he dared anyone to reject it.71
66 Daniel H. ‘Admiration for PM’s lead’ (letter), The Age, 10 May 1996.
67 Dunleavy S. ‘For their sake’, Daily Telegraph, 10 May 1996.
68 Howard J. Channel 7 News, 30 April 1996.
69 Millett M. ‘Howard’s gun gamble’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
70 Ibid.
71 Kitney G. ‘PM’s personal triumph becomes his symbol of authority’, SMH, 
11 May 1996.
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Howard vowed to ‘bury’ any State which blocked the push 
for a national gun control code.72
His performance evoked the quietly spoken schoolboy who is being 
cajoled and bullied but has the courage to defy all threats. The media 
were intrigued by Howard’s obvious personal dedication to the issue. 
Many reports noted his grief at the massacre: ‘Colleagues say he was 
clearly distraught . . . his eyes red-rimmed, his face still registering shock 
. . .’73 The television pictures of a plainly moved Howard confirmed his 
persona as an ‘ordinary Australian’. An intriguing juxtaposition was cre-
ated between his reputation as a somewhat grey character and the force 
of his convictions on gun law reform: 
Howard, portrayed as weak and an ideologue as Opposition 
Leader, has displayed authority and pragmatism as Prime 
Minister.74
His style is rarely frightening, dramatic or spectacular. In 
time it may even come to be considered boring. But for the 
moment at least, Mr Howard is seen to be honest, workman-
like . . .75
For his political bravery . . . the Prime Minister deserves con-
gratulations.76
Howard repeatedly claimed his demands for gun law reform came 
from the heartland of ‘middle Australia’. He did not hector or adopt an 
overt campaigning mode. Rather, his style embodied a dignified deter-
mination to see his reforms through. He avoided framing the changes 
he was attempting to enact as in any way radical, world-beating or pio-
neering. Instead, he presented them as changes any ordinary, decent 
72 Millett M. ‘Howard’s gun gamble’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
73 Ibid.
74 Steketee M. ‘Culture of violence demands tight controls’, The Australian, 11 
May 1996.
75 Anon. ‘Mr Howard’s first hundred days’, The Age, 8 June 1996: A22.
76 Anon. ‘A worthwhile victory on guns’ (editorial), The Age, 24 July 1996: 
A12.
The massacre
53
person would see as necessary. On the eve of the Police Ministers’ meet-
ing, Howard stated in Parliament that his radical reform position was 
not ‘an ambit claim. It represents what we believe to be the collective 
aspiration of the Australian people . . .’77 In his speech on the night of the 
10 May agreement, Howard stated: ‘I think we have done good work for 
the future of Australia today . . . We have done something that will send 
a signal to people all around this country that ours is not a gun culture, 
ours is a culture of peaceful cooperation.’78
As Geoff Kitney, a senior writer for the Sydney Morning Herald 
suggested: ‘Any backlash from gun owners will be overwhelmed by 
the gratitude of ordinary people who will be hopeful that the Howard 
reforms will give them a safer future.’79 Howard, he wrote, was ‘the 
ordinary people’s leader’ who had been able to achieve the agreement 
because he had ‘effectively mobilis[ed] the ordinary people’s power.’
Another ironic aspect of Howard’s stance was that he was first and 
always a conservative, anti-regulatory politician in matters of social 
policy. An unnamed politician said, 
The fact is no-one could have ever believed that a conserva-
tive government could have ever come this far in reforming 
gun control laws. Even if there is still some dispute at the 
margin, we are still going to come out with Australia’s first 
comprehensive set of national gun laws.80 
Howard ‘believes in deregulation and getting government out of the 
lives of people; yet he has just imposed some of the most restrictive 
and intrusive regulations ever imposed on hundreds of thousands of 
Australians.’81 This irony underscored the exceptional nature of the event 
77 Millett M, Lagan B. ‘PM’s final plea on guns’, SMH, 10 May 1996; Millett 
M. ‘Howard’s gun gamble’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
78 Millett M. ‘A victory for sanity.’ SMH, 11 May 1996: 1.
79 Kitney G. ‘PM’s personal triumph becomes his symbol of authority’, SMH, 
11 May 1996.
80 Millett M. ‘Howard’s gun gamble’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
81 Steketee M. ‘Culture of violence demands tight controls’, The Australian, 11 
May 1996.
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and the corresponding need for an exceptional policy response which 
married ‘decency’ with uniqueness. Mike Steketee in The Australian 
suggested: ‘This is Howard’s version of Richard Nixon’s trip to China 
– a pragmatic response, taken in the national interest but contrary to 
normal expectations.’82
This decisive action by a conservative politician caused some great 
amusement: 
You’ve got to laugh! Just thinking about all those flak-jack-
eted weekend Rambos stockpiling their weapons to protect 
their freedom from that homosexual, drug-taking, god-
less, pinko, long-haired, commie, Hawke-Keating Socialist, 
Zionist, nigger-lovin’, dole-bludging, fat-arsed excuse-for-a-
government, and then whoa! Lo and behold, it’s the Howard 
Government which takes away their guns! It’s exquisite!83
But Howard did not convince the Shooters Party’s John Tingle of 
his sincerity. Tingle tried to explain to shooters that Howard was in fact 
a far left-wing ideologue, telling the Sydney pro-gun rally on 15 June: 
‘Understand this has nothing to do with guns. This is not about public 
health or public safety or guns. It’s a political agenda from the far left 
outfield. What it’s about is control!’84
Howard was not alone in abandoning his non-interventionist prin-
ciples. Media personalities more commonly aligned with the political 
right – radio hosts like Stan Zemanek, Alan Jones, John Laws, Howard 
Sattler and the journalist Piers Akerman – all took a strong anti-gun 
position and most of them maintained it throughout the months-long 
aftermath of the first APMC meeting. John Laws, with Australia’s larg-
est radio audience broadcasting to more than 2.5 million people a day, 
was particularly tenacious in his support and apparently received sev-
eral threats from shooters.85 The rabid gun magazine Lock, Stock and 
82 Ibid.
83 Ellis G. Letter, The Australian, 18–19 May 1996: 20.
84 Channel 9 TV News, 15 June 1996.
85 Safe M. ‘Laws and order’, The Australian Magazine, 7–8 December 1996: 
12–19.
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Barrel paid Laws the ultimate tribute by caricaturing him in Nazi uni-
form along with Hitler and Howard on the cover of their first post–Port 
Arthur issue, above the caption ‘Tyrants comparing notes’.
Journalist Geoff Kitney wrote that the leadership Howard displayed 
over the issue was unprecedented in Australian political history: ‘John 
Howard yesterday marked himself as the leader who has probably 
changed the nation’s future more decisively, more quickly than any 
prime minister before him.’ He said gun control would henceforth 
‘be long regarded as the symbol of John Howard’s prime ministerial 
authority’.86 The Age declared, ‘Beyond question, the finest hour in the 
Prime Minister’s first three months in office coincided with the nation’s 
darkest hour.’87 These comments were mirrored in the Daily Telegraph’s 
editorial: ‘No matter what he does in the remainder of his term as Prime 
Minister, he will do no more important work than this.’88
To the Sydney Morning Herald, the decision was ‘historic’ because 
it ‘put public safety ahead of political self-interest’.89 It was compared 
to ‘the introduction of seat belts, public sewerage systems and hygiene 
education’.90 On 11 May The Age ran a banner headline, ‘The historic 
bans’, over its pages reviewing the agreement. Other comments on the 
portent of the decision included: ‘To the credit of the Prime Minister, 
Premiers and police ministers, there was no back down yesterday, no 
kowtowing to the noisy protests of the gun lobby . . .’91
‘The days of licensed gun owners assiduously assembling arsenals 
of weapons without any hindrance are gone.’92
86 Kitney G. ‘PM’s personal triumph becomes his symbol of authority’, SMH, 
11 May 1996.
87 Anon. ‘Mr Howard’s first hundred days’ (editorial), The Age, 8 June 1996: 
A22.
88 Anon. ‘Out of the shadow of the gun’, (editorial), Daily Telegraph, 11 May 
1996.
89 Anon. ‘Historic pact on gun reforms’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
90 Chatterton P.’ Show a bit of courage’ (letter), SMH, 21 July 1996: 12.
91 Anon. ‘Out of the shadow of the gun’ (editorial), Daily Telegraph, 11 May 
1996.
92 Ibid.
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Threat of a referendum
After the 10 May Police Ministers’ meeting, three states (Queensland, 
South Australia and Western Australia) and the Northern Territory 
became the sites of prolonged debates and lobbying that sought to 
weaken and relax several of the resolutions, broaden definitions and 
amend provisions. The proposal to allow ‘crimping’ of whole categories 
of guns listed for banning (see Chapter 4), became a particular point of 
pressure on the Federal Government.
Fearing disintegration of the national resolve, the Prime Minister 
threatened to hold a national referendum if all parties to the agreement 
failed to introduce the laws they had promised on 10 May.93 He set a 
deadline of 22 July for all states and territories to fall into line on the 
crimping issue, threatening a referendum if they failed to agree. The 
referendum question would have sought the electorate’s permission to 
alter the constitution so as to transfer the power to make gun laws from 
the states to the Commonwealth Government. All opinion polls indi-
cated that in each state the majority support required for this would 
have been very easily obtained, particularly since the reforms had the 
full support of the Federal Labor Opposition. Howard thus held a very 
powerful card, and was volubly supported by NSW Premier Bob Carr94 
who had earlier sought to transfer all gun control powers to the Federal 
Government. One commentator described the referendum threat as 
Howard ‘arming himself with the political equivalent of a nuclear weap-
on’.95 Knowing that a referendum would be easily won and that it would 
cost the community $50 million, the Northern Territory’s chief minister 
admitted that it would have been ‘reckless and irresponsible’ for any 
state or territory government to force a referendum. Howard got his 
way before the deadline he set.96
93 Millett M. ‘Referendum threat over gun deadlock’, SMH, 18 July 1996: 1.
94 Humphries D. ‘Carr to support people’s gun vote’, SMH, 16 July 1996: 9.
95 Millett M. ‘PM’s gun ploy may backfire’, SMH, July 19 1996: 17.
96 Millett M, Roberts G, Graham D. ‘Official: guns victory to PM’, SMH, 23 
July 1996: 1.
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A Sydney Morning Herald editorial nonetheless suggested bluntly: 
‘In some ways it will be a pity if Australians are denied the opportunity 
of voting . . . A referendum would destroy the political power of the gun 
lobby in this country once and for all.’97
Prime Minister in bullet-proof vest
Howard’s strong leadership on the issue was maintained throughout 
the months after the Police Ministers’ agreement, before the states and 
territories introduced their legislation. On 15 June, as the first stop on 
a much-publicised tour of Australia’s rural heartlands to sell the gun 
reforms,98 Howard spoke at a 3000-strong pro-gun rally at Sale in rural 
Victoria.99 On security advice he wore a bullet-proof vest underneath 
his suit. As he faced the crowd, who jeered and taunted him with cries 
of ‘Nazi’, ‘Fascist’ and ‘Heil Hitler!’, and signs reading ‘Gun Culture Safer 
than Canberra Poofter Culture – Only Woosies Hand in Guns’, the 
contours of the bullet-proof vest were plainly visible to TV and press 
cameras. Much was made about this being the first occasion that any 
Australian politician had taken such precautions and what this implied 
about the violent propensities of some gun owners.
The Prime Minister’s appearance in the vest inspired many letters to 
the press, debating whether it was a symbol of his courage, cowardice or 
folly.100 While the SSAA’s Ted Drane predictably described the vest as ‘an 
insult’,101 all editorials described his visit as ‘courageous’ and once again 
97 Anon. ‘Referendum on gun laws’, SMH, 19 July 1996: 16.
98 Grattan M, Savva N. ‘Howard to tour rural areas to sell gun laws’, The Age, 
6 June 1996: A5.
99 Farr M, Miranda C. ‘Why he wore it’, Daily Telegraph, 18 June 1996: 1; 
Wright T. ‘PM dons anti-shrapnel jacket to face gun protesters’, SMH, 17 June 
1996: 1; Gordon M. ‘PM braves angry gun crowd’, The Australian, 17 June 
1996.
100 Bennett C. ‘A hysterical reaction’ (letter), The Age, 19 June 1996: 14; 
Graham M. ‘Sad to see PM in a bullet-proof vest’ (letter), The Age, 19 June 
1996: 14.
101 Anon. ‘What they said about Mr Howard’, Daily Telegraph, 18 June 1996: 4.
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focused on the ‘lunatic fringe’ among the gun lobby102 (see Chapter 5). 
One journalist observed that the incident provided a new type of cou-
rageous role model: ‘At a time when courage is in short supply and we 
lament the lack of role models for our young, the sight of John Howard, 
hands outstretched in front of a hostile crowd, was inspiring. Shortish, 
balding, bespectacled and physically unimposing, he didn’t look like a 
classic hero. But hero he is.’103 This writer also described a farmer who 
attended the rally on 15 June and defied the crowd by shouting support 
for Howard.
A public opinion poll conducted on the same weekend found that 
Howard’s personal popularity in country regions had risen to 66%, up 
six percentage points from May (also after Port Arthur) and higher than 
his 63% city rating.104 The next day in Federal Parliament, Howard said 
he would visit other rural areas: 
I intend to undertake a number of other visits to do what I 
endeavoured to do yesterday, and that is to explain in direct 
and simple terms the reasons why the Government has taken 
this decision. I think it is part and parcel of the role of a polit-
ical leader not to be deskbound on issues such as this. You do 
have an obligation to go around the country, particularly to 
regional and rural areas.105 
But Howard did not undertake any more of these visits – perhaps 
because his advisers suggested they were unnecessary in the face of the 
huge public support he enjoyed.
102 Anon. ‘The PM in armour’ (editorial), SMH, 18 June 1996: 16; Anon. 
‘Democracy at work’ (editorial), The Age, 18 June 1996: A14.
103 Devine M. ‘Modest heroes defy the bullies’, Daily Telegraph, 18 June 1996: 
4.
104 Wright T, Roberts G, Lagan B. ‘Qld breaks ranks on gun control’, SMH, 
18 June 1996: 1.
105 http://hansard.aph.gov.au/reps/dailys/dr170696.pdf [no longer active, 
2013].
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They did not die in vain . . .
Along with ‘not down the American road’, the declaration that the Port 
Arthur victims ‘must not be seen to have died in vain’ became one of the 
most enduring clichés of the period. It captured a redemptive morality 
fuelled by horror at the event, anger at collusive political inertia, and 
the long-standing Judeo-Christian tradition of atoning for wrong-
doing. The Sydney Morning Herald’s editorial on the morning of the 
Police Ministers’ meeting listed the moral choices facing the ministers 
that day: ‘The nation looks today to Canberra for statesmanship, not 
opportunism; for wisdom, not ignorance; for cooperation, not petty 
squabbling; for courage, not intimidation. Those who were slain at Port 
Arthur must not be allowed to die in vain.’106 An Age editorial used 
the same expression: ‘The 35 victims may not have died completely 
in vain.’107 By mid-July when there was anxiety that some states would 
renege on the changes, NSW Premier Bob Carr again repeated this 
appeal: ‘It would be simply unforgivable in the wake of Port Arthur if we 
don’t go for tighter gun laws. It will mean those lives were lost in vain. 
It’s as simple as that.’108 The Tasmanian CGC called a press conference 
in Hobart and Walter Mikac, the husband and father of three victims, 
invoked the reference too, saying, ‘To do anything else would be a 
betrayal of those 35 people who died that day.’109
A less sentimental comment on the cliché was run by the Daily 
Telegraph on the day after the Police Ministers’ meeting: 
It would be a travesty and an insult to the memory of the Port 
Arthur 35 to declare now that ‘they did not die in vain’. Their 
lives were spent for nothing . . . They died because we allowed 
lax gun laws . . . we should remember not only the 35 victims 
of Port Arthur but also the hundreds of others who have died 
unnecessarily by gunfire.110
106 Anon. ‘Deaths can’t be in vain’ (editorial), SMH, 10 May 1996.
107 Anon. ‘Beyond gun laws’, (editorial), The Age, 7 May 1996: A14.
108 Humphries D. ‘Carr to support people’s gun vote’, SMH, 16 July 1996: 9.
109 Darby A. ‘Father who lost all speaks out’, SMH, 20 July 1996: 2.
110 Anon. ‘Out of the shadow of the gun’ (editorial), Daily Telegraph, 11 May 
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Brokering bipartisanship
As discussed, reportage of the Police Ministers’ agreement and Howard’s 
role in it invariably referred to Australia’s former political shirking of 
gun control. Since 1980 Australia’s police ministers had met 20 times to 
discuss uniform national gun laws, but as one editorial commented, ‘yet 
no [comprehensive national] laws are in place’.111
With the exception of Barrie Unsworth’s 1988 efforts to seriously 
reform gun laws, successive NSW governments, along with those in 
Tasmania and Queensland, had long stood in the way of a national gun 
control policy. Queensland and Tasmania still allowed open access to 
military-style semi-automatic weapons and all three states had refused 
to introduce registration for rifles and shotguns. (All other jurisdictions 
had registration of all firearms, but these three renegade states required 
it only for handguns, which constitute only about 5% of guns). Three 
days before the 1995 Queensland election, then Premier Wayne Goss 
did a deal with the gun lobby, promising not to introduce gun registra-
tion in return for the lobby’s electoral support.112
The Port Arthur massacre provoked immediate and passionate calls 
for gun law reform, many of them citing the appalling political record 
of inaction. The letters editor of the Sydney Morning Herald wrote, ‘Not 
since the run-up to the Gulf War, when people feared an apocalyptic 
conflict, has our mail bag been so large.’ In her weekly summary of let-
ters received, she wrote: 
People had to find someone to blame that such a thing could 
happen – they homed in on politicians’ inaction over gun 
control. The same words were used time and again: gutless, 
vacillating, weak-kneed, self-serving, cowardly, etc. Rarely 
have politicians been so out of touch with the public mood. 
Rarely has the public been more cynical about its politicians. 
John Howard’s statements have been well received, but our 
1996.
111 Anon. ‘Success, or lethal shame’ (editorial), Daily Telegraph, 10 May 1996.
112 7.30 Report, ABC TV, 29 April 1996.
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readers have made it clear he’ll be judged on his practical gun 
control achievements, not his rhetoric.113
Other typical comments included: 
The time for excuses has passed. Now it is time for action.114
.  .  . such expressions of pain ring hollow [without political 
action].115
. . . the public was appalled by both the number and type of 
guns in circulation and the inability of state governments to 
keep tabs on their whereabouts.116
It is indicative of the sad state of politics in this country that it 
has taken the deaths of 35 people to bring our political lead-
ers into a positive, non-partisan position of agreement.117
As the 10 May meeting of the Police Ministers approached, many 
editorials were scathing in their predictions that, yet again, no national 
consensus would be reached. Most described the approaching meeting 
as an opportunity to test political courage: ‘Rarely in a federation of sov-
ereign States such as our nation is there an opportunity to take decisive, 
united action to bring about instant change for the national good.’118 
Significantly, the pastor conducting the Mikac funeral on the day before 
the Police Ministers’ meeting stated in his eulogy, ‘To our national lead-
ers we say, do not trade your votes for lives.’119
Four days after the massacre the front page of the Daily Telegraph 
showed 35 bullets, each with the name of a victim. Underneath was the 
statement: 
113 Walsh G. Postscript, SMH, 6 May 1996: 14.
114 Anon. ‘A cool look at gun laws’, SMH, 30 April 1996.
115 Ibid.
116 Millett M. ‘Howard’s gun gamble’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
117 Akerman P. ‘Blasting the myths of the gun lobby’, Sunday Telegraph, 5 
May 1996.
118 Anon. ‘Success, or lethal shame’ (editorial), Daily Telegraph, 10 May 1996.
119 Freeman J. ‘1,000 mourn as tragic family is laid to rest’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
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Gentlemen, the people of Australia are weary of the gun 
debate. In Tasmania, 35 people are dead because a killer was 
able to arm himself with a semi-automatic rifle. Your respon-
sibility is to make it illegal to own these guns, illegal to be in 
possession of them, illegal to obtain the bullets they fire. All 
this is within your power and the public demands nothing 
less.120
The NSW Labor Party
After the 1988 defeat of the Unsworth Labor Government in NSW, gun 
control had become a political sore for the NSW Labor Party – the party 
in government in NSW – requiring regular band-aid applications such 
as highly publicised voluntary gun amnesties. Before Port Arthur the 
party had plainly ruled out any serious tightening of gun laws, partic-
ularly long-arm registration, due to its fear of electoral reprisal from 
the gun lobby. In 1995 the CGC sought a meeting with Premier Carr 
and his Police Minister, Paul Whelan. We met Whelan and Carr’s senior 
adviser and their message was unequivocal: the Labor Government 
would not move alone to introduce gun registration. The only possible 
avenue of hope lay in the remote possibility of brokering a bipartisan 
policy between the Liberal-National Coalition and the Government. 
But almost everyone we spoke to was highly sceptical that we would 
have any hope of convincing the National Party arm of the Coalition to 
support registration.
Premier Carr had gone on public record several times, both in 
Parliament and in the media, saying he would not consider intro-
ducing registration unless there was bipartisan support between 
the Government and the Opposition parties. The Liberal-National 
Opposition agreed: ‘The only way to provide for serious and lasting 
reforms on firearm ownership, if there is bipartisan consensus, is to 
have broad-based community support .  .  . Opposition members .  .  . 
encourage a bipartisan and consensus approach in the future.’ Despite 
both major parties thus agreeing that bipartisanship was necessary and 
120 Anon. ‘35 reasons why our leaders must act’, Daily Telegraph, 2 May 1996: 1
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even a good thing, both stood like shy brides, each refusing to take the 
initiative to consummate the arrangement. John Tingle noted after Port 
Arthur that he had ‘an assurance in writing [dated November 1994] 
from Bob Carr when he was Opposition Leader that . . . his government 
if it came into power would not be moving toward any kind of registra-
tion or anything else’(emphasis added).121 But Port Arthur changed this 
almost overnight.
On 2 May, four days after the Port Arthur massacre, Carr announced 
that he would introduce legislation to turn over the state’s powers to 
regulate guns to the Commonwealth. Carr based his reasoning on the 
prospect that other states would refuse to act on gun control, arguing 
that the issue of national laws was too important to be left to flounder 
while it required identical legislation to be passed by six state and two 
territory governments.122
We suspected that many in the Carr Government – including Carr 
himself – privately sympathised with gun control, but their political 
pragmatism forced them to appease the gun lobby. Nonetheless we 
were highly suspicious of Carr’s move, judging it as cynical posturing 
designed to make him appear tough on gun control while avoiding 
giving offence to John Tingle of the Shooters Party. He must have known 
the move would come to nothing, as it was highly unlikely that other 
states would want to hand powers back to the Federal Government. 
This would have then allowed Carr to blame other states for not having 
the ‘courage’ to hand over power to the Commonwealth, thereby derail-
ing national gun law reform and allowing him to retreat behind the 
defence that he could not be expected to act alone. The CGC issued a 
press release deploring the move as buck-passing and hand-washing. 
Professor Charles Watson, a member of the CGC, said: 
The reason the State Government wants to hand it all over 
to the Federal Government is because it is too scared to do 
121 Tingle J. ‘What the Shooters Party is saying’, Guns Australia, July/August 
1996: 5–6.
122 Carr B. ‘States have failed dismally with guns’, Sunday Telegraph, 5 May 
1996: 8.
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anything. The Federal Government can only make gun laws 
if all the states cede their power, and Queensland will never 
do that, so it was a safe move for NSW.123
A Sydney Morning Herald journalist, Bernard Lagan, who had 
long reported gun control matters from the NSW Parliament, wrote 
an article under a particularly critical headline ‘Hairy chested and hare 
brained’. He contrasted Carr’s previous position on gun control with his 
new-found enthusiasm. Lagan wrote that Carr’s 
new hairy-chested approach to tougher gun laws . . . smacks 
of a Premier anxious to position himself at the forefront of 
the gun control debate that has arisen out of the blood of 
Port Arthur .  .  . Carr won’t be thanked by voters for using 
the current gun debate to advance his own political creden-
tials.124 
The same criticism was never made of Howard’s motivations, prob-
ably because of his consistent position on gun control from the pre–Port 
Arthur period.
By the time of the 10 May Police Ministers’ conference, NSW 
Premier Bob Carr and Police Minister Paul Whelan had apparently 
converted to gun control advocacy. The CGC believes it played an 
important role in brokering this radical transformation. But on the 
Tuesday after the massacre, the NSW Labor Party was in a dither about 
what to do. A motion by the Left faction to toughen the party’s position 
was rejected in an emotional Caucus meeting. The proposer, Sandra 
Nori, had urged the Premier to develop a bipartisan approach with 
the State Opposition. Carr was reported to have rejected this in favour 
of his much-publicised move to hand over gun control powers to the 
Commonwealth Government.125
123 Carty L. ‘Professor demands “bloody” Tingle’s head’, Illawarra Mercury, 
10 May 1996.
124 Lagan B. ‘Hairy chested and hare brained’, SMH, 3 May 1996.
125 Humphries D. ‘Emotions run high as Left loses bid to toughen laws’, 
SMH, 1 May 1996: 8.
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On 4 May, six days after the Port Arthur massacre, the CGC organ-
ised a mass rally for gun control in Sydney’s Hyde Park. One of our 
intentions at the rally was to read out a four-point minimal position for 
gun law reform and to tell the crowd where the two main state political 
parties – the Labor Government and the Liberal-National Coalition – 
stood on these points: 
Uniform gun laws across Australia.
Proof of reason required for all gun licences.
Registration of the sale, transfer and ownership of all guns.
No lifetime licences.
State Parliament was sitting that week, and four CGC members 
– Rebecca Peters, Geoff Derrick, Charles Watson and I – first sought 
an appointment with the leader of the Opposition, Peter Collins. 
What made us seek the views of the Opposition before those of the 
Government? The first reason was that the Liberal Opposition seemed 
more likely than the Labor Government to want to appear consistent 
with the position being advocated by the Liberal Prime Minister. If 
the Opposition signed, this would put pressure on Carr and his Labor 
Government who had long opposed gun registration. Second, we 
had sent the four-point list to all State MPs and asked for their faxed 
responses by the Friday morning. We received responses from all the 
minor parties and several Labor MPs, but nothing from the Opposition. 
We felt we held a card that, if publicised, would be embarrassing to the 
Opposition and so wanted to give them an 11-hour opportunity to state 
their views.
We telephoned on the morning of Friday 3 May to request a meeting 
with Collins, which was arranged for that afternoon. Collins arrived at 
the meeting with National Party leader Ian Armstrong, Shadow Police 
Minister Andrew Tink and National Party MP Peter Cochrane. It was 
the first time most of us had met any of these men in our capacities as 
gun control advocates. After briefly explaining the aims and structure 
of the CGC, we pointed out that we had received no response from the 
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Opposition to our four-point statement. We explained that we intended 
to read out a list of politicians who both supported and opposed our 
points at the rally the following day.
Peter Collins expressed surprise that we had not received his 
response – he was sure he had signed the statement. He then looked 
for and produced the statement, containing – sure enough – his signa-
ture. He passed it to Ian Armstrong, who (to our amazement) signed 
as well, without hesitation. Swiftly Collins then produced a typed list 
of Coalition MPs which he attached to the document, remarking airily 
that he and Armstrong were signing for every parliamentary member 
of the Coalition. To say we were speechless would be putting it mildly. 
Here, with little argument and no acrimony, the entire Opposition had 
been signed over to support gun registration and the other points in the 
document.
We left the building so jubilant that we momentarily overlooked 
trying to get the Government’s agreement. Geoff Derrick then said, 
‘We’ve only got the job half done – we need Carr’s signature.’ We re-en-
tered the Parliament building and called Bob Carr’s office, explaining 
to a staff member what had happened. He replied that he thought ‘the 
boss’ would want to know about this urgently, so would we please come 
up to his rooms. We gave the staffer a photocopy of the statement signed 
by the Opposition – having first extracted a promise not to break the 
news publicly – and then we were left to wait. We waited for over an 
hour, during which (thanks to mobile phones) we ploughed ahead with 
the barrage of media interviews, which were still coming thick and fast, 
this being just five days after the massacre. After an hour we began to get 
nervous: Geoff Derrick suggested, only half in jest, that the Government 
was holding us hostage. Eventually we were taken to meet the Premier 
and the Police Minister, and they both promptly signed our document.
We had brokered the long sought-after bipartisan support. For the 
first time in recent NSW political history, all parties had agreed to intro-
duce the gun lobby’s bogeyman: gun registration. The next day at the 
Hyde Park rally, Rebecca Peters held aloft the signed agreements and 
declared: ‘These documents mean the end of the power of the gun lobby 
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in NSW. If Bob Carr or Peter Collins or Ian Armstrong renege on this 
commitment . . . they need never ask for the trust of the people of NSW 
again.’126
From that day on, the NSW Government became an open sup-
porter of gun control, taking every opportunity to present itself as a 
leader of national reform. On the day of the 10 May Police Ministers’ 
meeting – when several states were equivocating about details of the 
Howard plan – Carr convened a press conference where he had the 
temerity to refer to this obstruction to national agreement as coming 
from ‘the usual suspects’.127 NSW had for years, under both Labor and 
Coalition governments, been one of the principal states obstructing 
national agreements on gun law reform. But now things promised to 
be different.
On the eve of the 10 May Police Ministers’ meeting, former NSW 
Premier Barrie Unsworth chronicled in the Sydney Morning Herald 
Australia’s recent history of failure to achieve national gun laws. 
Unsworth had unsuccessfully attempted to introduce gun registration 
in 1988, thereby becoming a ‘scalp’ of the gun lobby. In the months 
after the defeat of Unsworth’s Government in 1988, the SSAA and the 
Firearms Advisory Council distributed a publication to all politicians 
titled ‘Rednecks, Reactionaries & Rambos: the true story of how a sup-
posedly unsophisticated group of firearm owners helped bring down a 
government’.128 The title came from a statement made by Unsworth. The 
booklet gloated over the gun lobby’s alleged power in unseating the gov-
ernment. The gun lobby claimed its advertising expenditure during the 
election had been topped only by that of the two main political parties.
In the article, Unsworth attributed his failure to ‘a lack of bipartisan 
126 Larkin J. ‘Gun crazy fools’, Sunday Telegraph, 5 May 1996: 1; Warnock S. 
‘A city cries for the dead’, Sun Herald, 5 May 1996: 2.
127 Lagan B. ‘Howard’s threat to expose the waverers pays off ’, SMH, 11 May 
1996.
128 Sporting Shooters Association of Australia and Firearms Advisory 
Council. ‘Rednecks, Reactionaries & Rambos: ‘the true story of how a 
supposedly unsophisticated group of firearm owners helped bring down a 
government’, undated (probably 1988).
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political support’ on the issue – Nick Greiner’s Liberal Opposition had 
opposed Unsworth’s reforms. Unsworth’s article failed to mention any of 
the other factors to which analysts also attributed his defeat in 1988.129 
He concluded that after Port Arthur politicians were ‘now all older and 
wiser’130 – doubtless code for ‘not foolish enough to try and ride out this 
one by doing nothing’ or more optimistically, ‘at last we have a pretext 
to show political courage’. It was as if the outrage of the event could not 
sustain another moment of procrastination. One analyst suggested: ‘The 
devastation wreaked . . . had rendered gun control reform inevitable.’131
Reflecting the widespread community cynicism about politicians 
being soft on gun law reform, NSW Police Minister Paul Whelan (who 
had himself worn this accusation) said soon after the meeting, ‘But those 
changes had to happen on Friday – it was a litmus test for politicians.’132 
Presumably the colour to be avoided was yellow. Similarly, Tasmania 
saw a dramatic turnaround in the Liberal Government, which still con-
tained many of the parliamentarians who had endorsed former Police 
Minister Frank Madill’s decision to do nothing about military and other 
high powered semi-automatic weapons. Tasmania was now to have the 
toughest gun laws in Australia, said Premier Rundle. The Tasmanian 
Liberal’s U-turn mirrored that of the Labor Party’s. For years both par-
ties had courted the redneck shooters’ vote by ignoring gun law reform. 
Following Port Arthur, they sang in unison with the Tasmanian Greens 
who were long-time gun control advocates.
The force of this discourse created a formidable definition of gov-
ernment as spineless and utterly out of touch with community concerns. 
At the beginning of his term in office, Prime Minister John Howard had 
the chance to reinvent himself as a model of political leadership rarely 
seen in Australia in recent years.
129 Cockburn M. ‘Political cowardice stems from myth of Unsworth defeat’, 
SMH, 30 April 1996.
130 Unsworth B. ‘Failure on guns an affront’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
131 Millett M. ‘Howard’s gun gamble’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
132 Vass N. ‘Owners won’t give up weapons: Tingle’, SMH, 13 May 1996.
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The National Party
The National Party presented the greatest threat to political bipar-
tisanship across the country. Conservative socially and politically, 
perennially suspicious of having their interests ignored by city-domi-
nated parliaments, the Nationals had a long and ugly record of opposing 
gun law reform. The Victorian Deputy Premier, the National Party’s 
Pat McNamara, had stood beside Ted Drane on the platform at a pro-
gun rally in Melbourne after the Cain Labor Government reacted to 
the Queen St massacre in 1987.133 Drane himself had formerly stood as 
a National Party candidate in Victoria. In 1995 Queensland’s National 
Party Police Minister, Russell Cooper, announced his party would give 
householders what the Bulletin magazine called ‘the unfettered right to 
shoot intruders’,134 following a series of populist articles in Brisbane’s 
tabloid press on the alleged rise in crime.
On the night after Port Arthur, Cooper told the 7.30 Report: ‘What 
I don’t want to do is one of these massive knee-jerk reactions . . .’ going 
on to explain that he didn’t support gun registration and that he wanted 
to see a prohibited person register ‘with the cooperation of the AMA 
[Australian Medical Association]’.135
The National Party’s Federal leader, Deputy Prime Minister Tim 
Fischer, fell in behind his Prime Minister and, despite being threat-
ened with revolt in his party, consistently supported Howard’s position 
throughout the months of debate. Several commentators noted that 
Fischer was emerging as a hero in his own right, because he had far more 
to lose by supporting gun control than Howard did. His party’s rural 
seats were the main electoral targets of the Shooters Party, which cam-
paigned vigorously against the gun laws, distributing leaflets, organising 
meetings and recruiting members. It was said the entire executive of at 
least one National Party branch resigned en masse to join the Shooters 
Party. Tim Fischer travelled tirelessly to country towns, explaining the 
133 Archival footage shown on 7.30 Report, ABC TV, 9 May 1996.
134 Roberts G. ‘Break, enter and die’, The Bulletin, 9 May 1995: 15, 17–19.
135 7.30 Report, ABC TV, 29 April 1996.
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new gun laws and dampening down the hysteria fomented by the gun 
lobby.
In early June, the bipartisan unity in NSW appeared to be under 
threat when National Party leader Ian Armstrong suddenly announced 
that his party did not support gun registration, something to which 
he had signed his explicit agreement on the CGC’s document on 4 
May. Armstrong announced that he ‘support[ed] the call by the Prime 
Minister for a national register of gun ownership’ – that is, a record of 
the general fact that a person owns guns – but not a specific record of 
how many or what type of guns. He denied he had changed his stance, 
insisting this was the form of ‘registration’ he had always intended to 
support.136 (Unfortunately the wording used in the CGC statement 
was ‘registration of the ownership of all guns’. The words ‘registration 
of every gun’ would have expressed our intention more clearly. But 
since the principle of firearms registration is firmly established in other 
Australian jurisdictions, and even in NSW for handguns, there could 
never really have been any doubt about what was meant by the phrase.) 
The CGC attacked Armstrong’s announcement as a pathetic attempt to 
weasel out of his signed agreement, suggesting that, ‘Mr Armstrong may 
be being held captive to a hillbilly minority in the Coalition’.137 To his 
credit, Liberal leader Peter Collins stood firm and said the Opposition’s 
position was unchanged on registration and support for the full Howard 
package: ‘Regardless of anything that may have been said today by Mr 
Armstrong, I guarantee that the Howard legislation will pass through 
the NSW Parliament.’138
And pass it did. Chapter 7 reviews several areas where state and 
territory governments watered down some of the principles of the 10 
May APMC agreement when it came to incorporating these into legis-
lation. Some of these were serious departures from the agreement and 
reflected obvious lobbying by conservative groups. Nonetheless, most 
136 Morris R. ‘Guns push Coalition to the brink’, Daily Telegraph, 8 June 1996.
137 Simon Chapman on ABC TV News, 7 June 1996.
138 Peter Collins on ABC TV News, 7 June 1996.
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of the APMC package passed into laws around Australia. Port Arthur 
had been the catalyst for transforming political cowardice. Federal 
Attorney-General Daryl Williams told the 7.30 Report: ‘I think the gun 
lobby is now being matched by an anti-gun lobby .  .  . The people of 
Australia expressed their own view of this issue quite emphatically and 
I think that gave the political will which was previously missing.’139
There will always be speculation about whether John Howard’s 
resolve over gun law reform was opportunistic, or whether he would 
have been as resolute had the massacre occurred at a less politically 
‘safe’ time. Howard’s March election victory had been sweeping, giving 
him the confidence of huge electoral support. But would Howard have 
been so bold if the massacre had occurred toward the end of his first 
term as Prime Minister? Or if he had not enjoyed such a large parlia-
mentary majority? Liberal-National parties were also in power in seven 
out of eight Australian states and territories. This allowed Howard, as 
Liberal leader, a huge advantage in dealing with state premiers who 
shared much of his political philosophy. Would the Federal Opposition 
have taken the same action if it had still been in power, with the same 
political situation prevailing in the states? Some have speculated that 
the coincidence of Bryant’s rampage with the first weeks of Howard’s 
sweeping political victory created a ‘now or never’ situation for gun 
law reform: even a massive backlash from shooters would not be sus-
tained throughout a three-year political term. By this analysis, Howard 
had little to lose but everything to gain by stamping his mark of strong 
leadership on the community as his first major political act as Prime 
Minister.
On the first anniversary of Howard’s prime ministership, a national 
poll asked respondents to rate 19 different issues in terms of how well 
the Howard Government had handled them. Only the handling of two 
issues – interest rates (55%) and gun control (63%) – was rated by more 
than half the respondents as ‘good/very good’. The mean ‘good/very 
good’ rating across the 19 issues was only 27.5%.140 Almost a year after 
139 Williams D. 7.30 Report, ABC TV, 10 May 1996.
140 Millett M. ‘It’s thumbs up’, SMH, 1 March 1997: 34.
Over our dead bodies
72
Port Arthur, it seemed that no other issue could come close to gun con-
trol in community approval ratings.
73
2
The case for fewer guns
No blueprint of gun control promises to eliminate gun violence from 
communities. But the wide range of murder rates – between the 
extremes of Colombia (167.6 male homicides per 100,000), where guns 
are readily available and Japan (0.7 per 100,000),1 which has the strictest 
gun control in the world – raises obvious questions about whether there 
might be some connection between gun availability and total and gun 
homicide rates. Similar questions can be asked about gun suicide rates.
The main reforms introduced after the Port Arthur massacre were 
designed to reduce the number of guns in the Australian community 
by making it much harder to qualify for gun ownership; tightening 
requirements on registration and storage; and removing certain weap-
ons deemed unacceptable for civilian use. These policies were expected 
to reduce gun ownership, gun availability and therefore gun violence 
(murders, suicides, accidental deaths and injuries).
This chapter summarises the main arguments for reducing the 
number of guns in communities and the number of people permitted 
to own guns. The concern here is with the central question of whether 
reducing access to guns can be expected to reduce the number of people 
killed and injured from guns through murder, suicide and unintentional 
injury. I will summarise several key pieces of research on the relation-
ship between the prevalence of guns in communities and their death/
injury rates, and comment on the gun lobby’s counter-arguments.
1 WHO: World health statistics annual 1994. Geneva, 1995.
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Reduction not elimination
The tightest gun control laws imaginable would not eliminate all gun 
violence from a community. No nation has a zero death rate from guns. 
As with all preventive public health policies, gun control policies seek 
to reduce rather than eliminate the problems they address. Road safety 
policies are acclaimed when they reduce deaths and injuries. If some-
one condemned random breath testing or highway patrols because they 
only halved rather than eliminated drunk driving or speeding, they 
would hardly be taken seriously. Yet this was what the gun lobby sought 
to argue in regard to the new gun laws.
Mike Ascher, from the NSW Amateur Pistol Association, bellowed 
to the crowd at the 15 June 1996 pro-gun rally in Sydney, ‘Get rid of 
the guns and you stop homicides. Get rid of the guns and you stop 
robberies. Get rid of the guns and you stop home invasions. What a 
load of unadulterated bloody rubbish!’2 Similarly John Tingle argued: 
‘Handguns have been registered in NSW since 1927. It has not and will 
never stop their use in crime.’3 Here Tingle, like Ascher, adroitly sets up 
the straw man argument that the only worthwhile test of gun registra-
tion is whether it eliminates all criminal use of guns. Anything less is 
presumably considered worthless.
International comparisons
The task of comparing countries head-to-head on two variables – for 
example, number of guns per population and number of incidents of 
violence (usually death from gun homicides, suicides and accidents) 
– is fraught with methodological problems. There are many cultural, 
historical and economic factors that can influence the scale of a nation’s 
gun violence. The Colombian gun death rate, for example, plainly has 
much to do with the presence of cocaine cartels and their private armies 
– something few other nations share. Civil wars and persistent sectarian 
2 ABC TV News, 15 June 1996.
3 Tingle J. Channel 7 News, 22 March 1996.
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violence in places like Bosnia, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland also con-
fuse the gun availability/violence picture.
The extent of a nation’s ‘gun culture’ depends on many factors 
including whether guns have been historically revered and glamorised, 
patterns of urbanisation, the extent of all violent crime, and whether 
guns are kept in homes as part of strictly regulated civil defence pro-
grams (as in Switzerland). These potentially complex and confounding 
variables are difficult to define and quantify, and make direct interna-
tional comparisons problematic. All but the most intractable in both 
gun control and pro-gun factions admit there is clearly room for debate 
whenever precise claims are made about the relationship between avail-
ability and gun violence.
However, these groups differ radically over the question of whether 
there is an acceptable degree of research support for the general prop-
osition that more guns means more deaths. The gun lobby argues this 
is nonsense and champions the case of nations with high rates of gun 
ownership and low rates of gun homicide (for example, Norway). Gun 
control advocates are less concerned about exceptional cases and more 
with the pattern across countries. There have been several recent studies 
comparing rates of gun ownership and gun violence between countries 
that are broadly similar culturally and economically.
A comparison of homicide rates between the US and Britain found 
that the non-gun US homicide rate (per 100,000 population) was 3.7 
times higher than the British rate, while the rate of handgun homicides 
was 175 times higher.4 This suggests that, even if Americans were inher-
ently somewhat more murderous than the British, the easy availability 
of handguns has produced a massively disproportionate number of 
homicides.
A study comparing the cities of Seattle (US) and nearby Vancouver 
(Canada) found the cities had almost identical rates of burglary, assault 
and robbery without a gun; but that the Seattle rate of assault with a 
firearm and homicide with a handgun were seven and 4.8 times higher 
4 Clarke RVG, Mayhew P. ‘The British gas suicide story and its crimino-
logical implications’, British Journal of Criminology, 1991, 31: 186–88.
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respectively than the corresponding rates in Vancouver.5 Again, hand-
guns are much more accessible in the US than in Canada.
A later study by Centerwall6 compared homicide rates from 1976–
89 in Canadian provinces and US states on the US/Canada border. 
He concluded that there were no consistent differences between the 
homicide rates of the two countries, despite handgun ownership being 
much higher in the US. But other researchers have pointed out that 
Centerwall’s comparison gives the same weight to sparsely populated 
states and provinces as it does to densely populated urban areas. If the 
comparison is made between states and provinces of similar population 
densities, the homicide rate is between two and four times higher on the 
US side of the border.7
The prolific suicide and homicide researcher David Lester exam-
ined the relationship between gun availability and both the total and 
gun homicide rates in 16 European countries. He used the proportion 
of all murders and suicides where guns were used, as well as the annual 
accidental gun death rate, as proxy measures for gun availability, com-
menting that ‘no country of the world provides accurate measures of 
firearm ownership’. He found a strong correlation between these mea-
sures of availability and gun homicides, demonstrating that nations 
with more firearms have higher gun homicide rates. He also found that 
the rate of homicide by other means did not present any compensatory 
corollary; that is, in countries where guns were less available, there was 
5 Sloan JH, Kellermann AL, Reay DT et al. ‘Handgun regulations, crime, 
assaults, and homicide: a tale of two cities’, New England Journal of Medicine, 
1988, 319: 1256–62.
6 Centerwall BS. ‘Homicide and the prevalence of handguns: Canada and the 
United States, 1976 to 1980’, American Journal of Epidemiology, 1991: 1245–60.
7 Gabor T. ‘The impact of the availability of firearms on violent crime, 
suicide, and accidental death’, Department of Justice Canada, 1994; Mayhew P. 
‘A reply to comments on the research note in the government evidence’, Lord 
Cullen’s Inquiry into the Circumstances Leading Up To and Surrounding the 
Events at Dunblane Primary School on Wednesday 13 March. Home Office, 
July 1996: 12.
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no significant increase in alternative methods of killing.8
Swiss criminologist Martin Killias published in 1993 a review of 
international correlations between gun ownership and rates of homi-
cide and suicide in 14 countries,9 later updating this to 18 nations.10 The 
data on percentages of households with guns was obtained from the 
1989 and 1992 International Crime Victimisation Surveys (ICVS) con-
ducted by telephone interviews with householders. This is the largest 
international attempt to use a standard method to measure gun own-
ership. Table 2.1 shows Killias’ results, listed by ascending levels of gun 
ownership.
Table 2.1. Homicide, suicide and household gun ownership in 18 countries 
(rates per million population)
Country Overall 
homicide
Homicide 
with a gun
Overall 
suicide
Suicide 
with gun
% of 
household-
swith guns
Holland 11.8 2.7 117.2 2.8 1.9
England & 
Wales
6.7 0.8 86.1 3.8 4.7
Scotland 16.3 1.1 105.1 6.9 4.7
CSSR 13.5 2.6 117.8 9.5 5.2
Nthrn Ireland 46.6 35.5 82.7 11.8 8.4
Germany 12.1 2.0 203.7 13.8 8.9
Spain 13.7 3.8 64.5 4.5 13.1
Sweden 13.3 2.0 182.4 21.2 15.1
8 Lester D. ‘Crime as opportunity. A test of the hypothesis with European 
homicide rates’, British Journal of Criminology, 1991, 31: 186–88.
9 Killias M. ‘International correlations between gun ownership and rates 
of homicide and suicide’, Canadian Medical Association Journal, 1993, 148: 
1721–5.
10 Killias M. ‘Gun ownership, suicide and homicide: an international 
perspective’, in Understanding crime: experiences of crime and crime 
control. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 
Publication No 49, Rome, August 1993: 289–302.
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Country Overall 
homicide
Homicide 
with a gun
Overall 
suicide
Suicide 
with gun
% of 
household-
swith guns
Italy 17.4 13.1 78.1 10.9 16.0
Belgium 18.5 8.7 231.5 24.5 16.6
Australia 19.5 6.6 115.8 34.2 19.6
New Zealand 20.2 4.7 137.7 24.1 22.3
France 12.5 5.5 223.0 49.3 22.6
Finland 29.6 7.4 253.5 54.3 23.2
Switzerland 11.7 4.6 244.5 57.4 27.2*
Canada 26.0 8.4 139.4 44.4 29.1
Norway 12.1 3.6 142.7 38.7 32.0
US 75.9 44.6 124.0 72.8 48.0
* The Swiss gun ownership rate excluding military guns is 12.2%.
Killias found that across the nations, the rate of household gun 
ownership correlated with the rates of homicide and suicide commit-
ted with guns, the proportion of all homicides and suicides committed 
with guns, and the overall rates of homicide and suicide. In other words, 
countries with high gun ownership rates tended to have higher rates of 
fatal gun violence than those with lower gun ownership. Nor did the 
study find a ‘substitution’ effect; that is, in countries with low rates of 
gun ownership, the rates of homicide and suicide by other means did 
not compensate for the lack of access to guns.
Killias noted: 
The correlation between gun ownership and suicide with 
a gun was stronger when the categories of firearms were 
combined instead of considered separately .  .  . One might 
conclude that, in the case of suicide at least, the mere pres-
ence of a lethal weapon [i.e., any type of gun] shapes the 
outcome of an acute crisis, whatever the legal status or the 
technical characteristics of the weapon may be.11
11 Ibid.
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The gun lobby has criticised Killias’ study because of the high 
non-response rates (47% averaged across all 18 nations).12 It is also 
generally sceptical about surveys of gun ownership, arguing that many 
people will under-report ownership, due to fear of government perse-
cution. But these critics cannot explain why the non-respondents would 
produce any systematic bias. In other words, they provide no compel-
ling reasons why the correlations obtained would be any different had 
more people responded – if gun owners had consistently high rates of 
non-response to the surveys across the 18 countries, and the data were 
adjusted to account for this, this would not have altered the correlational 
results. Nor have they responded to the fact that the ICVS reported that 
rates of gun ownership generally corresponded well with estimates 
obtained by other surveys undertaken in some of the countries.13
The gun lobby also claims that the argument works the other way 
round: high homicide rates in a community may prompt people to pur-
chase more guns for self-defence; that is, high gun murder rates lead 
to higher rates of gun ownership. This argument fails to explain why 
Killias and others have also found a link between high gun ownership 
levels and high suicide rates. It would be ludicrous to suggest that high 
gun suicide rates prompt communities to arm themselves more.
Gun violence in Australia
Table 2.2 shows the data on gun deaths in Australia for the five years 
1990–95.
In summary: 
•	 Between 1990 and 1995, an average of 560 people died from guns 
each year.
•	 Of all gun deaths, 81% were suicides; 14% resulted from violence; 
4% were unintentional (accidents); 1% were of unknown intent.
12 Mayhew P. ‘A reply to comments on the research note in the government 
evidence’, op. cit.
13 Ibid.
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In addition in 1994: 
•	 95.2% of gun suicides were males; 63.2% of gun homicides were 
males.
•	 Firearms were used in one in four homicides and one in five 
suicides.14
•	 One in four male suicides involved a firearm.
•	 One in 18 female suicides involved a firearm.
•	 55% of female firearm deaths resulted from an assault.
Table 2.2. Firearm deaths, Australia 1990–95 (rate per 100,000 population in 
brackets)15
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Suicide 486 (2.9) 505 (2.9) 488 (2.8) 431 (2.4) 420 (2.4) 388 (2.2)
Assault 
(homicides)
79 (0.5) 84 (0.5) 96 (0.5) 64 (0.4) 76 (0.4) 67 (0.4)
Unintentional 
(accidents)
30 (0.2) 29 (0.2) 24 (0.1) 18 (0.1) 20 (0.1) 15 (0.1)
Total* 610 (3.6)* 623 (3.6)* 615 (3.4)* 519 (2.9)* 522 (2.9)* 470 (2.7)
* Column totals include gun deaths where intent was unknown. ** 1995 
excludes legal interventions and deaths where intent was unknown.
In New South Wales, between 1984 and 1988, guns were the third 
leading cause of injury and death (8% of total), behind motor vehicle 
accidents (35%) and falls (12%).16
14 Mukherjee S, Carcach C. Violent deaths and firearms in Australia: data and 
trends. Australian Institute of Criminology. Research and Public Policy Series 
No. 4, 1996.
15 Australian Injury Prevention Bulletin 1994, Issue No 8; 1995 data from 
Moller J, Bordeaux S. ‘Update of gun-related death data to 1995’, National 
Injury Surveillance Unit, February 1997.
16 Lyle D et al. ‘Firearm injuries in New South Wales’, New South Wales 
Department of Health: NSW Public Health Bulletin, 1991, 2: 111.
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Measuring the effect of gun laws in Australia has been difficult in 
the past because the eight states and territories all had different laws 
and the absence of interstate border checks meant guns were easily 
transported between jurisdictions, rendering the laws largely inopera-
ble. This meant that guns bought freely in a state with a liberal law (for 
example, Queensland) could be carried into a stricter state where they 
would be illegal and not easily detected. The absence of gun registration 
in NSW, Tasmania and Queensland also meant there were no national 
records of number sand types of guns in circulation. Before the new 
laws, Australia’s strictest gun law was in Western Australia, where many 
of the 1996 APMC agreement terms were law already.
The most striking feature of the distribution of firearm mortal-
ity in Australia is that the two states with the most permissive laws, 
Tasmania and Queensland, have gun death rates significantly above the 
average.17 (The Northern Territory also has a relatively high rate, but it 
has such a small population (170,000) that a single gun death can dra-
matically increase the rate per population.) Gun death rates per 100,000 
population in 1990–1994 were: Tasmania 7.97, Northern Territory 
7.52, Queensland 5.04, South Australia 3.55, NSW 2.83, Victoria 
2.66, Western Australia 2.55, Australian Capital Territory 1.56.18 The 
Tasmanian gun death rate in 1994 was 7.2 per 100,000, based on 34 gun 
deaths for that year. Port Arthur doubled this rate in one afternoon.
One of the few Australian studies on the relationship between 
firearm availability and violence was conducted by Chris Cantor and 
Penelope Slater. They examined the effect of the Queensland Weapons 
Act 1990, which introduced firearm licensing and a 28-day waiting 
period for all applications.19 The researchers said their study provided 
preliminary evidence that tightening gun control may reduce suicides 
17 Harrison J, Moller J, Bordeaux S. ‘Injury by Firearms Australia 1994’, 
Australian Injury Prevention Bulletin, Issue No. 13, Supplement, October 1996.
18 Mukherjee S, Carcach C. op. cit.
19 Cantor CH, Slater PJ. ‘The impact of firearm control legislation on suicide 
in Queensland: preliminary findings’, Medical Journal of Australia, 1995, 162: 
583–85.
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rates, especially among young men. (They found reductions in both gun 
suicides and overall male suicides in provincial areas, and in gun sui-
cides in the cities.)
Gun violence in the United States
As described in Chapter 1, the American gun problem has long 
imprinted itself in the Australian consciousness as the embodiment of 
all that should be avoided. For US gun control campaigners, the intro-
duction of the most basic restrictions are seen as major victories; for 
example, the radical requirement that handgun buyers endure a six-day 
cooling-off period to allow background checks. The State of Virginia has 
introduced what the gun lobby bemoans as a tough handgun law, allow-
ing residents to purchase a maximum of only one handgun per month.
The gun lobby likes to make the point that there is no shortage of 
gun laws in the US; rather, there are 20,000 separate gun laws which 
have not curbed the epidemic of violence.20 The large number of gun 
laws illustrates the same fundamental deficiency which undermined 
gun control in Australia until 1996: the lack of national uniformity. A 
ban on military-style semi-automatics in her home state of Western 
Australia did not prevent 21-year-old Kate Scott from being killed 
when she visited Port Arthur, because Tasmania’s law still allowed these 
weapons to be freely sold. The safety of an entire nation is undermined 
when gun laws are more feeble in some states than in others. But at 
least Australian gun laws are state and territory laws, so our legal patch-
work was made up of only eight parts. US gun laws are often municipal 
ordinances – local bans which in reality have only symbolic value: the 
equivalent of banning handgun sales in downtown Perth while a brisk 
trade continues in neighbouring Fremantle.
In 1996, 31 of the 50 states in the US had laws permitting citizens 
to carry concealed loaded handguns21 – a situation the National Rifle 
20 SSAA. Gun control: the facts. Is Australian going down the American path? 
Pamphlet, December 1996.
21 Violence Policy Center. ‘Concealing the risk: real-world effects of lax 
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Association (NRA) claims actually reduces the gun homicide rate. In 
1996 a great deal of publicity was given to a paper by two American 
researchers, Lott and Mustard, focusing on ‘shall issue’ laws which 
require officials to issue permits for citizens to carry concealed guns.22 
The researchers examined whether these laws deterred violent crime. 
They concluded that states with such laws had lower rates of violent 
crime than those without. The gun lobby rapidly championed the 
study on the internet and in countless editorials. But reviews by other 
researchers found the study was methodologically weak enough to 
render its conclusions suspect.23 The ‘guns make us safe’ perspective 
could probably only be advanced with a straight face in a country where 
gun violence is as rampant as it is in the US. For outside observers, the 
first and most obvious question to ask is: ‘If carrying guns and arming 
homes prevents gun violence, why does the most heavily citizen-armed 
nation in the Western world have about 38,000 annual gun deaths, 
including 18,000 gun homicides a year, giving it the highest per capita 
rate of gun violence?’ The debate on gun control in the US is profoundly 
parochial, with the horizons of many internal commentators seldom 
reaching beyond US shores to consider the perspective of other nations’ 
gun violence records.24 To argue from the US situation that guns make 
concealed weapons laws’, Washington DC: Violence Policy Center, 1996.
22 Lott JR, Mustard DB. ‘Crime, deterrence, and right to carry concealed 
handguns’, Journal of Legal Studies, January 1997, available at: http://www2.lib.
uchicago.edu/~llou/guns.html.
23 Webster DW. ‘The claims that right to carry laws reduce violent crime are 
unsubstantiated’, Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research, Johns 
Hopkins University, School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, October 1996. 
See also: McDowell D, Loftin C, Wiersema B. ‘Easing concealed firearms laws: 
effects on homicide in three states’, Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 
1995, 84: 193–206; McDowell D, Loftin C, Wiersema B. ‘Additional discussion 
about easing concealed firearms laws: effects on homicide in three states’, 
Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 1995, 86: 221–26; Nagin D. ‘General 
deterrence: a review of the empirical evidence’, in A Blumstein, J Cohen, D 
Nagin (eds), Deterrence and incapacitation: estimating the effects of criminal 
sanctions on crime rates. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1978. 
24 The NCGC often receives email from American shooters upbraiding 
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communities ‘safer’ is rather akin to arguing that war-torn Bosnia is 
safer than Rwanda during the genocide. Ever since Port Arthur, the 
NCGC’s web site has attracted virulent email from US shooters gasp-
ing in near apoplexy over our statements, apparently seldom realising 
that other nations’ gun laws differ from those of the US and seemingly 
unaware that the benchmarks of ‘safer’ communities in the US are fre-
quently outrageously high compared with other nations with tougher 
gun laws.
Here are some recent statistics on gun violence in the US (popula-
tion about 254 million): 
•	 From 1968 to 1991, annual deaths due to motor vehicles declined by 
21% (from 54,842 to 43,536), while during the same period deaths 
due to firearms increased by 60% (from 23,875 to 38,317).25 If this 
trend continues, by the year 2003 the number of US citizens killed 
annually by firearms will exceed the number killed in motor vehicle 
crashes.26 In some states this crossover has already occurred.
•	 In 1993 there were 39,595 firearm-related deaths, a rate of 
15.36/100,000. Of these, 18,940 (47.8%) were suicides, 18,571 
(46.9%) were homicides, 1,521 (3.8%) were unintentional, and the 
remainder were of undetermined intent.27 Firearm-related deaths 
were the fourth leading cause of ‘years of potential life lost’ before 
age 65.28
us for stating that there is no constitutional right to bear arms. Quite apart 
from the dubious existence of such a right in the US, these correspondents 
seem unaware that the United States ends at its shores: our website has many 
references marking it as an Australian site.
25 Centers for Disease Control. ‘Deaths resulting from firearm and motor 
vehicle-related injuries United States, 1968–1991, Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report, 1994, 43: 37–42.
26 Hinkle J, Betz S. ‘Gunshot injuries’, AACN Clinical Issues, 1995, 6: 175–86. 
27 Mercy J. US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Email dated 9 
September 1996.
28 US Centers for Disease Control. ‘Firearm-related years of potential life 
lost before age 65 years – United States, 1980–1991’, Morbidity and Mortality 
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•	 A total of 26,009 homicides were reported nationally in 1993, of 
which 71% (18,466) were firearm related. Overall rates of homi-
cide increased from 1985 to 1991 and decreased from 1992 to 1994. 
During these two periods, rates for total firearm-related homicides 
and homicide among people aged 15–24 years increased and then 
stabilised, but remained at record high levels.29
•	 For every person killed by a gun, another 2.5 are injured seriously 
enough to be admitted to hospital. An estimated 99,025 people 
were treated for non-fatal firearm-related injuries in US hospital 
emergency departments in 1992.30
•	 In 1992 the US had more gun dealers (about 245,000) than petrol 
stations (about 210,000).31 Since recent law reform outlawing 
‘kitchen table’ dealerships, the number of dealerships has fallen to 
a mere 142,094.32
In summary, the US has nearly 14 times Australia’s population. It 
has 69 times our total gun deaths, and 172 times Australia’s gun homi-
cides (Table 2.3). By contrast, Japan has nearly seven times Australia’s 
population, yet has nearly six times fewer gun deaths and nearly three 
times fewer gun homicides.
Weekly Report, 1994, 43: 609–11.
29 US Centers for Disease Control. ‘Trends in rates of homicide – United 
States, 1985–1994’, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 1996, 45: 460–64.
30 Annest JL, Mercy JA, Gibson DR, Ryan GW. ‘National estimates of non-
fatal firearm-related injuries: beyond the tip of the iceberg’, JAMA, 1995, 273: 
1749–54.
31 Violence Policy Center. ‘More gun dealers than gas stations: a study of 
federally licensed firearms dealers in America’, Washington: 1992.
32 Violence Policy Center. ‘Number of gun dealers plummets by 100,000 in 
two years’, press release, 15 May 1996. Washington.
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Table 2.3 Gun deaths and rates per 100,000 compared: US, Canada, Australia, 
Japan33
US Canada Australia Japan
Total annual
gun deaths
36,985 (14.05) 189 (4.08) 536 (3.05) 93 (0.07)
Total gun
homicides
16,524 (7.23) 176 (3.35) 96 (2.38) 34 (0.04)
Gun violence in England, Wales and Scotland
The gun control and gun violence situation in mainland Great Britain 
(excluding Northern Ireland, because of the continuing sectarian vio-
lence there) is particularly instructive. In a population of 57 million, 
Great Britain has very low rates of gun violence compared to those of 
Australia and the United States. Table 2.4 shows that the gun homi-
cide rate in England and Wales is eight times less than in Australia, and 
nearly 56 times lower than the US rate. The gun suicide rate is nine 
times lower than Australia’s and 19 times lower than it is in the US.
After the 1987 Hungerford massacre, Britain banned virtually all 
semi-automatic rifles in 1988 from private ownership. In response to 
the Cullen report on the March 1996 Dunblane massacre, the British 
Government passed The Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997 which 
banned all private possession of handguns over .22 calibre and all multi-
shot .22s. Tony Blair’s new Labour Government, elected in June 1997, 
lost no time in outlawing all private ownership of handguns, attribut-
ing the decision to the Dunblane shootings. Intriguingly, Lord Cullen’s 
report did not apply the reasoning behind his recommendations about 
ex-residential handgun storage, to all guns. He wrote: 
the range of uses for [guns other than handguns] is very dif-
ferent. Thus the considerations relating to the possession and 
33 Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, United Nations Office at 
Vienna. United Nations Study on Firearm Regulation. Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, Vienna 28 April–9 May 1997: 79.
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use of shotguns are concerned with very different areas of 
activity from those relating to handguns. I am not persuaded 
that it is justifiable to approach all these types in essentially 
the same manner.
One cannot hunt or target-shoot with rifles and shotguns inside 
homes. But long arms are often stolen from homes, entering the crim-
inal subculture. Being more common than handguns, shotguns and 
rifles are also more commonly used in domestic homicides and sui-
cides. Having to take the time and trouble to check out a shotgun from 
a community armoury can put a critical cooling-off period between a 
raging impulse to shoot oneself or one’s family and actually doing it. 
It is regrettable that Lord Cullen apparently chose to apply his terms 
of reference only to ‘public’ safety from guns, when gun murder and 
suicide behind the closed doors of gun owners’ houses claim more lives 
each year.34
The NCGC frequently exemplified Britain’s strict gun control post 
Hungerford and low death rates as the direction Australia should take. 
The gun lobby had no answers to this, except to claim that as Britain’s 
gun laws had become tougher, its gun crime rate had risen. In fact, 
between 1993 and 1994 both gun homicide and armed robbery fell in 
Britain (Table 2.4). But this did not stop the gun lobby claiming that 
‘firearm deaths are increasing at a higher rate than [in] the so-called 
“gun crazy” United States’.35
34 Chapman S. ‘Getting guns out of homes’ (editorial), British Medical 
Journal, 1996, 313: 1030.
35 Howden J. ‘Shooting from the hip on gun debate’, Newcastle Herald, 3 
April 1996.
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Table 2.4. England, Wales and Scotland: offences in which a firearm was 
reported to have been used36
Year All offences* Homicide Attempted 
murder
Robbery  
& assault
1993 15,727 82 1,388 6,014
1994 14,755 75 1,445 4,475
Change -6.1% -8.5% +4.1% -25.6%
* Includes offences such as criminal damage using a gun, reckless conduct.
The gun lobby has argued that high gun homicide rates in some 
nations result not from high gun ownership, but from high levels of 
‘violent culture’, which manifests itself in gun homicides.37 On this 
basis, nations which do not have ‘violent cultures’ can safely have access 
to guns without this translating into high rates of gun homicide. The 
gun lobby put this argument in submissions to the Dunblane inquiry. 
Unfortunately for the gun lobby, the argument that Britain is a ‘less vio-
lent’ and less crime-ridden nation than the US does not stand up to 
scrutiny. Table 2.5 lists rates of various crimes in the US and in England 
and Wales. It shows that property crime and non-gun assault rates are 
actually higher in England and Wales than in the US. This contradicts 
the suggestion that the British ‘culture’ is inherently less ‘criminal’ than 
the American, as the gun lobby seeks to imply. Gun-related crime rates, 
though, are dramatically different – suggesting that the availability of 
guns increases both fatal and non-fatal gun crime considerably more 
than might be expected from differences in recorded levels for other 
offences.
36 Evidence submitted on behalf of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the 
Home Secretary to Lord Cullen’s Inquiry Into the Circumstances Leading Up 
To and Surrounding the Events at Dunblane Primary School on Wednesday 
13 March 1996. 30 April 1996: 46. 
37 Mayhew P. op. cit., 7.
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Table 2.5. Rates of various crimes in the US and England and Wales (per 1 
million population, 1990–1994 averages)38
Crime England & Wales US E&W/US ratio
Burglary 24,340 11,590 1: 0.48
Vehicle theft 10,960 6,290 1: 0.57
Non-gun assaults 3,860 3,290 1: 0.9
Non-gun robberies 890 1,540 1: 1.7
Non-gun homicides 12.4 30.4 1: 2.4
Gun assaults 53 1,045 1: 20
Gun robberies 98 1,033 1: 11
Gun homicides 1.2 63.6 1: 52
Gun violence in Japan
The extremely low gun death rate in Japan is an object lesson for other 
nations. Japan has the world’s toughest gun laws. Citizens are not per-
mitted to own handguns or swords. In 1971 the Japanese Government 
stopped the private transfer of all rifles then held by citizens, and 
required family heirs to surrender guns when the owners died. As a 
result, by 1986 only 27,000 people were licensed to keep a rifle or shot-
gun39 and the number of licensed guns fell from 652,000 in 1981 to 
493,373 in 1989.40 In 1992 Japan had 133 million people (seven times 
Australia’s population of 17.5 million), yet in 1995 just 34 people were 
murdered with guns – about one-third of Australia’s gun homicide 
total. More people were shot dead at Port Arthur in one afternoon than 
in Japan in all of 1995.
38 Ibid, 10.
39 National Police Agency, Japanese Government. White paper on police 1986 
(excerpt), Trans. Tokyo: Police Association, 1986: 79.
40 National Police Agency, Japanese Government. White paper on police 1990 
(excerpt), Trans. Tokyo: Police Association, 1990: 80.
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Despite this, the editor of Australian Gun Sports told his readers: 
‘Japan has a high murder rate and its people are prohibited from owning 
firearms.’41 The NCGC repeatedly raised the example of Japan in media 
interviews and radio compere John Laws emphasised it many times. Yet 
a SSAA pamphlet distributed in December 1996 stated: ‘Even though 
guns are virtually prohibited in Japan their murder rate is the same as 
Australia’s – a fact gun prohibitionists never mention.’ The pamphlet 
cited the World Health Organisation as its source.42 The reason why 
‘gun prohibitionists’ such as the NCGC never mention this ‘fact’ about 
Japan is because it is utter nonsense. At 0.7/100,000, Japan has the 
world’s lowest homicide rate.
Gun violence in Switzerland
For many years the gun lobby has played what it believes is a rhetori-
cal trump card in promoting the case of Switzerland, a nation whose 
civilian militia is said to hold some 400,000 military guns at home. By 
European standards, Switzerland has a low rate of homicide overall and 
a middle-range rate of homicide by guns (Table 2.1). The gun lobby 
believes this proves that heavily armed populations can live in safety. 
Immediately after Port Arthur it seemed that every second opponent 
of gun law reforms felt he had had the final word if he cited the case of 
Switzerland.43
Martin Killias, a Swiss resident, has pointed out that the image of 
Switzerland as a society with unrestricted access to guns is a ‘crimi-
nological myth’.44 The firearms kept in many Swiss homes are military 
guns that many citizens are obliged to keep as a part of their nation’s 
civil militia. This kind of gun ownership differs fundamentally from 
that in countries like Australia and the US. The social meaning of gun 
41 Galea R. ‘Howard’s hidden agendas?’, Australian Gun Sports, 2 June 1996: 6.
42 SSAA. Gun control: the facts, op. cit.
43 Roudenko A. ‘One in 10,000’ (letter), SMH, 8 May 1996: 16.
44 Killias M. ‘Gun ownership and violent crime: the Swiss experience in 
international perspective’, Security Journal, 1990, 1(3): 169–74.
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ownership has much more to do with Swiss civic responsibility than 
any personal interest in guns.45 Further, as one writer to the Sydney 
Morning Herald pointed out, the gun lobby seldom acknowledges that 
in Switzerland both arms and ammunition must be kept under strict 
locked storage conditions that are checked every year.46 The military 
weapons are heavy and difficult to carry inconspicuously, and military 
ammunition is not sold. There are extremely harsh penalties for fail-
ure to comply with these storage requirements and for any misuse of 
the military weapons. In terms of non-military firearm ownership, the 
Swiss gun law is ‘definitely not among the most liberal in Europe’.47
As for gun violence, Killias noted that Switzerland has a high rate of 
gun homicide and one of the highest rates of gun suicide in Europe (see 
Table 2.1). This evidence, he says, contradicts the contention that the 
high gun ownership rate in Switzerland is not accompanied by frequent 
illegal use.48 In fact the Swiss Government and people themselves believe 
guns are too easily available: in 1996 the population voted overwhelm-
ingly to replace their patchwork of cantonal gun laws with one national 
law. At the time of writing, the new national law, which is stricter than 
the old cantonal laws, was expected to pass through Parliament.
Killias’ work confirms what would seem to be intuitively the case: 
that societies with high rates of gun ownership pay the price with high 
rates of gun death, and those with strict gun controls tend to have low 
death rates. Easy access to guns places lethal and efficient killing instru-
ments in the hands of people who might otherwise use less efficient 
means.
45 Harding R. ‘Gun use in crime, rational choice, and social learning theory, 
in Clarke RV, Felson M (eds). Routine activity and rational choice. Advances 
in criminological theory vol. 5. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993: 
95.
46 Looser E. ‘Careless with the truth’ (letter), SMH, 18 May 1996.
47 Killias M. ‘Gun ownership and violent crime: the Swiss experience in 
international perspective’, Security Journal, 1990, 1(3): 170.
48 Ibid, 174.
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The gun lobby constantly disputes the relationship between gun 
availability and gun violence. A SSAA official agreed that the US as a 
whole had a high gun death rate, but insisted, ‘there are many American 
States with murder rates as low as anywhere in the world that are safer 
to live in than parts of Australia. North Dakota and Nebraska are 
two examples’.49 The reminder that there are some peaceful places in 
America was little comfort to Australians when our own quiet little 
backwater, Tasmania, was so savagely rocked by gun violence. (Although 
Tasmania’s ‘quiet’ reputation was hardly deserved. Along with the most 
liberal gun laws in the country, it has the highest rate of firearm deaths.)
One senior journalist reviewing the gun control debate concluded: 
‘The crux of the guns lobby’s argument – that there is no relationship 
between the murder rate and the level of gun ownership – simply is not 
tenable. It makes about as much sense as saying that there is no connec-
tion between the road toll and the number of cars, and moreover that 
Formula One cars should be allowed on the open road.’50
Suicide prevention
Since 81% of all Australian gun deaths are suicides, suicide prevention 
is clearly a major goal of gun control policy. Public gun massacres and 
other homicides capture more media attention, but are statistically over-
shadowed by gun suicides as the main type of gun death. Opponents of 
gun control believe restricting access to firearms will not prevent sui-
cides because people who are unhappy will kill themselves anyway, by 
another method. But expert opinion suggests that only a proportion of 
people intent on suicide will substitute other methods. Of those who 
do, many will substitute less lethal methods and therefore have a greater 
chance of survival. Suicide prevention is the primary reason why the 
campaign for tighter gun laws has been strongly supported by the Royal 
Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, the Australian 
49 Ziccone S. ‘In defence of arms’, The Age, 10 May 1996: A15.
50 Steketee M. ‘Culture of violence demands tight controls’, The Australian, 11 
May 1996. 
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Medical Association, Suicide Prevention Australia, the Public Health 
Association, the Australian College for Emergency Medicine, and the 
Centre for Adolescent Health – among others.
Many suicide attempts are not planned well in advance. Many are 
relatively impulsive acts, precipitated by bouts of depression or inci-
dents such as sexual conflict or financial crises.51 A Scottish study of 522 
self-poisonings, for example, found that two-thirds were impulsive.52 
Many suicide attempts occur when the person’s judgment is impaired 
by intoxication.
Choice of suicide method by individuals and across different 
populations may be influenced by many factors: availability, cultural 
acceptability, technical skills (for example, being able to tie a fail-safe 
noose), whether planning is necessary, certainty of death, time taken 
to die, scope for second thoughts, chances of intervention, courage 
needed, perceived consequences of failure such as pain, disfigurement 
or humiliation, consequences for others (for example, danger, contami-
nating the family ‘nest’), scope for concealing or publicising the suicide, 
symbolism, cultural ritual (for example, Japanese hara-kiri, seppuku, 
shinju and oyako-shinju) and dramatic impact.53
Whatever the relevance of the above to the choice of using a gun, 
three factors stand out as highly important: 
Many more suicide attempts arise from temporary despair, rather 
than from a genuine decision to die. A Sydney hospital conducted 
an eight-year retrospective study of 33 survivors of self-inflicted fire-
arm injury, finding that most were young men who did not suffer from 
major depression or psychosis. Most shootings occurred in the context 
51 Easteal P. ‘Homicide-suicides between adult sexual intimates: an 
Australian study’, Suicide Life Threatening Behaviour, 1994, 24: 140–51.
52 Kessel N. ‘Self-poisoning’, in Shneidman ES (ed.). Essays in self destruction. 
New York: Science House, 1976.
53 Dudley M, Cantor C, de Moore G. ‘Jumping the gun: firearms and 
the mental health of Australians’, Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Psychiatry, 1996, 30: 370–81.
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of personal disputes with sexual partners or family members. They shot 
themselves impulsively in a crisis, were not psychotic, and had ready 
access to firearms.54 Significantly, after medical and counselling inter-
vention, almost none of the survivors attempted suicide again. This 
contradicts the popular misconception that ‘they’ll do it again anyway’; 
that is, that suicidal people will kill themselves no matter what efforts 
are made to prevent them from doing so. For every suicide in Australia, 
it has been estimated that there are 30–40 attempts (parasuicides).55
Guns are a particularly efficient means of killing. Different methods of 
attempting suicide have different ‘completion’ or fatality rates. In NSW, 
for example, attempts using guns are second only to hanging (see Table 
2.6). The contrast in completion rates is particularly stark between 
firearms (75%) and the most common methods of attempting suicide 
– slashing oneself (6%) and drug overdoses (4%). The data suggest that 
if more people attempting suicide used guns, the number of suicide 
deaths would almost certainly rise. Alternatively, if more ‘attempters’ 
used knives, razors or drugs instead of guns, the number of suicides 
would fall. If access to guns was more difficult, some attempting sui-
cide – particularly in impulsive contexts – might chose these less fatal 
methods.
Suicidal intent can dissipate in the time taken to locate or construct 
a method of attempting suicide. If a gun is not immediately available, 
by the time it is obtained or a substitute method found, the suicidal 
crisis may be over. US research suggests the availability of a highly 
lethal method like a gun in a house can precipitate an impulsive suicide 
attempt.56 In other words, the availability of firearms influences not only 
54 DeMoore GM, Plew JD, Bray KM, Snars JN. ‘Survivors of self-inflicted 
firearm injury – a liaison psychiatry perspective’, Medical Journal of Australia, 
1994, 160: 421–25.
55 Davis AT, Schruder C. ‘The prediction of suicide’, Medical Journal of 
Australia, 1990, 53: 552–54.
56 US Centers for Disease Control. Youth Suicide prevention programs: a 
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the outcome of an attempt, but also the likelihood of a person attempt-
ing suicide at all.
Hanging has a suicide fatality rate comparable to that of firearms. So if 
a gun was not available, might not those seriously attempting suicide 
choose a rope, which of course is readily accessible? ‘Why don’t you try 
to ban ropes!’ the gun lobby may sneer. Obviously some attempters may 
indeed choose hanging if a gun is not available. But hanging requires 
skill with knots, a suitable location and a degree of organisation. Some 
may reject this method as too difficult and too likely to fail.
Table 2.6. Suicide attempts resulting in death or hospitalisation in NSW, 199257
Method Attempts Died 
without 
hospital-
isation
Hospi-
talised
Died in 
hospital
Survived Fatality 
rate (%)
Hanging 230 186 44 2 42 82
Firearms 211 145 66 13 53 75
Motor 
vehicle 
exhaust gas
203 127 76 4 72 65
Jumping 
from a 
high place
102 56 46 3 43 58
Cutting & 
piercing 
instru-
ments
382 19 363 4 359 6
Poisoning 
with drugs
2975 99 2876 13 2863 4
Others 360 56 304 14 290 19
Total 4463 688 3775 53 3722 17
resource guide. September 1992.
57 Sayer G, Stewart G, Cripps J. ‘Suicide attempts in NSW: associated mortality 
and morbidity’, NSW Public Health Bulletin, 1996, 7(6): 55–59, 63. 
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There is an extensive body of research on whether people intent 
on suicide switch to alternative methods if the first choice of suicide is 
unavailable.58 There is compelling evidence from the UK on the impor-
tance of limiting access to easily accessible, culturally accepted means of 
suicide. In England and Wales between 1963 and 1975, the number of 
suicides suddenly and unexpectedly declined from 5,714 to 3,693 when 
suicide rates were rising in most European nations.59 The fall was almost 
wholly attributed to the detoxification of domestic gas when carbon 
monoxide was removed from the gas supply. Many people attempting 
suicide did not switch to other means when they were no longer able to 
kill themselves in their homes using a gas oven or heater.
But what about gun control? Does restricting access to firearms 
prevent suicides? Canadian criminologist Thomas Gabor identified 16 
local, national or international studies conducted since 1980 on firearm 
availability and suicide rates.60 He observed that 15 of the 16 studies 
found a strong link between gun availability and gun suicides. (The only 
study not confirming this relationship was conducted by Gary Kleck, 
the researcher whose work is most heavily relied on by the gun lobby.) 
Gabor found eight of these 15 studies also concluded that high gun 
availability led to higher suicide rates overall. Six found no relationship, 
and one study did not consider overall suicide trends. But Gabor noted 
that if the two factors were not connected at all, one would expect to see 
a balance of positive and negative correlations in the research results; 
for example, some studies suggesting that high gun ownership reduces 
suicide rates. The absence of any such studies led Gabor to conclude 
that the research is ‘strongly suggestive of a link between suicide and 
firearm availability’. Even more important for clinicians, counsellors 
58 Clarke RV, Lester D. Suicide: closing the exits. New York: Springer-Verlag, 
1989; Marzuk PM et al. ‘The effect of access to lethal methods of injury on 
suicide rates’, Archives of General Psychiatry, 1992, 49: 451–58.
59 Clarke RV, Mayhew P. ‘The British gas suicide story and its criminological 
implications’, Crime and Justice, 1988, 10: 79–116.
60 Gabor T. ‘The impact of the availability of firearms on violent crime, 
suicide, and accidental death’, Department of Justice Canada, 1994.
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and families to keep in mind is the evidence from case-control studies 
of the relationship between domestic gun availability and suicide. Three 
important US studies have found that the presence of a gun in the home 
increases the risk of suicide.61
Domestic violence
Gun control has long been a concern of those working to reduce domestic 
violence in Australia. The largest category of homicides (around 40%) 
is domestic, and guns are more commonly used in family killings than 
among homicides in general. A NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research study noted: ‘The difference between a fatal and a non-fatal 
episode of domestic violence may be entirely due to the presence of a 
dangerous weapon such as a gun.’62 US Research shows that domestic 
assaults involving guns are three times more likely to result in death 
than those with knives; 23 times more likely than unarmed assaults; and 
12 times more likely than non-firearm assaults overall.63
Victim surveys confirm abundant anecdotal evidence from domes-
tic violence groups that guns are frequently used to intimidate women 
and children in their homes. For example, 14% of victims who con-
tacted the 1988 Queensland domestic violence phone-in said they had 
61 Brent DA, Perper JA, Allman CJ, Moritz GM, Wartella ME, Zelenak JP. 
‘The presence and accessibility of firearms in the homes of adolescent suicides: 
a case-control study’, Journal of the American Medical Association, 1991, 
266: 2989–95; Brent DA, Perper JA, Goldstein CE, Kolko DJ, Allman MJ, 
Allman CJ, Zelenak JP. ‘Risk factors for adolescent suicide’, Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 1988, 45: 581–88; Kellermann AL, Rivara FP, Somes G, Reay DT, 
Francisco J, Banton JG, Prodzinski J, Fligner C, Hackman BB. ‘Suicide in the 
home in relation to gun ownership’, New England Journal of Medicine, 1992, 
327: 467–72.
62 Devery C. ‘Domestic violence in NSW: a regional analysis’, NSW Bureau of 
Crime Statistics and Research, 1992: 9.
63 Saltzman LE, Mercy JA, O’Carroll PW, Rosenberg ML, Rhodes PH. 
‘Weapon involvement and injury outcomes in family and intimate assaults’, 
Journal of the American Medical Association, 1992, 267: 3043–47.
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been threatened or injured with a gun.64 In 1991 Sydney’s Domestic 
Violence Advocacy Service (DVAS) reported that 15% of clients said 
their partners had a gun.65 The DVAS and other agencies have described 
some of the ways guns are used to terrorise family members, including 
direct threats, shooting pets as a warning, mock executions, sleeping 
with the gun nearby, and cleaning the gun during or after arguments, 
especially during custody disputes.
Danielle Mazza’s recent study of 1,500 women attending their doctor 
found that of those women who were in couple relationships, one in 50 
had been threatened with a knife or a gun in the previous year, and one 
in 100 had had a knife or gun used against them.66 The 1996 Women’s 
Safety Survey revealed that 0.5% of all Australian women – that is, about 
34,500 – had been either threatened or harmed with a knife or gun in 
the previous 12 months.67 However vicious and traumatic a knife threat 
or attack may be, the availability of a gun greatly increases the likeli-
hood of conflict or depression leading to death.
64 Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force. ‘Beyond these walls’, Brisbane 
1988.
65 Domestic Violence Advocacy Service (NSW). Domestic Violence Advocacy 
Service 1986–1991: the first five years. Sydney 1991.
66 Mazza D. ‘Guns and domestic violence’, Paper presented to Guns, Violence 
and Victims, Australian Medical Association conference, Canberra, 28 June 
1996.
67 Australian Bureau of Statistics. Women’s Safety Australia 1996. ABS 
Canberra, 1996: 16.
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The campaign for gun control
The Port Arthur massacre was at least the fifth tragedy in recent years 
to expedite reform of a country’s gun laws. In August 1987, after 
Michael Ryan shot 16 people at Hungerford, Berkshire, UK, the British 
Government introduced the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 which 
effectively prohibited the private ownership of most self-loading rifles 
and shotguns in Britain. In 1989 Patrick Purdy, 24, returned to his ele-
mentary school in Stockton California and fired at least 105 rounds 
from an AK–47 military-style semi-automatic rifle with a 75-round 
drum magazine. He killed five children and injured another 30 before 
killing himself. The outrage over these killings is widely held to have 
precipitated the eventual banning of newly manufactured or imported 
assault rifles in the US on 13 September 1994. (This law did not prevent 
the possession or sale of any such weapons already in the country, nor 
of the vast numbers of them stockpiled by gun dealers before enactment 
of the bill).1
The 6 December 1989 shooting murder of 14 women at Montreal’s 
Ecole Polytechnique also set in train what eventually became gun con-
trol Bill C–68, passed in the Canadian Parliament on 6 December 1995. 
Among its most important provisions, this law required the registration 
of all firearms – something always implacably opposed by gun lobbies 
throughout the world.
1 McCarron SM. Summary of Firearms Provisions of Federal Crime Control 
Law, enacted 13 September 1994. Undated Fact Sheet, US Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms, Washington DC.
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The Dunblane Primary School massacre on 13 March 1996, when 
Thomas Hamilton killed 16 children and their teacher, prompted the 
British Government to ban all handguns of a higher calibre than .22, 
and ban people from keeping any handguns in the home.2 This was sub-
sequently extended to a ban on all private ownership of handguns.
Like the Hungerford, Californian, Canadian and Dunblane shoot-
ings, the Port Arthur massacre became the catalyst for a quantum leap in 
gun law reform. Australian gun control groups had long advocated the 
measures agreed by the Australasian Police Ministers Council (APMC), 
both in the media and in representations to politicians. But before Port 
Arthur, national uniform gun laws based on the registration of all guns 
and banning all semi-automatic rifles seemed only a remote possibility.
Advocacy for gun control before Port Arthur
The gun control movement in Australia had its first manifestations in 
the Committee to Register all Guns, set up by families and friends of 
two teenage girls, Margaret Bacsa and Ella Rosvoll, shot dead in the late 
1960s in Victoria. In 1981 Professor Richard Harding of the University 
of Western Australia published his pioneering book, Firearms and vio-
lence in Australian life,3 and convened the first Australian conference on 
the subject.4 Around this time the Council to Control Gun Misuse was 
established in Victoria and began lobbying the state government there.5 
Advocacy for gun control accelerated after the shooting murder of four 
2 Lord Cullen. ‘The Public Inquiry into the Shootings at Dunblane Primary 
School on 13 March 1996’, Report presented by the Secretary of State for 
Scotland by Command of Her Majesty Oct 1996 London: The Stationary 
Office; The Public Inquiry into the Shootings at Dunblane Primary School on 
13 March 1996. The Government Response.
3 Harding R. Firearms and violence in Australian life. Perth: University of 
Western Australia Press, 1981.
4 Firearms: laws and use. Proceedings of First Australian National 
Conference, Perth, Western Australia, 25–27 June 1981.
5 Crook J. Issues in gun control. 2nd edn. Chelsea: Gun Control Australia, 
1994. 
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teenage girls in the Sydney suburb of Pymble in 1987, followed by a 
spate of mass killings in the late 1980s in Sydney, Melbourne and South 
Australia. Coalitions for Gun Control were established in Tasmania 
(1987), Victoria (around 1988), and NSW (around 1990). Another 
group, Gun Control Australia, formed under the leadership of John 
Crook, a retiree who had written a masters thesis on the subject.
By the time of Port Arthur, these years of advocacy, supplemented 
by efforts from a diverse range of health, legal, academic, church, trade 
union, women’s and community groups, had established widespread 
public support for the main platforms of gun control. Table 3.1 sets 
out some recent opinion poll data on gun control in Australia, show-
ing the consistently huge community support for stronger controls. But 
progress had been slow and ad hoc, with isolated legal reforms made by 
individual states and territories. A rational, comprehensive and national 
uniform gun control scheme was urgently needed.
Table 3.1: Recent surveys of community opinion about gun control
Poll Question asked Results (percentages)
Saulwick Poll, 
August 19916
‘Should semi-automatics be banned?’ Yes: Sydney 90, 
Melbourne 89
AGB-McNair, July 
19957
‘Would you support or oppose gun 
laws that make it more difficult to buy 
guns in NSW? Is that strongly support/
oppose or support/oppose?’
64 strongly support; 
18 support
North Sydney Local 
Govt Elections, 
September 1995
‘Should there be tougher gun control 
legislation in NSW including gun 
registration?’
93.1 in favour
AGB McNair 
national phone poll 
2,058, 3–5 May 1996
‘Do you support or oppose [a ban 
on all automatic and semi-automatic 
guns]?’
Support: National 90, 
NSW 91, Vic 90, Qld 
86, SA/NT 89, WA 
91, Tas 95, ACT 92. 
City: 91, Rural: 88
6 Hicks I. ‘Most support bans on guns’, SMH, 20 August 1991: 4.
7 Herald AGB McNair Poll. ‘Should gun purchase be more difficult?’, SMH, 8 
August 1995.
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Poll Question asked Results (percentages)
‘Do you support or oppose a register 
of all guns?’
National: 95, NSW 
95, Vic 97, Qld 93, 
SA/NT 96, WA 96, 
Tas 92, ACT 97. City: 
96, Rural: 93
Morgan national poll 
526 voters, 1–2 June 
19968
‘Do you agree or disagree with John 
Howard’s new gun control laws?’
Agree: 80; Disagree: 
18
Morgan national poll 
526 voters, 1–2 June 
19969
‘Would you vote against a political
candidate if advised by a gun group?’
Yes: 4; No/don’t 
support: 96
A National Gun Summit convened by then Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke on 22 December 1987 – after the Queen Street massacre in 
Melbourne – failed to achieve consensus on national gun laws or even a 
national ban on military-style semi-automatics.9 The most entrenched 
opposition came from Tasmania and Queensland. Ironically, as it tran-
spires, NSW Premier Barrie Unsworth walked out of that meeting 
declaring with disgust: ‘It will take a massacre in Tasmania before we 
get gun law reform in Australia.’10 Victorian Premier John Cain echoed 
this: ‘I hope it’s not true that some other disaster has to occur, maybe to 
our south [that is, Tasmania], to try and make those people understand 
the gravity of the problem we have.’11 (After Port Arthur, Unsworth 
commented on the huge advances that had occurred: ‘It has been 
remarkable how [Tasmania’s Premier] Rundle has changed [his mind] 
so quickly, because back then Tasmania did not care what happened . . . 
these things did not happen in its backyard.’)12
From 1987 most jurisdictions did make some improvements in 
their gun laws. For example: 
8 Murphy D. ‘Popgun politics’, The Bulletin, 11 June 1996: 14–8.
9 Unsworth B. ‘Failure on guns an affront’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
10 Byrne A. ‘Unsworth gloomy on summit’, SMH, 3 May 1996.
11 Archival footage from 23 December 1987, 7.30 Report, ABC TV, 10 May 1996.
12 Byrne A. op. cit.
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•	 Victoria tightened restrictions on semi-automatic long-arms after 
the 1987 Hoddle Street and Queen Street massacres.
•	 The ACT introduced a new Weapons Act in 1991, requiring firearm 
registration and (in some cases) proof of reason for ownership.
•	 In NSW, the Labor Government completely overhauled the gun 
law between 1985 and 1988. (Ironically, Labor’s legislation at that 
time was very similar to the scheme established after Port Arthur 
by the APMC.) Labor’s law was overturned when the government 
changed in 1988; and the new Liberal-National Government waited 
until 1992 to introduce a few improvements such as compulsory 
cancellation of gun licences for domestic violence offenders.
•	 In 1990 the Queensland Parliament enacted that state’s first law reg-
ulating rifles and shotguns – henceforth a licence was required to 
own or buy guns.
•	 In 1991 Tasmania passed a similar law. The Bill was still before the 
Tasmanian Parliament in September 1991 when Wade Frankum 
killed eight people with a military-style semi-automatic in Sydney’s 
Strathfield shopping mall. The Tasmanian Parliament responded by 
giving the Police Minister the power to ban rapid-fire centre-fire 
weapons. He did not use that power until one week after the Port 
Arthur massacre.
Gun control had been on the agenda of 20 out of 29 meetings of the 
nation’s police ministers’ conferences, and two previous special meet-
ings had been held on the subject.13 Despite the efforts of some states 
and individual police ministers to broker a workable agreement on uni-
form laws, in early 1996 Australia seemed no closer to achieving it. The 
most fundamental element of any uniform scheme had to be universal 
firearm registration, and the refusal by NSW, Queensland and Tasmania 
to cooperate over this left Australia with a legal patchwork of astonish-
ing inconsistency.
13 Millett M. ‘Howard’s gun gamble’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
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For example, the differences between the states meant that guns 
declared illegal in one state could be purchased in another and then 
taken back over the border. With no requirement for gun registration in 
the first state, there would be no record of the guns bought, or taken out 
of that state. In Australia as in the US, this inconsistency allowed people 
to exploit state laws by freely moving banned weapons interstate.14 In 
1995, a journalist from Channel 9’s A Current Affair, who did not have 
a shooter’s licence, travelled to Tasmania, looked in the ‘for sale’ sec-
tion of the Hobart Mercury for a military-style semi-automatic, bought 
two (plus ammunition) with consummate ease and then handed the 
guns to the Tasmanian police – all on national television.15 The embar-
rassed Tasmanian Government threatened to charge the journalist 
with obtaining a gun without a licence. The Police Minister ordered an 
investigation into the matter, and police interviewed the journalist and 
gun control activist Roland Browne (who had been interviewed on A 
Current Affair). This was the same Police Minister who had refused to 
ban military weapons, while Tasmania had banned free access to fire-
works in 1992 because of the annual injury toll to children.
After the Strathfield massacre in 1991, the military-style semi-
automatic rifles Bryant used at Port Arthur were banned from sale in all 
jurisdictions except Tasmania and Queensland, where they remained 
freely available. Tasmania even had its own gun manufacturing 
industry: Hobart boasted Australia’s only private factory, Australian 
Automatic Arms, producing military-style semi-automatic rifles until 
1993 for export and local sales. Anyone travelling to Queensland or 
Tasmania could readily purchase such a weapon from a local gun owner 
and take it to their home state where, though technically illegal, it would 
be unregistered and therefore highly unlikely to come to the attention 
of police.
Just a month before the Port Arthur massacre, the Sydney Morning 
Herald reported the findings of a state-wide public opinion poll 
14 Anon. ‘Historic pact on gun reforms’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
15 Darby A. ‘Nightmare shatters the island of dreams’, SMH, 30 April 1996.
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conducted for the NSW Health Department.16 Three questions on 
attitudes to gun control were asked among some 90 covering a wide 
range of health issues. In the developmental stages of the survey, I 
had been invited to submit questions on gun control that would be 
important to future policy debate. The number of people questioned 
(2,251) made this the largest Australian sample ever invited to answer 
questions on gun control. As with the previous opinion polls shown 
in Table 3.1, a large majority of those interviewed (90%) supported 
gun registration. Support was also very high among rural respondents 
(83%) and among gun owners, or at least those who reported having a 
gun on their property (69.3%).
Despite these figures, Health Minister Dr Andrew Refshauge pub-
licly dismissed the study and its findings, claiming it to be ‘no better 
than an opinion poll’ – referring to the very same tool political parties 
routinely use to guide policy-making in most fields of government. He 
told a news conference: ‘It is not found that there is any link between 
gun control and reduction of gun violence.’ I learned that Refshauge’s 
office had angrily demanded an explanation from Health Department 
officials: Why had the gun questions been included in the question-
naire? Why had their release not been cleared through his office? This 
strongly implied an intention to suppress release of the results, given an 
opportunity. NSW Labor still feared upsetting the gun lobby or having 
to take positive steps about gun control.
In NSW the gun control campaign focused on universal firearm 
registration, without which other gun control measures are doomed to 
fail. The Carr Labor Government, like its immediate predecessors (the 
Fahey and Greiner Liberal governments) had been constantly pressured 
to introduce registration. Almost every reported shooting brought a 
reiteration of public and media criticism of these governments being 
‘soft on guns’. The standard policy response from governments was an 
amnesty allowing shooters to surrender their guns. Voluntary, uncom-
pensated amnesties prompt a relatively small number of gun owners 
16 Lagan B, Lamont L. ‘Major push to register all weapons’, SMH, 22 March 
1996: 1.
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to hand in their weapons’, but there are usually enough to create public 
relations opportunities for governments to boast that they are ‘doing 
something’.17 NSW Police Minister Paul Whelan admitted as much on 
ABC TV’s Lateline: 
Whelan: It [the latest amnesty] actually went up to nine-and-
a-half thousand .  .  . it worked quite successfully .  .  . that’s 
nine-and-a-half thousand guns that had been removed from 
New South Wales.
Maxine McKew: But it’s a drop in the bucket, isn’t it?
Whelan: Well it is in the totality .  .  . it’s a step in the right 
direction.18
In NSW the latest amnesty began seven months before Port Arthur, 
in response to the shooting of two police at Crescent Head. On 21 
September 1995, an ebullient Premier Bob Carr sat in the parliamen-
tary press room next to Police Minister Paul Whelan and the Shooters’ 
Party’s solitary MP, John Tingle, to announce an all-new amnesty for 
unlicensed shooters. Under the plan, unlicensed gun owners could 
shuffle their feet over the next 12 months and ponder surrendering their 
weapons to police or selling them to gun shops. Backed with a K-Tel-
style offer of a $15 smoke detector voucher from a hardware chainstore 
– a set of free steak knives was seen as inappropriate – this, in the words 
of Carr’s press release, was ‘action’ to reduce guns in the community.
But wait! There was more! Without presenting a shred of evidence, 
and notwithstanding that licences were already free for farmers, Tingle 
had convinced the Government that the $75 licence fee should be 
dropped during the amnesty. Designed as an incentive to encourage 
17 Bearup G. ‘Amnesty reaping an ugly harvest’, SMH, 3 January 1996; Larkin 
J. ‘4000 weapons handed in’, Sunday Telegraph, 28 January 1996. Larkin J. 
‘Minister to extend gun amnesty’, Sunday Telegraph, 18 February 1996; English 
B. ‘Illegal weapons given to police’, Daily Telegraph, 20 February 1996; Anon. 
‘Prolific weapons amnesty may be extended’, Newcastle Herald, 20 February 
1996; Anon. ‘Premier praises weapons amnesty’, SMH, 20 February 1996.
18 Lateline, ABC TV, 9 May 1996.
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unlicensed shooters to go legal, the free licence would also have been a 
huge incentive for thousands of low-income youths to consider buying 
a gun for the first time. No wonder Tingle looked chipper.
At 2.15pm Carr told the House that the plan followed ‘extensive 
consultations’ with Tingle and the Coalition for Gun Control. In fact, 
CGC representatives had been told of the forthcoming announcement 
by Paul Whelan only an hour previously. The group had not been con-
sulted at all, and told Whelan the plan was pitiful, refusing to endorse it.
The day before, on 20 September, the parents of 15-year-old Dali 
Handmer-Pleshet, shot dead near Mudgee in June 1993, had called for 
stronger gun laws based on gun registration.19 A week earlier, Australia’s 
first referendum on gun control, held during the North Sydney local 
government elections, resulted in 93.1% support for registration of 
long-arms – the same sort of system that had operated smoothly since 
the 1920s for handguns.20
In Parliament, Carr said further progress would depend on bipar-
tisan support from the Opposition. Opposition leader Peter Collins 
immediately got to his feet, supported the campaign and soberly 
endorsed the need for bipartisanship. If ever there was an opportu-
nity for a leader to seize the day and accept the offer, here it was. Yet 
minutes later, Carr resumed the circus that passes for parliamentary 
process, launching into an extended ridicule of Collins’ performance 
as Treasurer in the previous Government. Carr basked in vainglory 
and Collins sat glumly. Carr’s minutes-old condolences to the families 
of Dali Handmer-Pleshet and the Crescent Head police were dutifully 
recorded in Hansard, but were already out of political sight.
This sort of tokenism led some in the NSW Labor Party to become 
critical of the party’s performance on gun control. Just weeks before 
Port Arthur, one of Carr and Refshauge’s parliamentary colleagues, 
backbencher Ann Symonds – who had a long record of gun control 
advocacy – led factional criticism in the Labor Party about its poor 
19 Brown M. ‘Gun jokes led to girl’s death, court told’, SMH, 22 October 1993: 1.
20 Llewellyn M. ‘Shooters scoff at local gun vote’, SMH, 21 September 1995: 3.
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record on the issue and its willingness to appease the interests of the 
Shooters’ Party MP, John Tingle.
Tingle was a strident opponent of gun registration; instead he 
championed the rights of crime victims and advocated stiffer penalties 
for crimes involving guns.21 In promoting these two issues, his position 
was consistent with that of gun lobbies around the world, relying on the 
basic premise that there are two sorts of shooters: the responsible ones 
and the irresponsible criminals, with little or no overlap. Like most gun 
lobbyists, Tingle framed the gun control issue entirely in law and order 
terms, rather than seeing guns as in any way relevant to public health 
and safety. For Tingle, it followed that any measures designed to make 
guns less accessible to the general population should be opposed, while 
measures designed to punish those who had already misused guns 
should be supported. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, this convenient 
division of gun owners into safe versus dangerous, good versus bad, 
bears little resemblance to the facts about gun violence.
Early in 1996, another NSW parliamentarian, Alan Corbett of 
the Better Future for Our Children Party, announced his intention 
to introduce a comprehensive private member’s Bill on gun control.22 
Corbett had extensively consulted the CGC on the content of his Bill. 
Without the support of the Government or the Opposition – none 
was expected from either – there was no chance that his Bill would be 
passed. Nonetheless, two hopes were held for it: it would represent a 
model Bill lying ready for action in the right political climate; and it 
would temporarily resurrect the debate in the media, thereby acceler-
ating growing public cynicism about the mainstream political parties’ 
cowardice before the gun lobby (see Chapter 5).
In early April 1996 Professor Fred Stephens, an eminent Sydney 
surgeon, spoke for many in the community when he wrote to the Sydney 
Morning Herald: 
21 Macey R. ‘Shooters want tough penalties’, SMH, 9 June 1992: 7.
22 Sharp M. ‘Gun register push fails to win Carr over’, SMH, 27 February 
1996; Anon. ‘Sensible gun laws now’ (editorial), SMH, 23 March 1996: 36.
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successive leaders of both sides of politics show the spinal 
fortitude of a jellyfish when it comes to doing something 
really meaningful [about guns] . . . It is humbling for me to 
reflect that a political leader with integrity and a modicum of 
insight and courage could, in one act, surpass as a service to 
humanity all I have achieved in almost 40 years as a practis-
ing surgeon and professor of surgery. That one act would be 
effective limitation of gun ownership and gun availability . . .23
Just three days before the Port Arthur massacre, the Sydney Morning 
Herald published an article from the CGC arguing for universal gun 
registration. The article anticipated the imminent findings of a coronial 
inquiry into the fatal shooting of two police at Crescent Head, NSW, in 
1995.24 The coroner had received submissions from hundreds of health, 
legal, and community organisations advocating firearm registration, 
and we believed his report would include this recommendation. We 
also expected the Carr Government would try to dismiss or shelve the 
recommendation, and we wished to shame such a move before it hap-
pened. In fact another month passed before the coroner’s report was 
released, but it vindicated the CGC. The report recommended the two 
most important propositions in the CGC’s submission to the coroner: 
not only registration but also that proof of reason for gun ownership 
should be required for all gun licences. By that time the coroner’s 
inquiry had been overtaken by the APMC agreement.
Even before taking office in March 1995, Bob Carr’s public position 
had been consistently opposed to registration, because the gun lobby 
had threatened political retaliation against any government considering 
such a measure. These threats dated from a resounding defeat suffered in 
1988 by a previous NSW Labor Government after then Premier Barrie 
Unsworth had introduced tougher gun controls. His massive defeat was 
seen within Labor circles as a prime example of the gun lobby’s power 
to direct votes away from anti-gun candidates. After the 1988 defeat, 
23 Stephens F. ‘A spinal transplant called for’ (letter), SMH, 9 April 1996.
24 Chapman S. ‘A timely trigger for gun control’, SMH, 25 April 25 1996: 11.
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the NSW Labor Party hierarchy proclaimed that any talk of serious gun 
control a political no-go zone.
In 1994, when Carr was Leader of the Opposition, a coroner rec-
ommended tightening the gun laws in his report on the murder-suicide 
of twin three-year-old girls by their father. Carr responded: ‘After our 
experience in gun laws in 1988, we will take no initiative that doesn’t 
reflect the consensus in Parliament.’25
The view that Unsworth’s stance on guns led to his Government’s 
defeat has been criticised as superficial and expedient, insofar as it 
avoided a more searching examination of the public hostility to many 
initiatives of his Government linked to politicians still highly placed 
in the Labor Party in the post-Unsworth years. At worst, one analyst 
argued, only five of 20 seats lost by Labor at the 1988 election could have 
been affected by an anti-gun control vote.26 Any power the gun lobby 
had was due to the lack of bipartisanship on gun control in NSW state 
politics, which allowed the gun lobby to play one party off against the 
other. The gun lobby would typically threaten any politician or party 
supporting gun control, urging shooters to direct their preference votes 
away from that candidate.
These developments illustrate the climate of gun control in 
Australia’s most populous state just before the Port Arthur massacre. 
In summary, apart from the publicity potential of Alan Corbett’s Bill, 
and the possibility that the State Coroner might table a set of strong 
recommendations on gun control, there was no tangible prospect of 
substantial law reform on the political horizon.
Meanwhile in Tasmania, the Parliament had struggled with gun laws 
for almost a decade. Green Independent Dr Bob Brown’s Dangerous 
Weapons Control Bill, which provided for gun licensing, registration, 
safe storage and a ban on military firearms, was defeated in 1987. In 
1988 the Liberals introduced a Guns Bill modelled on a ‘prohibited 
25 Morris L. ‘60,000 decline in licensed shooters’, SMH, 30 April 1994: 5.
26 Cockburn M. ‘The gun lobby’s electoral support is much weaker than 
many people think’, SMH, 4 August 1995: 10; Cockburn M. ‘Political 
cowardice stems from myth of Unsworth defeat’, SMH, 30 April 1996.
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persons register’ (see Chapter 6). It was passed but never proclaimed. In 
1990 Dr Brown tried again with his Firearms Bill. It was again defeated, 
though in 1991 Tasmania finally enacted the Guns Act 1991, the weak-
est gun law in Australia. All this would change radically after Martin 
Bryant’s rampage on 28 April.
Just 12 days later, in what was universally described as an historic 
moment, the APMC released its agreement at 6.20pm, after meeting for 
more than seven hours. Previous parliamentary opponents of gun reg-
istration, notably NSW Labor leader Bob Carr and Tasmanian Premier 
Tony Rundle, rushed to proclaim their passionate support for the Prime 
Minister’s initiative. There had seldom been greater chameleon acts in 
Australian political history.
Media interest in gun control
Port Arthur and the many facets of its aftermath will probably rank, 
after the two world wars, as one of the largest news events in Australian 
media history. In terms of volume alone it is likely to rival the 1991 
Gulf War, the 1975 sacking of the Whitlam Government, and the 1974 
destruction of Darwin in Cyclone Tracy. It will quite easily surpass 
reportage of several Olympic games.
Multiple murders, particularly of people unknown to the gunman, 
unleash huge news media interest. Debate on gun control receives most 
prominence in the days after mass shootings or poignant individual 
homicides, particularly if these occur in public settings. Table 3.2 lists 
some mass killings by civilians in peacetime that attracted heavy media 
coverage.27
27 For details of many of these murders see Crook J, Harding A. Gun 
massacres in Australia. Chelsea: Gun Control Australia, 1994.
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Table 3.2: Mass shootings that received extensive reportage
Good Friday 1996:  
Vernon, British Columbia
Mark Chahal shoots nine people at a pre-wedding 
celebration.
25 January 1996:  
Hillcrest, Queensland
Peter May shoots six then himself.
5 December 1994:  
Fawkner, Victoria
Fotios Diakonidis fatally shoots two then himself with 
M1 30/30 carbine after shooting indiscriminately.
20 June 1994:  
Dunedin, New Zealand
David Bain shoots five family members.
26 August 1993:  
Burwood, Sydney 
Josip Jankovec shoots landlord and two boarders.
21 August 1993:  
Melbourne
John Lascano shoots three people in a suburban 
gunshop.
31 March 1993:  
Cangai, NSW 
Len Leabeater and two others shoot five.
27 October 1992:  
Terrigal, NSW
Malcolm Baker shoots six.
29 July 1992:  
Burwood, Victoria 
Ashley Coulston murders three.
20 May 1992:  
Paerata, New Zealand
Brian Schlaepfer shoots four, then himself.
18 October 1991:  
Luby’s Cafe Killeen, Texas
George Hennard Jr shoots 22 dead in a cafe.
17 August 1991:  
Strathfield, NSW 
Wade Frankum kills six, then himself in shopping 
plaza.
5 January 1991:  
Camp Hill, Brisbane
Peter Forrest murders his former de facto, her father 
and baby daughter then suicides.
13 November 1990: 
Aramoana, New Zealand
David Gray shoots 13 in village, before being shot by 
police.
30 August:  
Surry Hills NSW 
Paul Evers shoots five neighbours.
8 April 1990:  
Burleigh Heads, Queensland
Rodney Dale, armed with a .22 rifle and a pump-
action shotgun, kills one and wounds 13.
12 March 1990:  
Girrawheen, Western 
Australia
Gun enthusiast Don Clemensha kills his ex-wife and 
her two teenage daughters, then suicides.
26 March 1990:  
Wynnum, Brisbane
Michael Woods murders his two children then 
suicides.
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3 November 1989:  
Evandale, Tasmania
15-year-old Wayne Johnson murders his parents and 
young brother.
5 February 1988:  
Patterson Lakes, Melbourne
Mayer Kaldas kills wife, his two children then himself 
with shotgun.
25 September 1988:  
Oenpelli, Northern Territory
Dennis Rostron shoots six.
27 December 1987:  
Winkie, South Australia
Frank Pangallo kills wife and two relatives with 
pump-action shotgun.
8 December 8, 1987:  
Queen Street, Melbourne
Frank Vitkovic shoots eight in office block, then 
himself.
10 October 1987:  
Canley Vale, NSW
John Tran shoots five, then himself.
19 August 1987:  
Hungerford, England
Michael Ryan kills 16 people then suicides.
9 August 1987:  
Hoddle Street, Melbourne
Julian Knight shoots seven strangers.
19 June 1987:  
Northern Territory
Joseph Schwab shoots five over nine days, then 
himself.
23 January 1987:  
West Pymble, Sydney
Richard Maddrell armed with a pump-action shotgun 
kills four teenage girls.
2 September 1984:  
Milperra Viking Tavern
Rival motorcycle gangs fought one another in carpark: 
eight dead, 20 wounded.
July 1984:  
San Ysidro California
James Huberty kills 21 and wounds 19 others in a 
McDonald’s restaurant.
When the Port Arthur massacre occurred on 28 April 1996, the 
Australian public and the media were already concerned about gun vio-
lence. In the Dunblane massacre in Scotland on 13 March, 16 small 
children and their teacher were killed in a school gymnasium, a tragedy 
that flooded the Australian newspapers with articles and letters to the 
editor. One week later, extensive coverage was given to the shooting of 
Jean Majdalawi (Lennon) by her former husband outside the Family 
Court at Parramatta, Sydney, where they were due for a child custody 
hearing.28 The letters editor of the Sydney Morning Herald wrote that the 
28 Horin A. ‘At least mum doesn’t have to run from him any more’, SMH, 22 
March 1996; Cornford P, Lamont L. ‘Bloody ending to a bitter custody battle’, 
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volume of letters about the Majdalawi murder 
threatened to destroy Letters’ fax machine .  .  . [it] overlaid 
the despair in the community already felt after the massacre 
at Dunblane, Scotland. The Parramatta killing turned weepy 
grief to anger at the lack of political resolve over our gun 
laws. If our fax machine is any guide, politicians on both 
sides would be foolish to ignore such intense public feeling.29 
A Sun Herald editorial yet again called on the Carr Government 
to ‘stop fudging the issue of gun control’ after the Majdalawi shoot-
ing.30 The week ending 28 April was National Stop Domestic Violence 
Week, and the issue of domestic gun homicide weighed heavily on the 
minds of everyone, including journalists, who took part in rallies, vigils 
and meetings around the country. Proposals for gun control had also 
received prominence after the discovery of large caches of armaments, 
publication of reports on the rising rate of youth suicide involving guns, 
and after reports about controlling violence in the community.
In the ten years before the Port Arthur massacre, Australia and New 
Zealand had 13 mass shootings in which five or more people died, some-
times including the perpetrator.31 Consistent with the overall homicide 
pattern in the community, nine of these incidents involved men shoot-
ing people known to them (usually family members or neighbours). In 
the other incidents, gunmen ran amok in public places or stalked and 
killed total strangers over a number of hours or, in two cases, days.
These latter incidents (particularly Queen Street, Hoddle Street, 
and Strathfield) received huge media coverage compared to that given 
SMH, 22 March 1996: 1; Powell S. ‘Domestic violence victims fear Jean’s fate’, 
The Australian, 23 March 1996; Morris R, Gelastopoulos E. ‘Instant AVOs to 
protect women from their violent partners’, Daily Telegraph, 23 March 1996.
29 Walsh G. ‘Postscript’, SMH, 25 March 1996: 12.
30 Anon. ‘Need for firm action’, Sun Herald, 24 March 1996: 30.
31 Alpers P. The people most likely to kill with a gun, NZ Mental 
Health Commission Fact Sheet, http://www.gunpolicy.org/documents/
doc_download/5347-the-people-most-likely-to-kill-with-a-gun-nz-mental-
health-commission-fact-sheet.
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to family and neighbour killings. The number of people shot in family 
massacres has often equalled or exceeded the numbers in public inci-
dents, but they tend to attract less media interest and seldom provoke 
political comment or action. The same can be said about media and 
political interest in the most common forms of gun death – suicides and 
family murders of individuals. If reported at all, they tend to be reported 
briefly without major display. Yet cumulatively, each year these deaths 
far exceed the annual death tolls from mass shootings. For every victim 
of a mass shooting in Australia and New Zealand, nine more died in a 
less newsworthy gun murders. Every one of these deaths leaves a trail 
of grief. The NCGC refers to these other gun deaths, which receive little 
media coverage, as ‘the slow massacre’ in which hundreds of people die 
each year.
The disparity between the coverage of stranger killings and reports 
of domestic homicides is often remarked on by domestic violence 
agencies. It may be that journalists are susceptible to society’s general 
discomfort about confronting the reality of domestic violence; or that 
they believe domestic homicide is a ‘private’ matter; or that the victims 
have somehow provoked their own deaths; or because of the ‘there by 
the grace of God go I’ factor – the possibility that they could have been 
victims themselves.
The sheer magnitude of the Port Arthur massacre – described as 
the ‘biggest’, ‘worst ever’, ‘monstrous’ and so on – was reflected in its 
media coverage. The event and the discussion of gun control became 
the leading news item in both print and electronic media recorded by 
monitoring agencies. Even in late June, gun control remained the ‘most 
discussed’ news issue on NSW radio and TV stations,32 and letters to the 
Sydney Morning Herald were still flowing in steadily, ‘most of them in 
favour of Prime Minister Howard’s plans.’ 33
Almost universally, the Australian media’s editorial line on the issue 
supported the NCGC’s gun control platform. Much of this support was 
32 ‘The public eye’, Rehame Australia Monitoring Services. cited in SMH, 24 
June 1996: 24.
33 Walsh G. ‘Postscript’, SMH, 17 and 24 June 1996: 16.
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confined to the commentary and opinion sections of newspapers, but 
it was occasionally revealed in news headlines, for example: ‘Amnesty 
reaping an ugly harvest’,34 ‘Modest heroes defy the bullies’.35
34 Bearup G. ‘Amnesty reaping an ugly harvest’, SMH, 3 January 1996.
35 Warnock S. ‘Modest heroes defy the bullies’, Sun Herald, 25 July 1996.
117
4
The main reforms
This chapter outlines the main reforms introduced after Port Arthur. 
It examines the rationale and supportive evidence for each reform, the 
gun lobby’s efforts to attack each proposal and how gun control advo-
cates sought to respond to these attacks. In summary, the key provisions 
of the new laws were: 
•	 A ban on the importation, ownership, sale, resale, transfer, posses-
sion, manufacture or use of semi-automatic rifles and pump-action 
shotguns.
•	 A compensatory ‘buyback’ scheme funded by an increase in the 
Medicare levy, whereby gun owners would be paid the market value 
of prohibited guns they handed in.
•	 The registration of all firearms as part of an integrated shooter 
licensing scheme.
•	 Shooter licensing based on a requirement to prove a ‘genuine reason’ 
for owning a firearm.
•	 Requirements that all guns be stored securely.
•	 Uniform national gun laws (See Introduction for more details.)
Ban on semi-automatics
Martin Bryant carried three weapons at Port Arthur. Inside the café he 
pulled an AR–15 semi-automatic .223 calibre rifle from a tennis bag and 
began shooting the patrons. In the next 90 seconds he fired 29 shots, 
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killing 20 people in the café. A bus driver and passengers parked out-
side were killed, along with passers-by, hotel patrons and motorists of 
all ages. The killer used his second military-style semi-automatic rifle, 
a .308 FN, or ‘SLR’, as he drove through the community, took a hos-
tage whom he later killed, then drove to the Seascape Cottage. There 
he had access to an SKS–46 semi-automatic rifle which he fired at 
police and helicopters ferrying the wounded. Early the next morning 
Bryant set fire to the house and finally rushed outside in flames, drop-
ping his rifles and surrendering to police. In the ashes police found 
weapons described as ‘highly unusual and very distinctive’ including 
a military-style Belgian-made shotgun. The third gun in Bryant’s bag 
had been a 12-gauge semi-automatic shotgun, but this was not used in 
the killings. Before the killings, Bryant answered a private newspaper 
advertisement to purchase one of his weapons, an AR–10 military-style 
semi-automatic rifle. When he took the AR–10 to a gun shop for repairs 
two days before the shootings, the dealer refused to hand it back until 
he’d sighted a firearms licence. Bryant had purchased the AR–15 and 
the shotgun from a Hobart dealer who probably also sold him the SLR. 
Bryant did not have a firearms licence, and had not applied for a drivers’ 
licence as he felt he was too unintelligent to pass the test. The son of 
the owners of the Seascape was a gun collector, and this may be where 
Bryant obtained the SKS.
Self-loading or semi-automatic firearms are guns which reload 
automatically after each shot, so the user does not have to insert a fresh 
round of ammunition by hand after each bullet is fired. Each time the 
trigger is squeezed, a shot fires. (By contrast, a fully automatic weapon, 
or machinegun, fires continuously while the trigger remains depressed.) 
Different magazine sizes can be fitted to many semi-automatic guns, 
with some capable of firing dozens of rounds in rapid succession. This 
capability can make a gunman particularly difficult to approach and 
disarm. Under the new gun control scheme, pump-action shotguns, 
which reload with a sliding movement by the shooter, are also classed 
as semi-automatic.
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Before the APMC agreement, the laws governing self-loading weap-
ons varied widely across Australia. All states and territories had banned 
fully automatic rifles completely from private ownership, except for 
those held by a few collectors. With the exceptions of Queensland and 
Tasmania, all had also banned new sales of military-style semi-auto-
matic rifles. (The definition of ‘military style’ is based on appearance and 
accessories rather than on its functional capacity.) Otherwise all states 
and territories allowed private ownership of non-military, self-loading 
weapons, mostly with additional restrictions on centre-fire semi-au-
tomatic rifles with large-capacity or detachable magazines. Rim-fire 
semi-automatics and pump-action shotguns were treated no differently 
from ordinary single-shot weapons in most Australian jurisdictions.
Along with the buyback scheme, the ban on self-loading rifles 
and shotguns attracted more controversy than any other aspect of 
the APMC agreement (see Chapter 6). No longer were ‘military-style’ 
weapons singled out as the only really dangerous firearms. They were 
joined by all self-loading long-arms that were labelled as prohibited 
weapons (Categories C and D in the new licensing scheme). Category 
C firearms were semi-automatic rim-fire (low-power) rifles with 
a magazine capacity up to 10 rounds, as well as semi-automatic and 
pump-action shotguns up to five rounds. These were prohibited except 
for occupational use by police, farmers, and professional shooters. A 
further exemption was added for certain clay target shooters. Category 
D included all semi-automatic centre-fire (high-power) rifles, whether 
military style or not; and semi-automatic and pump-action shotguns 
with a magazine capacity over five rounds. These were prohibited except 
for police, military and professional shooters.
The APMC’s decision to prohibit ownership of all self-loading rifles 
and shotguns from all but a tightly defined group of shooters was based 
on community concern about the ability of these guns to fire a rapid 
stream of bullets, and the potential danger this posed to public safety. 
Guns that were capable of killing large numbers of people quickly were 
no longer considered ‘sporting’ weapons.
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In any case, the ability of shooters armed with semi-automatics to 
spray a target with bullets always sat awkwardly with notions that these 
guns were ‘sporting’ in the usual sense of the term. Semi-automatic 
weapons allow lazy or mediocre shooters to miss their targets but 
simply blast away until they achieve their purpose – quite the oppo-
site of the high-level technical ability associated with skilled sporting 
shooters and hunters. Greg Carlsson, spokesperson for the Association 
of Professional Shooters (APS), told the media that semi-automatics 
were favoured by incompetent amateurs: ‘The basic people who own 
semi-automatic firearms come from the city and are more interested 
in blowing away anything that moves .  .  . The common terminology 
out here for them are weekend shooters – that’s when we are being 
nice about them .  .  .’1 A professional kangaroo shooter from western 
Queensland with 22 years experience, Carlsson said semi-automatics 
were ‘too inaccurate to be humane’.
The use of semi-automatics on the battlefield lends them an addi-
tional negative connotation. Dr Brian Walpole, the doctor in charge of 
the Royal Hobart Hospital’s Department of Emergency Medicine which 
received the Port Arthur victims, described the bloodshed he witnessed: 
‘We went to war for a day in Tasmania and we saw on the bodies of all 
those people the havoc the weapons of war can wreak.’2 Many commen-
tators picked up the military analogy, for example: 
•	 ‘They are killing machines – those guns were designed to kill 
people.’3
•	 ‘Weapons designed for rapid mass killing.’4
•	 ‘These hideously dangerous ego-boosting toys.’5
1 Collins C. ‘Single-shot Greg takes aim at the semi-automatics lobby’, The 
Australian, 11 May 1996.
2 Wright T. ‘A doctor can look forward with hope’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
3 Anon. ‘Success, or lethal shame’ (editorial), Daily Telegraph, 10 May 1996.
4 McGuinness PP. ‘Fanatics cause discomfort for the Nationals’, The Age, 8 
June 1996: A23.
5 Kinson K. ‘The overkill factor’ (letter), The Age, 9 May 1996: 14.
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The ban on semi-automatics thus arose from a concern to remove 
weapons from the community which might be used in public massacres 
like Port Arthur, Strathfield, Terrigal, Queen Street and Hoddle Street 
– as opposed to single homicides and suicides, which constitute the 
great majority of gun deaths in Australia. Massacres are rare events; the 
average gun homicide incident involves only 1.09 victims per offend-
er.6 But when a semi-automatic is involved, the number of victims can 
climb dramatically. As the Federal Government pointed out, the past 
decade had seen 116 people killed in 14 massacres in Australia and New 
Zealand where four or more people were shot; only six of the 14 per-
petrators used military-style semi-automatics, but these accounted for 
74% of the victims.7 In early June, publicity was given to a report pub-
lished in the Journal of the American Medical Association that showed 
that the increasing popularity of semi-automatic handguns in the US 
was a major factor in the escalation of handgun deaths there.8
The gun lobby’s reaction
In the first week after Port Arthur, the gun lobby probably hoped that 
the mooted ban on semi-automatics would simply bring the two most 
recalcitrant states, Tasmania and Queensland, into line with the other 
jurisdictions by banning military-style semi-automatic weapons. John 
Tingle repeatedly asserted that he had always argued the ban on such 
weapons should be national, later appearing to carefully change his 
words to say that he supported a ‘reduction in semi-automatics’.9 After 
the NSW Government had acted to ban military-style semi-automatics 
6 Gallagher P, Huong MTND, Bonney R. ‘Trends in homicide 1968–1992’, 
Crime and Justice Bulletin, 1994, 21: 1.
7 ‘Australian Firearm Statistics’, The Australian Firearms Buyback (fact sheet) 
November 1996.
8 Wintemute GJ. ‘The relationship between firearm design and firearm 
violence: handguns in the 1990s’, JAMA, 1996, 275: 1749–53. 
9 Lawnham P, McGarry A. ‘Shooters will defy news laws, MP warns’, The 
Australian, 11 May 1996.
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after the Strathfield massacre in 1991, Tingle nonetheless joined other 
groups in mapping out a strategy to fight the new laws.10
A profile of Tingle published in Guns Australia in 1993 quoted him 
as saying: ‘My wife Gail and I are members of the RAE Military Rifle 
and Holsworthy Pistol Clubs .  .  .’ and that his wife had once said to 
former NSW Police Minister Ted Pickering that ‘no one will take her 
M1 Carbine away if she can help it’.11
The SSAA’s Ted Drane had publicly lobbied to increase access 
to military-style weapons as recently as April 1995 (‘Mr Drane .  .  . 
supported some of the recommendations [of the Victorian Firearms’ 
Consultative Committee, such as the proposal to increase access to some 
military weapons.’12), but most gun lobby leaders and many shooters 
immediately threw in the towel on the argument for citizen access to 
military assault rifles, and agreed with the Police Ministers that these 
guns should be banned. As one gun owner wrote: ‘While I approve of 
stringent gun laws and the banning of semi-automatic high-powered 
rifles, I must protest at the proposed mass confiscation of the legally 
held property of hundreds of thousands of law-abiding Australians.’13)
Ted Drane predictably described the ban on all semi-automatics 
as ‘an invasion of law-abiding citizens’ rights’.14 Others described the 
ban as ‘undemocratic and un-Australian’,15 despite the huge community 
support for the move (see Chapter 1). Ian McNiven, of the Firearms 
Owners’ Association (see Chapter 6), obligingly dampened the gun lob-
by’s new-found efforts to distance themselves from military-style guns 
by saying on national television: ‘There is no reason to compromise on 
10 Fitzpatrick E. ‘Shooters Party to fight new gun laws’, SMH, 18 May 1992: 2.
11 Palladino T. ‘Men of calibre. John Tingle’, Guns Australia, January/
February 1993: 60–61.
12 Brady N. ‘Gun report criticised’, The Age, 6 April 1995: 4.
13 Lawson JB. ‘Punished just for being a gun owner’ (letter), The Age, 15 May 
1996: A16.
14 Lawnham P, McGarry A. ‘Shooters will defy news laws, MP warns’, The 
Australian, 11 May 1996.
15 Rees P. ‘Shooters call crisis talks’, Sunday Telegraph, 12 May 1996.
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military-style semi-automatic rifles. They are an essential part of our 
nation’s defence system.’16
.22 ‘rabbit rifles’
Along with gun registration, the element of the APMC agreement that 
most angered the gun lobby was the ban (apart from limited exemp-
tions) on all self-loading long-arms, including pump-action shotguns 
and the ‘innocent’ .22 semi-automatic. Gun lovers attempted to draw 
a distinction between the frighteningly labelled ‘military-style’ weap-
ons and other semi-automatics that were positioned by comparison as 
benign.17 One wrote, ‘Rim-fire self-loading rifles have not proved to be 
a public danger, although many thousands of them are in use. Centre-
fire self-loading guns, not necessarily military weapons, do have a very 
useful and legitimate place . . .’18
The gun lobby often referred to these rim-fire semi-automatics as 
‘rabbit guns’ or ‘pea rifles’, seeking to portray them as inconsequential 
‘toys’. The Northern Territory’s Chief Minister, Shane Stone, described 
them in this way on Lateline the night before the Police Ministers’ first 
meeting. Later in the program, I replied, ‘I was concerned to hear Mr 
Stone refer to them as “pea shooters”. They don’t shoot peas. They shoot 
bullets.’19 The SSAA’s Sebastian Ziccone wrote: ‘Self-loading rabbit rifles 
. . . have been safely owned in this country since 1903. This is too stupid 
for words.’20
Gun control advocates both in and outside government were ada-
mant that all semi-automatics, regardless of calibre, should be included 
in the ban. Low-calibre bullets like .22s can easily kill humans, so the 
ability to fire many such bullets in rapid succession increases their lethal 
16 McNiven I. 7.30 Report ABC TV, 9 May 1996.
17 Aubert E. ‘Blackmore digs in over weapons decision’, Newcastle Herald, 11 
May 1996.
18 Heinze J. ‘The gun curbs just won’t work’ (letter), The Age, 10 May 1996.
19 Chapman S. Lateline, ABC TV, 9 May 1996.
20 Ziccone S. ‘In defence of arms’, The Age, 10 May 1996: A15.
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potential enormously. As the Western Australian Police Commissioner 
stated: ‘Whether or not they are small calibre and high velocity or heavy 
calibre – in other words military-style weapons – is not really of great 
interest. It’s the rapidity of fire [which is critical].’21
When it became apparent that most people in the gun lobby were 
prepared to roll over on military semi-automatics, but would con-
centrate their opposition on rim-fire weapons, the NCGC set about 
emphasising that .22 rifles could and did kill more Australians than 
any other category of weapon and should therefore not be trivialised 
as harmless ‘pea shooters.’ Several journalists noted this point.22 The 
advocacy task became one of supporting this contention and attacking 
gun lobby arguments that sought to trivialise the .22 as being ‘innocent.’ 
Ted Drane had said: ‘The main argument against [banning them] is that 
they have never been involved in any of these [mass murder] incidents. 
They are innocent, if you like.’23)
This was demonstrably not the case and so it was a straightforward 
task to refute Drane’s claim. One journalist wrote a profile of the use of 
the .22 semi-automatic in mass killings. She recalled the multiple mur-
ders in Hope Forest, South Australia in 1971 (Clifford Bartholomew 
killed 10 people including his seven children with such a gun) and 
Campsie, NSW in 1981 (Fred Daoud shot his wife and four children, 
then himself). The journalist cited Australian Institute of Criminology 
data showing that the generic class of .22s (single shot and semi-auto-
matics combined) had been used in 40% of gun homicides in Australia 
in 1992–93, making it the most common type of gun used. Shotguns 
accounted for 30% and high-powered semi-automatics like the type 
used at Port Arthur only accounted for 7% of the homicides.24
In the Sydney Morning Herald I pointed out: ‘
Although two-thirds of the victims of local mass shootings 
were shot with military-style semi-automatic rifles using 
21 Chapman S. ‘For the Howard plan’ (vox pops), SMH, 10 May 1996.
22 Anon. ‘Deaths can’t be in vain’ (editorial), SMH, 10 May 1996.
23 Lamont L. ‘The calibre favoured by killers’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
24 Ibid.
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‘high power’ centre-fire ammunition designed for the bat-
tlefield, a large proportion also died at the hands of men 
wielding the most common semi-automatic rifle of them all: 
the ubiquitous .22 calibre ‘bunny gun’. Although these fire 
‘low power’ rim-fire rounds, .22 semi-automatic rifles have 
been used as the principal weapon in four recent mass shoot-
ings in Australia and New Zealand. In these events alone, 
27 people were shot dead. The .22 rabbit rifle also features 
in many family violence shootings and hold-ups. The police 
killed at Crescent Head were shot by such a gun.25 
On Lateline on the night before the first Police Ministers’ meeting, 
when debating Ted Drane, I listed several mass killings in recent years 
where .22 semi-automatics had been used. Drane avoided acknowl-
edging the particulars of the deaths listed. Instead he replied lamely: 
‘Simon Chapman’s point is based on somebody’s research called Alpers, 
a radio announcer from New Zealand, and there’s no official research 
in Australia.’26
For the record, Philip Alpers was a radio announcer for two months 
in 1974. He is now a researcher and journalist who has compiled infor-
mation for the New Zealand Police Association. Alpers’ meticulous 
records on mass killings in Australia and New Zealand over the past 
decade became an invaluable source of information supporting sev-
eral key debating points regarding the new laws. The gun lobby was 
never once able to deny the facts that Alpers had documented27 and so 
resorted to gratuitous personal attacks on his bona fides as a researcher. 
Ironically, John Tingle of the Shooters Party had been a radio announcer 
most of his working life.
On the eve of the Police Ministers’ conference, the Victorian Police 
Minister reportedly advocated exempting pump-action shotguns and 
.22s from the ban because they were ‘ineffective after 40 metres’. Asked 
to comment, I described this ‘watering down’ as ‘an obscenity. His 
25 Chapman S. ‘Now, about those guns . . .’, SMH, 9 May 1996: 15.
26 Drane T. Lateline, ABC TV, 9 May 1996.
27 http: //www.health.su.oz.au/cgc/fp_2_3.htm [no longer active, 2013].
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amazing comments on how pump-action shotguns and .22 rifles are 
ineffective after 40m are . . . cold comfort to the Broad Arrow Café vic-
tims.’28 These people, and indeed most victims of shootings, were shot 
at very close range. At the gun control rally in Sydney on 4 May 1996, 
Virginia Handmer spoke of her 15-year-old daughter Dali’s death by a 
semi-automatic .22. Dali was killed instantly at a distance of 106 metres.
One of the most delightful retorts to the gun lobby’s demands 
for open access to semi-automatics came from a sarcastic 
Sydney resident: For some time I’ve been petitioning the 
authorities to legalise the private use of armoured person-
nel carriers and the smaller tanks on our roads. The modern 
tank and the APC are very efficient, spacious and, need I say, 
safe means of transport, ideal for the family and the proposed 
40 km/h speed limit .  .  . Moreover, their banning makes it 
more likely the authorities will try to ban other types of vehi-
cles. There will be those . . . who will go on about the safety 
issue. They never seem to understand that it isn’t the shells or 
tracks which kill, but the driver the doctors didn’t weed out 
. . . If a disturbed person does grab the neighbour’s Leopard, 
all it should take is one or two people responsible people with 
anti-tank rockets or just plain armour-piercing ammunition 
to ensure the situation is defused.29
On Four Corners on 4 November, Rebecca Peters used a similar 
analogy: 
Military weapons are made for killing large numbers of 
people and they should have never have been allowed in the 
first place. You can’t be a collector of plutonium for fun, and 
you shouldn’t be allowed to use military rifles for fun. Times 
have changed, and this is not acceptable any more.
28 Chapman S. ‘For the Howard plan’, (vox pops) SMH, 10 May 1996.
29 Lowe A. ‘The hills are alive with them’ (letter), SMH, 20 May 1996: 14.
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Crimping
A major debate that emerged soon after the Police Ministers’ meeting 
concerned the issue of ‘crimping’ – the structural alteration of a five or 
seven-shot semi-automatic or pump-action weapon to allow it to fire 
a maximum of only two shots before reloading was required. Such an 
altered weapon would be a much-limited killing machine in a massacre 
or siege scenario. The main argument for crimping – strongly advocated 
by the Queensland, West Australian and Northern Territory govern-
ments in the weeks preceding a 17 July Police Ministers’ meeting – was 
that if guns could be mechanically altered in an irreversible way, many 
semi-automatic gun owners might take this option instead of surren-
dering their guns in the gun buyback. Since crimping would have been 
less expensive than the buyback cost of the entire gun, it promised to 
reduce the buyback cost by an estimated $100 million – although the 
basis of this figure was never explained.30 Many rural politicians also 
perceived crimping as an option that would placate many gun owners 
and reduce their electoral anger. ‘Crimping would have placated 60 to 
80% of gun owners,’ said a National Party backbencher.31 ‘It is better to 
achieve 90 per cent compliance to a modification regime than 50 per 
cent compliance to a confiscation regime,’ said another.32 National Party 
Leader and Deputy Prime Minister Tim Fischer had ‘gone into bat’ to 
support crimping in Federal Cabinet.33
On 4 July the SSAA put out a press release saying: ‘After conducting 
private polls around Australia, the SSAA is convinced that the public 
overwhelmingly supports the concept of crimping and believe that if 
30 Millett M, Riley M. ‘Rural MPs pressure Cabinet on guns’, SMH, 29 June 
1996: 2.
31 Millett M. ‘Howard stands firm against gun crimping’, SMH, 11 July 1996: 
1; Millett M, Riley M. ‘Rural MPs pressure Cabinet on guns’, SMH, 29 June 
1996: 2.
32 Middleton K. ‘WA to defy gun-crimping decision’, The Age, 12 July 1996: 4.
33 Kitney G. ‘Why Fischer will fight on’, SMH, 12 July 1996: 11; Hughes J, 
Emerson S. ‘Court alone as Borbidge reins in gun opposition’, The Australian, 
20–21 July 1996: 5.
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law abiding gun owners are given the opportunity to retain their fire-
arms using this method they won’t reverse the procedure.’ 
The details and results of these ‘polls’ were never revealed.
The main debate on crimping began around mid June34 and con-
tinued until just after the second Police Ministers’ meeting on 17 July 
when, one by one, those States supporting crimping agreed to drop 
their demands. The Prime Minister was forthright in his opposition 
to the option from the outset.35 His uncompromising stance on crimp-
ing prompted still more praise of his political courage (‘Doing so has 
required considerable political spine.’)36 The Federal Government had 
finally referred the issue to the Department of Defence for advice after 
an initial report from a ballistics expert had concluded that most gun 
owners would find it difficult to reverse modifications carried out by 
a gunsmith. The Defence Department’s report advised that the crimp-
ing process was reversible ‘within an hour’37 and Howard declared it an 
unacceptable option.
Given the gun lobby’s support for crimping, it was not hard to dis-
cern that the shooters saw it as an ineffective control. The old principle 
in advocacy – that if your opposition supports a particular proposal, it 
is wise to be immediately suspicious of it – impressed itself on NCGC 
members. Ted Drane made the tactical mistake of admitting that it was 
reversible38 and so the NCGC began to argue for the crimping option to 
be abandoned, framing it as an attempt to ‘walk away’ from the tough, 
uncompromising agreements reached by the Police Ministers on 10 May. 
The Prime Minister used this expression in speaking of his reservations.39
34 Savva N, Farouque F. ‘Deal could permit owners to keep guns’, The Age, 19 
June 1996: 3; Middleton K. ‘WA to defy gun-crimping decision’, The Age, 12 
July 1996: 4.
35 Millet M. ‘Howard stands firm against gun crimping’, SMH, 11 July 1996: 1.
36 Anon. ‘Press on, Prime Minister’ (editorial), The Age, 12 July 1996: A14.
37 Roberts G, Middleton K. ‘Be rational on guns, PM urges states’, The Age, 
15 July 1996: A3.
38 Grattan M. ‘Integrity survives the ‘crimp’ snag’, The Age, 11 July 1996: A8.
39 Millett M, Vass N. ‘Don’t walk away on guns: PM’, SMH, 13 July 1996: 13.
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The Sydney Morning Herald published a lengthy article by Rebecca 
Peters on the morning of the Police Ministers’ second meeting.40 She 
argued that the states’ concern to save money through crimping was 
disingenuous because the Commonwealth was paying for the buyback. 
She also argued that the compensation scheme – the major item of 
business at the meeting – should be extended to provide funds for gun 
owners who wished or would be obliged to surrender single-shot rifles.
The new laws would require gun owners to demonstrate that they 
had a legitimate need for a gun. Not having such needs, many current 
owners would not qualify, and if they owned single-shot weapons, there 
was no provision to buy back these guns. This would be a huge disincen-
tive for such people to surrender their guns. Arguing that the buyback 
system should be extended not only introduced a salient point that was 
hard to refute, but made any move to reject the buyback for semi-auto-
matics and pump-action shotguns that much harder. The call to extend 
the buyback, while entirely serious, could have also functioned as an 
ambit claim, allowing opposing politicians to appear before the gun 
lobby as having at least opposed moves to encourage even more guns to 
come out of the community.
One NCGC supporter pointedly asked: ‘Has anyone from the 
pro-gun group given a coherent reason for wanting a ‘crimped’ semi-au-
tomatic? How long will it be before a gun publication (or Internet) 
generously gives advice on DIY ‘uncrimping’?’41 A Sydney Morning 
Herald editorial stated that ‘the real objective of the defenders of crimp-
ing is not to save the community money but to be able to hold onto 
semi-automatic guns .  .  . when the heat [of Port Arthur] dies down, 
they can be uncrimped.’42 The issue of crimping faded away very rapidly 
under the threat of Howard’s referendum.
40 Peters R. ‘Ministers in the line of fire’, SMH, 17 July: 17.
41 Hudson L. ‘Crimping’ (letter), SMH, 6 July 1996: 34.
42 Anon. ‘PM right on gun caution’ (editorial), SMH, 12 July 1996: 10.
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Buyback
Australia’s gun buyback scheme appears to have been the first attempt 
anywhere in the world to combine a mandatory requirement to surren-
der particular categories of gun with an offer of full market value for 
them. Tony Blair’s Labour Government in Britain became the second 
government to use such a scheme when it acted swiftly in 1997 to ban 
all handguns from civilian use. In recent years, several cities and coun-
ties in the United States have organised voluntary buyback schemes 
where small, sometimes token payments have been given for surren-
dered guns.43 For example, Seattle organised a buyback program in 
1992, but only $US50 was paid for each handgun. A total of 1,772 fire-
arms were collected – less than 1% of handguns owned in Seattle – and 
66% of those who handed in their gun continued to own at least one 
other firearm after the exchange. There was no evidence of any effect of 
the program on homicides, suicides, unintentional deaths due to fire-
arms, firearm-related trauma admissions, or firearm related crimes.44
Before the details of the Australian buyback scheme were even 
announced, the gun lobby sought to anger shooters by spreading 
rumours that the amount of compensation to be offered would be 
minimal: ‘As we heard at the meeting, they’re offering probably $200 
for my pump-action shotgun which is worth over $600,’ claimed one 
gun owner.45 Ted Drane said on television: ‘A $2,000 firearm – if some-
body says they’re going to give you $100 for it, you’re unlikely to get 
it.’)46 He also sought to argue that the estimated budget for the buyback 
was hugely underestimated. Independent MP Graeme Campbell told 
Federal Parliament: ‘Ted Drane . . . says that he estimates compensation 
43 Plotkin MR (ed.) Under fire: gun buy-backs, exchanges and amnesty 
programs. Washington: Police Executive Research Forum, 1996.
44 Callahan CM, Rivara FP, Koepsell TD. Money for guns evaluation of the 
Seattle gun buyback program. Public Health Reports 1994, 109: 472–77.
45 Roberts G, Zinn C. ‘ “Pineapple” extremism takes root’, The Age, 11 June 
1996: A11.
46 Drane T. 7.30 Report, ABC TV, 9 May 1996.
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to be $500 million. I suspect Mr Drane is talking about Victoria alone, 
because the cost will be substantially higher.’47 Ted Drane regularly used 
the figure of $1 billion,48 having apparently decided to double his initial 
figure of ‘up to $500 million’,49 which presumably did not have the same 
sort of impact. John Tingle claimed that ‘some semi-automatics were 
worth as much as $70,000’.50 This tactic seemed designed to show that 
the bureaucrats were out of touch with gun marketplace realities and 
to introduce a spectre of aggregated payments that were so massive, 
that people could start comparing other community priorities on which 
such vast sums might have been spent.
On 30 July, newspapers published lengthy lists of what the 
Government would be paying for prohibited weapons. The figures 
were based on the average sale prices listed in gun dealers’ catalogues 
in March 1996. Prices ranged between $60 and $10,000, well short 
of Tingle’s alarmist $70,000 figure. Owners of expensive (more than 
$2,500) non-military semi-automatics were given the option of sub-
mitting the weapons to approved dealers who would try to sell them 
overseas for higher prices. Gun dealers would be compensated for any 
unsold prohibited firearms, ammunition, spare parts, maintenance 
equipment and manuals.51 Gun owners would not have to pay tax on 
the money gained in compensation.52
The media began showing film and pictures of the destruction 
of surrendered guns from mid-August. Victoria was the first state to 
implement the buyback, and TV news programs and newspaper reports 
showed queues of men lining up to receive cash for their guns, metal 
47 Australian House of Representatives Hansard for 9 May 1996. 
48 Grattan M, Brady N. ‘Tax to buy up banned guns’, The Age, 13 May 1996: 1.
49 Farouque F, McKay S. ‘Angry shooters plan a $1 million protest’, The Age, 
11 May 1996: A6.
50 Vass N. ‘Owners won’t give up weapons: Tingle’, SMH, 13 May 1996.
51 Farouque F, Darby A. ‘Owners able to sell guns overseas’, The Age, 24 July 
1996: A3; Millett M. ‘Lock, stock and barrel compo for gun owners’, SMH, 30 
July 1996: 9.
52 Middleton K. ‘Tax-free vow on gun cash’, The Age, 25 July 1996: A8.
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crushers pulverising the weapons and heavy machinery scooping up 
mountains of crushed guns to dump them in smelters.53 The states and 
territories began their respective buybacks at different dates and with 
a variety of different administrative arrangements. Victoria, for exam-
ple, paid shooters cash on the spot, while NSW had a system where 
cheques were posted about two weeks after surrender. Table 4.1 shows 
the state of the buyback at 5pm, 31 October 1997. In South Australia the 
buyback ended on 28 February 1997. In all other states and territories, 
the buyback and amnesty continued until 30 September 1997 although 
some states such as Tasmania have since continued with it.
Table 4.1 Gun buyback: numbers and dollars outlaid, 1 October 1997
State and 
population 
(millions)**
Buyback 
commenced
Number 
of guns 
surren-
dered
Adult pop-
ulation per 
gun surren-
dered***
$ paid Mean 
$ per 
gun
Vic* (4.5022) 1 September 207,220 16.0 101,324,241 489
SA* (1.474) 9 September 52,348 20.7 26,080,422 498
ACT (.3041) 1 September 5,380 41.7 2,803,918 521
Tas (.473022) 1 September 32,132 10.9 14,277,331 444
NT* (.177720 1 October 9,472 13.8 5,000,433 530
WA* (1.7317) 1 September 50,804 22.0 18,135,426 357
NSW (6.1151) 14 October 154,262 29.2 70,500,000 457
Qld (3.272) 13 January ’97 128,783 18.7 66,230,973 514
Total (18.0498) 640,401 20.8 304,374,176 475
* States that previously had gun registration ** population estimated as at 30 
June 1995 *** 73.7% of Australia’s population is aged 15–74 years. I assume 
a negligible proportion of people aged under 15 and over 75 would have 
owned semi-automatic weapons.
53 Adams D. ‘On-the-spot payment for gun owners’, The Age, 14 August 1996: 
A8; Costa G. ‘Thousands of guns go into crusher’, The Age, 26 August 1996: A2; 
Boreham G. ‘Long delays at gun centres’, The Age, 20 August 1996: 2.
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An ABC Radio report in October 1996 on the buyback in South 
Australia described it as reaping a bonanza for gun dealers who 
reportedly said many people used their compensation payments to 
immediately purchase legal single-shot weapons. Most of those inter-
viewed commented that this was further evidence of the folly of the 
new laws: how stupid the Government was to have thought the ban on 
semi-automatics would reduce the net number of guns in the commu-
nity. Shooters were simply replacing one sort of gun with others ‘just as 
capable of killing’, they argued. Here again, the gun lobby wanted it both 
ways: law abiding shooters would never commit homicide, yet the new 
guns they were purchasing were argued to be potentially dangerous.
When the NSW buyback began in November 1996, gun deal-
ers similarly predicted a boom in new rifle sales.54 This argument, of 
course, neatly avoided all the previous protests that few shooters would 
surrender their semi-automatics and that these guns were considered 
indispensable to their owners. Reports of a windfall for gun dealers 
also invited questions about whether the dealers were not seeking to 
use the publicity opportunity to suggest to shooters that they might use 
their compensation money to buy another gun, rather than use it for 
another purpose. Until gun registration update data became available, 
there was no way of knowing how much of this was marketing hype. 
But a press comment in December from the Victorian secretary of the 
Firearm Traders Association, Robert Brewer, suggested that this was 
exactly what was happening. Brewer said there had been a big increase 
in the number of firearms sold, but the surge would drop off. ‘Out of 
every 100 firearms handed in, only eight are being replaced. That means 
a massive drop in the number of firearms. Not everyone is buying a 
replacement.’55
In late September 1996 the NSW and Queensland governments 
began publicly criticising the Federal Government, claiming there was 
a large shortfall in the funding allocated to their states to pay for the 
54 Sandham S. ‘Shooters will thwart buyback, say dealers’, SMH, 5 November 
1996: 5.
55 Herald Sun, 13 December 1996: 1–2.
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buyback. The NCGC was asked for comment on NSW, which while 
having long passed the legislation, had not started a buyback several 
months later. Part of the costs the NSW Government complained were 
not being adequately met by the Commonwealth were infrastructural 
costs for regional police centres to record the buyback transactions. Gun 
control advocates argued that Victoria, Western Australia and South 
Australia had funded their own gun registration schemes when they 
had implemented these before Port Arthur. If these states had borne the 
costs of gun control without Commonwealth help, we believed NSW 
might be unreasonably trying to milk money it would otherwise have 
paid had it acted on guns previously. Additionally, if Victoria and South 
Australia could start their buybacks promptly, we felt little sympathy 
for NSW’s claim that they were being short-changed. This deadlock was 
eventually resolved with the Federal Government agreeing to fund all 
of the buyback.
Gun registration
Martin Bryant – who did not have a shooter’s licence – lived in a 
state which had no long arm registration. He obtained his guns from 
a Hobart gun dealer. Below are excerpts from the record of interview 
between two Tasmanian police officers and Bryant.56 They illustrate the 
frightening simplicity with which a licensed gun dealer knew he could 
sell a high-powered military weapon to someone like Bryant in a state 
where lack of registration meant that the purchaser of the gun would 
not be recorded.
Q: Do you remember where you bought that one [the Colt 
AR-15 semi-automatic]?
Bryant: Yeah Terry Hill, Terry Hill.
Q: At Guns and Ammo?
Bryant: Mmm.
56 http: //www.theage.com.au:80/special/bryant/t1.htm [no longer active, 
2013].
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Q: And you can remember how much you paid for that one?
Bryant: Ahh, five grand with the scope.
Q: Five.
Bryant: Five thousand dollars with the scope on it. It was 
gonna be four and a half thousand without the scope but it 
was five thousand with the scope and strap and also got, got 
some ammunition thrown in.
Q: All right. How many rounds of ammunition did you get 
with that, can you remember?
Bryant: Ohh, about eighty rounds. Eighty to a hundred 
rounds.
Q: Have you purchased any more rounds, umm, since you 
know you’ve bought the firearm itself?
Bryant: Umm, yeah I’ve probably purchased eight packets of, 
be twenty rounds in each . . . Terry, yeah. Terry’s, have you 
met Terry before?
Q: Yes, [I] know Terry.
Bryant: Still in business is he?
Q: Yes, he’s still in business . . . why do you ask that ahh, Mar-
tin, if Terry’s still in business?
Bryant: Ahh, ’cos I didn’t have a licence. I had no gun licence.
Q: So, just let me get this straight. You didn’t have a gun li-
cence?
Bryant: No.
Q: Did you make out you had a gun licence when you pur-
chased them?
Bryant: No, I never discussed it, I never, I just said I had the 
cash on me and he said that’s all right.
Q: Did he ever, did he ask to see if you had a gun licence?
Bryant: No, never.
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Gun registration – the recording of a gun’s ownership against a 
licence-holder’s name – has been the most vehemently and consistently 
opposed measure in the Australian gun control debate. Gun registra-
tion and shooter licensing are two terms that can be confusing. Perhaps 
the easiest way to understand the two is by analogy with the car. Each 
person who drives is legally required to have a driver’s licence, and 
each motor vehicle being driven is required to be individually regis-
tered. Driver licensing enables motor traffic authorities to test the 
competency of a driver to use a motor vehicle and for persons deemed 
unsuitable (for example, those with poor driving records, the poorly 
sighted and people with uncontrolled epilepsy) to have their driving 
licence cancelled or their application refused. The public benefits of 
vehicle registration include the ability to certify road-worthiness for 
each registered vehicle and to trace cars involved in crime, dangerous 
traffic incidents and those that are stolen.
There are key similarities in the arguments for shooter licensing 
and gun registration. No sensible person would argue that people with 
dangerous driving records or the poorly sighted should be allowed 
to drive. Nor should shooters – even the gun lobby would agree – be 
licensed if they are demonstrably unfit to own a gun; for example, if they 
have threatened or committed violence. Similarly, few would maintain 
that an unsafe car should be let onto public roads or that it is a bad idea 
to be able to trace a car via registration if it was involved in a hit-and-
run incident. Gun registration allows authorities to track the movement 
of a gun from owner to owner, to note if people are building arsenals, 
and to link a gun found to be used in a crime to its owner. All of these 
benefits, of course, assume that shooters would register their guns. 
Obviously, people intending to use a gun criminally would not register 
it, but in many ways this consideration should have been irrelevant to 
the gun lobby, because of its continual insistence that it spoke only for 
law-abiding citizens (see Chapter 6).
The most important argument for firearm registration is simply 
that without it, the shooter licensing system is undermined. Licensing 
is cardinal to the gun control policies of all countries with gun laws. 
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Legislators use licensing to exclude people such as those with violent 
criminal records and domestic violence offenders from owning guns. 
Licensing places a major obstacle in the way of known criminals and 
domestic violence offenders wishing to obtain the authorisation they 
would need to buy guns from a shop. However, firearms are often (and 
until the new laws, quite legally) obtained from sources other than gun 
shops. In the past, nearly half of all gun owners obtain their guns through 
private sales, gifts, as heirlooms or other means.57 Anyone disposing of 
a gun privately is still legally required to ensure the new owner holds a 
current gun licence – but without registration, many would think ‘why 
bother?’. Without gun registration there is no trail for police to follow.
Guns originally bought legally by a licensed shooter can pass easily 
into the hands of those forbidden from holding a licence because of a 
history of violence. This can happen quite innocently: how could some-
one selling a gun be expected to know the criminal or domestic violence 
record of any potential purchaser? ‘Straw man’ purchases also occur 
(when someone with no criminal record buys guns on behalf of others 
whose criminal record would preclude them from having one).
Registration also provides licensed gun owners with the incentive 
to remain licensed after their licence expires: if you can only retain a 
(registered) gun while you have a current licence, then you may be con-
cerned that cherished guns might be confiscated if you failed to renew 
your shooter’s licence. The importance of this was tragically demon-
strated by the double police killings at Crescent Head, NSW in July 
1995. The gunman there, John McGowan, was a licensed shooter who 
had not renewed his licence when it had expired a few years before. 
The two police who responded to a domestic violence call-out involving 
McGowan therefore had no way of knowing he had ever owned a gun 
and were therefore perhaps unprepared for what was to happen. They 
were shot dead.
Those opposed to gun registration often argue that police should 
always assume there may be a gun at such incidents. This is analogous to 
57 Harding R, Firearms and violence in Australian life, Perth: University of 
Western Australia Press, 1981: 84.
Over our dead bodies
138
expecting police to assume every car they see on the road is stolen, but 
never to obtain positive confirmation. Australian police routinely check 
by radio the names, vehicle details, criminal record, unpaid parking 
fines, history of stolen property and firearm ownership (among other 
things) associated with premises they are called to. Gun registration can 
boost incalculably the precision of this information.
It is naive to expect that all shooters with expired licences would 
conscientiously renew their licences or dispose of their guns legally 
when there is not the remotest possibility that they will be found to be 
breaking the law. The NCGC believes the absence of registration has 
been the main reason why such a large proportion of NSW licence-
holders have failed to renew on expiry (see below).
Domestic homicide prevention
Attempting to prevent guns being used in domestic violence, including 
homicide, has long been a major reason for restricting access to guns. 
But whatever improvements that might be made in laws on guns and 
domestic violence cannot hope to work without registration. When a 
gun licence is automatically suspended or cancelled after a protection 
order is issued, this does not guarantee that a guns are not still avail-
able to domestic violence perpetrators. If the licence is seized, this only 
prevents the former licensee from legally buying more guns. It does 
nothing to remove guns the violent person already has and may be 
hiding. Without knowing how many firearms a person owns, police can 
only guess whether the offender has any weapons they cannot locate.
The NSW Central Coast (Terrigal) massacre in 1992 illustrates this 
point. The gunman was Malcolm Baker, a licensed shooter with no 
criminal record. Three weeks before the shootings, his de facto wife, 
Kerry Anne Gannan, had left him and obtained an apprehended vio-
lence order (AVO) against him. When the AVO was issued, the local 
police cancelled Baker’s licence and searched his house for guns. They 
seized five firearms, assuming these were all he owned. But there was 
one more that was not found: a pump-action shotgun which he used to 
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kill Gannan and her sister, their father, his adult son, a former business 
associate and this man’s de facto.
The Central Coast massacre was widely publicised because of the 
extent of the carnage. Yet in important respects it was a very ‘usual’ 
homicide. It occurred within a family, was preceded by domestic vio-
lence, motivated by sexual possessiveness, and accomplished with a 
common firearm owned by a ‘law-abiding’ licensed shooter.
‘Registration has never helped to solve a crime’
The SSAA’s Ted Drane at one time argued ‘there has never been a crime 
solved in Australia through registration’, citing the case of murdered 
Federal Police Assistant Commissioner Colin Winchester, who was 
killed with a Ruger .22. According to Drane, police contacted ‘every-
one who had Rugers. They still haven’t found it.’58 But Drane was never 
heard to use this argument again after the notorious backpacker mur-
derer Ivan Milat was traced through a gun shop’s sales records, a de 
facto form of gun registration.
The gun lobby are fond of quoting a former Victorian police officer 
who is opposed to registration. But research by another Victorian police 
officer, Errol Mason, and criminologist Dr Jo Herlihy, has shown that 
registration can greatly assist police ‘even when it is administratively 
clumsy and reputedly operating at less than maximum efficiency’.59 
Mason and Herlihy’s interviews with police found many examples of 
cases in which firearm registration was crucial in investigating crimes. 
They cite seven examples, including homicides, armed robberies and 
drug offences, which could not have been solved without the use of 
the firearms registration system. Most of these involved professional 
criminals – precisely the type of gun owners for whom the gun lobby 
repeatedly claims the new gun laws would be irrelevant. If a gun is lost 
or stolen, registration can aid in its recovery. If police know the gun (or 
58 Aiton D. ‘Out for a duck’, The Sunday Age, 21 March 1993: 4.
59 Mason E, Herlihy J, ‘Firearms registration: the controversy revisited (first 
draft)’, unpublished manuscript, Australian Institute of Criminology 1993: 15.
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even the type of gun) used in a crime, registration provides a starting 
point for tracing the owner and piecing together the chain of events 
surrounding the crime – as the Milat backpacker investigations showed. 
Knowing that a gun is registered provides a disincentive to experienced 
criminals contemplating stealing it, because registration could link 
them to a crime.60 Few people bother to note down the manufacturer’s 
number on every household item such as video and sound equipment 
they own. Consequently, when stolen these items can usually find ready 
purchasers. But stolen guns – like stolen cars – can only be re-sold to 
people prepared to risk owning a numbered and identifiable gun. Even 
when serial numbers have been ground off the gun, forensic science 
techniques can often identify at least part of the original number.
Many arguments against registration have become redundant 
because of technological developments. Early registration systems 
depended on bookkeeping or carded record systems. Today’s computer 
based systems such as the national fingerprint database for Australia and 
New Zealand and the National Exchange of Police Information (NEPI) 
database that will link the gun licensing and registration systems of all 
eight Australian jurisdictions, allow information to be accessed almost 
instantly, updated and preserved.
‘Shooters won’t register their guns’
One of the gun lobby’s principal arguments against gun registration was 
that it would be administrative folly and a waste of taxpayers’ money 
to establish a registration system because many shooters simply would 
refuse or neglect to register their guns. Before Port Arthur, Western 
Australia, South Australia, Victoria, the Northern Territory and the ACT 
required long-arm registration. The gun lobby argued (almost certainly 
correctly) that even in those jurisdictions many shooters do not register 
their weapons. After the buyback concluded on the 30 September 1997, 
NSW’s comparatively low ratio of guns handed in per adult population 
(see Table 4.1) was widely attributed to many gun owners thinking ‘they 
don’t know I’ve got the gun, so why should I bother handing it in?’
60 Ibid, 10.
The main reforms
141
Part of the reason for this has undoubtedly been because no state 
had taken gun registration particularly seriously. No state engaged in 
random checks of houses for guns. None publicised the seriousness 
of owning an unregistered gun through, for example, the conduct of 
community policing campaigns (similar to the annual Operation Noah 
campaign where the public can inform police about suspected illicit 
drug dealing). And all states with gun registration seldom prosecuted 
anyone for having an unregistered gun, unless these guns were detected 
in the course of charging people with other offences. All this combined 
to send a message to shooters that failure to register a gun would most 
likely go unnoticed. Again, many probably thought ‘why bother?’
NSW has never had rifle registration, but some indication of the 
extent to which shooters might be ignoring gun laws could be gained 
by considering the situation of shooter licensing in the state between 
June 1991 and April 1993, when tougher, although still very inade-
quate, gun laws were introduced. In this period the number of licensed 
shooters fell from about 240,000 to about 180,000. The gun lobby and 
its political sympathisers attributed the fall to shooters refusing to take 
out licences, while the NCGC suggested that many of people no longer 
having licences may have decided that, not being active shooters, they 
no longer wanted a gun licence. Many may have given up shooting.61 
The answer probably lay in a combination of the two factors.
In summary, the gun lobby was certainly correct in maintaining 
that many shooters did not register their guns in states that already had 
gun registration, and that many would not register guns under the new 
trans-Australia laws. Much of this was doubtless due to a rational belief 
that with gun registration having so far been given low priority in police 
law enforcement efforts, they had little to lose by failing to register their 
guns. But to leap from this assessment to open public advocacy against 
registration was, as the NCGC regularly argued, equivalent to saying 
that all drivers should not drive within the speed limit because people 
often sped and were not caught by highway patrols. The gun lobby’s 
argument reduced to saying, ‘plenty of people break the law and get 
61 Morris L. ‘60,000 decline in licensed shooters’, SMH, 30 April 1994: 5.
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away with it . . . so the law is stupid and should be opposed’. A Sydney 
Morning Herald editorial argued that the failure of many to register 
was no argument against registration but rather ‘speaks of a disturb-
ing propensity among gun owners for flouting the law’.62 This theme is 
examined further in Chapter 6.
‘Criminals won’t register their guns’
A related argument was that ‘the basic flaw in the argument for fire-
arm registration [is that] it would only apply to the law-abiding citizen 
. . . and would have absolutely no effect on the criminal or the violent 
person . . . The fact is that you cannot legislate against insanity or against 
massacres . . .’63 Yet again, the gun lobby sought refuge behind its con-
venient dichotomy of good and bad shooters (see Chapter 6). Their 
argument here presupposed that all who would commit violence with a 
gun would be planning to do this when they acquired their guns. Hence, 
those intent on wrongdoing wouldn’t be silly enough to be licensed or 
register their guns. This argument attempted to frame the advocates of 
registration as utterly naive in their pursuit of bureaucratic solutions to 
problems that allegedly defied all regulation.
The problem for the gun lobby here is that the example shown by 
the facts on gun licensing simply do not support them. Philip Alpers 
presented a paper to the Third International Conference on Injury 
Prevention and Control in Melbourne in February 1996 and showed that 
in 11 multiple killings (five or more dead) in Australia and New Zealand 
between 1987 and 1993, 50 of the 70 victims were shot by licensed gun 
owners. Sixty of the dead (86%) were shot by someone with no previous 
history of mental illness or violent crime.64 Again the gun lobby had 
no specific response to Alpers’ analysis, with Ted Drane resorting to 
a vague and unsubstantiated slur: ‘Claims by Philip Alpers from New 
Zealand about licensed gun owners being killers were debunked after 
62 Anon. ‘A cool look at gun laws’ (editorial), SMH, 30 April 1996.
63 Tingle J. ‘The crossfire on gun legislation’, SMH, 11 July 1995: 15.
64 Allison C. ‘Licensed gun owners are main killers’, SMH, 19 February 1996.
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scrutiny in NZ,’ he claimed in a Sporting Shooters’ Association press 
release, providing no information about what exactly was debunked.65 
Drane’s informant on this point was the Sporting Shooters’Association 
of New Zealand. That country’s Police Commissioner later wrote to the 
local pro-gun group suggesting an apology for claiming, wrongly, that 
the Alpers study had been judged inaccurate. There was no response.
‘Gun registration is irrelevant to violence’
Shooters often claimed that the registration status of a gun was irrele-
vant to whether it would be used in a violent act (‘Mrs Majdalawi was 
killed by an unregistered pistol, even though all pistols are supposed to 
be registered. The children of Dunblane were murdered by registered 
pistols. What does it prove? Registration is irrelevant.’66) Obviously no 
one was arguing that registration would somehow stop a gun owner 
from shooting someone – just as no one would argue that a registered 
car would never be involved in an illegal act. But the gun lobby was not 
in the business of rational argument. Its aim was to present a simplistic 
vision of gun laws that sought to make them look facile. Drane’s clever 
rhetoric here framed registration as a solution around the wrong prob-
lem – guns – while his argument simultaneously framed the real issue as 
one of ‘bad’ men who presumably needed to be controlled, counselled 
or ‘educated’ not to be bad. As Drane’s point indicated, registration 
would not prevent any given murder, and if the debate stopped and 
ended there, the gun lobby would have succeeded in framing registra-
tion as a pointless exercise.
The task for gun control advocacy was to move the debate away 
from any particular murder to consider the population-wide benefits 
of registration, much in the same way that the community appreciates 
the car analogy. One of the NCGC’s most used debating points over the 
years when advocating gun registration had been: ‘We register cars, we 
register boats . . . we even register dogs! Why on earth can’t we register 
65 SSAA website, 19 February 1996.
66 Downes DA. ‘Guns and damned statistics’ (letter), SMH, 27 March 1996.
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guns?’67 We often found that to use this phrase in radio or television 
interviews almost guaranteed that it would be the ‘sound bite’ used in 
news reports. The argument followed that any community bothered 
enough to set up dog registration systems but not act on guns had per-
verse priorities. Professor Duncan Chappell said: ‘We have a better idea 
how many dogs we have in this country, rather than guns.’68
We also used the dog analogy to counter the gun lobby’s point that 
criminals would not register guns: ‘Some, often with criminal intent, 
don’t register their cars, boats or vicious dogs either. So do we hear a 
call for the abandonment of car registration?’ But guns are easier to hide 
than cars, ran the next stage of the argument. This can be countered by 
arguing that by this logic, handguns are the easiest to hide of the lot, yet 
they have been registered successfully since 1927.69
All Australian states have for many years required handguns to be 
registered, something the NCGC raised whenever appropriate. In public 
debate, this created an awkward precedent for the gun lobby when it 
tried to justify its opposition to long-arm registration. It obliged them 
to either criticise handgun registration or implicitly admit that the same 
sensible arguments applied, regardless of the type of gun. On no occa-
sion did anyone from the gun lobby argue that handguns should not 
be tightly controlled. Their usual debating approach was to try to wave 
the issue away by vague references to irrelevant ‘past history’. But the 
point was often noted by journalists and editorial writers: ‘If it’s good 
enough for handguns, it’s good enough for all guns.’70 We had sown this 
argument in media commentary during the years before Port Arthur.
67 Peters R, Chapman S. ‘Cars, boats, dogs . . . why not guns? The case for 
national gun registration in Australia’, Aust J Public Health, 1995, 19: 213–15.
68 Chappell D. Lateline, ABC TV 9 May 1996.
69 Chapman S. ‘Now, about those guns . . .’, SMH, 9 May 1996: 15.
70 Anon. ‘A cool look at gun laws’ (editorial), SMH, 30 April 1996.
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The gun lobby’s deepest fears
So why then did the gun lobby reserve its most vehement opposition 
for gun registration? On the morning of the Police Ministers’ meeting, 
the Sydney Morning Herald published a lengthy, anonymous article by 
a woman who had lived with a man who had threatened her and her 
children with gun violence. Most of the article described how hitherto 
ordinary, ‘good’ men who have guns in the house can lose self-control 
and use guns threateningly after things begin to go wrong in their 
domestic or working lives. In one highly sarcastic passage, the writer 
explored the gun lobby’s objections to gun registration by asking two 
most pertinent and obvious rhetorical questions: 
Why does the pro-gun lobby object to gun registration? 
Because someone might be able to trace an illegally pos-
sessed gun back to an irresponsible gun license holder who 
indiscriminately off-loaded one of his excess guns? Surely 
not. Because it might attract attention when your average cit-
izen accumulates an arsenal to rival a small nation’s defence 
force? Not likely.71
Here, so simply and eloquently expressed, were two of the main 
fears held by the gun lobby about registration; that is, a system of keep-
ing records of gun ownership and transfers which: 
•	 Governments could use to confiscate further categories of weapons 
that might be later declared illegal.
•	 Police could use to note if individuals were building up arsenals of 
weapons.
•	 Police could use to trace the sale of a weapon to someone not autho-
rised to own it (that is, a person without a gun licence or without 
the correct class of licence).
•	 The Tax Office could access to assess whether tax has been paid on 
any income gained from selling guns.
71 Anon. ‘Life in the firing line’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
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Of these, the fourth, concerning tax evasion, is never publicly 
voiced by the gun lobby for obvious reasons – there would be no polit-
ical advantage in trying to argue for a scheme that facilitated easy tax 
evasion. But I have been told on several occasions that there is an exten-
sive and (for some) lucrative black market in guns organised through 
gun fairs and various gun networks. Registration would severely restrict 
this trade and so is vehemently opposed. A press advertisement placed 
by ‘The Shooters Task Force’ listed as one of its gripes that the new laws 
would require that ‘all sales must go through a licensed gun dealer, thus 
reducing their value’.72 This was an understandable concern for shooters 
because dealers will always offer a lower price than could be obtained 
from a private sale. But it may also have been an allusion to the end 
of unrecorded cash transactions for guns, and hence tax avoidance by 
those who sold guns this way for a living.
One gun lobby advertisement expressed horror that the comput-
erised gun register would mean that ‘licensed gun owners’ names will 
be placed on the National Exchange of Police Information database 
alongside real criminals. An insult to every decent gun owner.’73 (our 
emphasis). This was a truly astonishing statement, revealing much about 
either the sheer innocence of some in the gun lobby about databases, 
or else about their resentment at even being remotely associated with 
criminals. A parallel claim of outrage might well have been drivers with 
flawless driving records feeling outraged that their names appeared on 
the Department of Motor Transport’s computerised list of all drivers 
‘next to’ people who had culpable, drunk, or negligent driving charges 
recorded against them. Horror!
The bottom line to the futility of the gun lobby’s resistance to regis-
tration can be simply expressed. It seemed that many among the public 
were satisfied that there was an obvious reason behind opposition to 
gun registration: that anyone wanting to own a gun for peaceful, legal 
purposes would have nothing to fear in registration, while those who 
72 The Shooters Task Force. ‘Firearm owners don’t be duped’ (advertisement), 
Daily Telegraph, 17 June 1996.
73 Ibid.
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implacably opposed registration must have something to hide (‘There’s 
nothing undemocratic about being asked to register your gun, and 
unless you have malevolent intent, what is there to hide?’).74 At the end 
of the day, we were left with an indelible sense that this sentiment was 
foremost in most people’s minds whenever this debate arose.
Genuine reason to own a gun
The ban on semi-automatics and the introduction of national gun regis-
tration were the two changes that caused most apoplexy among the gun 
lobby. But arguably the most significant reform attracted far less atten-
tion, despite its immense potential to reduce the number of Australians 
who would be allowed to own guns. This was the requirement that 
anyone wishing to own a gun needed to prove a genuine reason for 
being granted a licence.
Most Australians probably assumed that gun owners were required 
by law to prove that they had a legitimate reason for wanting to own a 
gun; the idea that one could legally acquire a firearm on virtually any 
pretext might seem incredible to non-gun owners. Yet under the exist-
ing law in most states and territories, pistols were the only guns where 
ownership required justification. All pistol owners needed to do was to 
prove they were active members of a target shooting club, or needed a 
pistol for occupational reasons, such as working in the security indus-
try. Some jurisdictions also required proof of reason for high-capacity 
semi-automatic rifles. Only Western Australia required proof for all 
types of firearms. Applicants elsewhere were asked to simply name their 
reason for wishing to own guns – no proof was required. Thus, outside 
Western Australia, any adult without a criminal record was eligible to 
own unlimited numbers of ordinary rifles or shotguns.
Resolution 3 in the APMC agreement requires applicants for all 
types of gun licences to establish a ‘genuine reason’ for owning or using a 
gun. The set of genuine reasons was short and seemingly unambiguous: 
74 Gordon H. Letter, SMH, 30 March 1996: 36.
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•	 Applicants claiming to be target shooters must demonstrate mem-
bership of an authorised club.
•	 Those claiming to be recreational hunters must produce permission 
from a rural landowner allowing shooting on their land.
•	 People claiming an occupational requirement must prove that their 
occupation actually does require a gun (for example, farmers with 
feral animal infestations).
•	 Gun collectors must prove to police that they are bona fide collectors.
•	 Other limited purposes (such as the use of guns in theatrical pro-
ductions) could be authorised by special permit.
In addition, those wishing to own self-loading firearms (Categories 
C and D) needed to prove a ‘genuine need’ that could not be met by 
single-shot weapons. Only farmers, professional shooters and authorised 
clay target shooters (the latter may only apply for one type of Category 
C weapon, a self-loading shotgun) could apply to prove ‘genuine need’. 
However most farmers would not qualify, as their needs (for example, 
routine feral animal control) could be met with an ordinary rifle or 
shotgun. Recreational hunters and the vast majority of target shooters 
were simply ruled out.
Being a farmer and member of a target shooting club were rela-
tively unproblematic. Both of these ‘genuine need’ categories would 
easily allow applicants to produce evidence of rural residence or prop-
erty ownership, or of gun club membership. Those stating hunting as 
their reason would have to obtain a letter from a landowner giving per-
mission for the shooter to shoot on the landowner’s property. This was 
always going to be a big problem for many shooters and for govern-
ments in having to rule out past stated reasons for gun ownership.
Many people owning guns before the new reforms had indicated 
when applying for a licence that they wanted them for hunting. They 
were not obliged to provide evidence for this, nor any landowner’s 
authorisation. Many urban gun owners probably would not even know 
a farmer, and on the strength of many comments made during the post–
Port Arthur debate by farmers who supported the new laws, would be 
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very unlikely to get such permission. Farmers signing a letter of authori-
sation risked entangling themselves in legal problems if a shooter to 
whom they had given permission to use their property was involved in 
some incident. It seemed likely that most cautious landowners would 
be deeply uninterested in providing such permission, particularly to 
strangers.
The criteria for ‘need to own’ a gun threatened to prove a huge 
headache for governments. They would exclude many thousands of 
angry shooters, particularly those living in cities, who were not farmers, 
did not belong to a gun club, and could not find a landowner willing to 
provide authorisation for hunting. In short, it promised to ‘disenfran-
chise’ thousands of people who held shooters’ licences under the old 
laws. Not only would thousands of shooters be required to surrender 
their semi-automatics, but thousands more would be told that, not sat-
isfying the criteria for having genuine need to own a gun, they could 
not continue to legally own any gun. And if these guns were single-shot 
rifles and shotguns, there was no provision for any compensation to be 
paid for their surrender. The NCGC regularly called for the provisions 
of the buyback to be extended to cover compensation for any gun sur-
rendered. No state took up our suggestion.
Throughout the debate that followed the Port Arthur massacre, the 
NCGC noticed that politicians paid little attention to this issue. We took 
this as a sign that governments had privately decided it was something 
they would simply not take on. Several times we heard reassurances on 
radio from politicians that people who already held shooters’ licences 
had ‘nothing to fear’. This was plainly very much against the intent of 
the Police Ministers’ agreement on the nature of a ‘genuine reason’ to 
own a gun.
Safe storage
The new proposals reiterated and strengthened provisions in some 
states requiring licensed gun owners to securely store their weapons 
at home. A national standard for storage required that guns be stored 
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in a locked hardwood or steel receptacle that could not be easily pen-
etrated. To avoid easy removal, the receptacle must weigh more than 
150 kg when empty, or be fixed to a building. All ammunition must be 
stored in a locked container of an approved type, separate from the fire-
arms. Farmers and professional shooters with special permits to own 
a semi-automatic gun or pump-action shotgun must store these in a 
locked steel cabinet bolted to a building.
Safe, secure storage in locked gun cabinets is considered import-
ant for two reasons: preventing theft and minimising access to guns by 
people (often children) not trained to use them. Guns are often stolen 
when found by thieves in break-and-enter situations. In the USA, a 
study of 1,678 criminals found that 47% reported having stolen a gun. 
When asked where they would go to steal a gun, the most common 
response (58%) was a home or apartment.75 In England, Scotland and 
Wales a 1994 study showed 1,339 offences were recorded when guns 
(excluding air rifles and starting pistols) were stolen. These included 
690 occasions when shotguns, pistols or rifles were stolen from hous-
es.76 (In Australia, there is no database on how many guns are stolen 
during robberies, but these statistics are available from crime reports of 
break and enters.)
We did not notice any public objections from the gun lobby to safe 
storage: to have done so would have required them to advance reck-
less arguments about leaving guns lying about in houses, which would 
counter their frequent efforts to position shooters as responsible. But 
there was behind-the-scenes lobbying against any move that granting 
a licence would be conditional on installation of a safe. The Australian 
Police Ministers’ Council resolutions required all governments to intro-
duce laws that would only allow shooter’s licences to ‘be issued subject 
75 Wright JD, Rossi PH. Armed and considered dangerous: a survey of felons 
and their firearms. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1986: 194–95.
76 Evidence submitted on behalf of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the 
Home Secretary to Lord Cullen’s Inquiry Into the Circumstances Leading up 
to and Surrounding the Events at Dunblane Primary School on Wednesday 13 
March 1996, 30 April 1996: 50.
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to undertakings to comply with storage requirements, to provide details 
of proposed storage provisions at the time of licensing’. Most people 
would imagine this means shooters can’t get licences until they under-
take to store their guns in ways that make them difficult to access. And 
given the seriousness of guns getting into the hands of criminals, people 
might be forgiven for thinking governments would arrange for these 
hand-on-heart ‘undertakings’ to be backed up with inspection. This was 
not to be the case in NSW.
In November 1996, only days after Martin Bryant’s sentencing, 
NSW independent politician Peter Macdonald sought to amend the 
NSW Act by requiring police to inspect safe storage arrangements 
before shooters were given a gun licence. Police Minister Paul Whelan 
replied that this was ‘unfair .  .  . It would mean that all applicants for 
firearms would be required to install expensive safes and other storage 
equipment before they knew whether their licence application had been 
approved’. Instead Whelan was content with applicants simply stating 
that they would comply with the requirements. While the Act allowed 
for inspections, it did not require them and the government gave no 
undertakings that it would set any target levels. Almost unbelievably, 
Whelan went on to explain that ‘police can inspect storage facilities at a 
time mutually agreed with the licence holder’.77 Just picture it. ‘Er, hello, 
Constable Plod here. Would it be convenient for me to drop around just 
to check that your guns are securely stored so that you won’t be hit with 
a whopping fine and possible jail sentence? Not tomorrow? Week after 
next, you say? Right. See you then.’
In many aspects of daily life, issues of public safety are backed with 
requirements for inspection. Would we accept the unchecked assur-
ances of owner-builders that they comply with electrical circuitry and 
building standards? From drivers that they promise not to drive with 
bald tyres and faulty brakes? Or from nightclub owners that their fire 
escapes will be adequate? Do Food Act inspectors bow to the privacy 
77 NSW Legislative Assembly Hansard. Firearms Amendment Bill. Second 
Reading. 26 November 1996.
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of café owners and arrange mutually convenient times to check for rat 
droppings?
The National Party’s Peter Cochrane, who had earlier unsuccessfully 
tried to have the Act amended so that guns would not be distastefully 
referred to as ‘weapons’ but as benign ‘devices’78 (‘Come out with your 
hands up and drop your device!’), told the NSW Parliament when sup-
porting the Government’s rejection of Macdonald’s amendment that 
country police officers ‘have far more pressing law and order issues to 
attend to than the inspection of storage facilities for firearms’. Or regis-
tering guns, he would have doubtless agreed.
Macdonald argued that a user-pays approach, so favoured by both 
government and opposition in practically every other facet of life, could 
be used to pay for the obvious costs that inspections would entail. Just 
like drivers pay for annual motor vehicle safety inspections, for exam-
ple. If drivers can’t afford compulsory insurance, we deem they can’t 
afford the car. So if shooters aren’t prepared to pay for storage inspec-
tions, should they be able to have a gun licence? Cochrane pointed out 
that country police would need to travel hundreds of thousands of kilo-
metres each year to undertake the inspections. With inspections only 
being one-off at the time of licensing, there was doubtless some hyper-
bole in this. But at a very minimum, it invited the solution of quotas of 
random inspections.
Under such a scheme all shooters would be on notice that each 
police station would be required to randomly inspect, unannounced, 
say 200 licensees a year. Any station which reported rates of compli-
ance much higher than the state average would have a further random 
sample inspected by external police. This was one very glaring exam-
ple of the (thankfully rare) backsliding that many had predicted would 
begin when the Port Arthur case faded from the media’s gaze.
78 Ibid.
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The gun lobby in Australia
This chapter and the next examine three of the main groups that make 
up the gun lobby in Australia and the range of arguments they used 
against the reforms. First, I look at the gun lobby’s reaction to the Port 
Arthur massacre and the announced gun law reforms, and particularly 
at how the lobby was described and discussed in the media. In the next 
chapter, I examine in detail their main arguments against gun control.
As described in Chapter 3, the public and media discourse on gun 
control in the three months after Port Arthur reached an unprecedented 
intensity. Australia’s gun lobby probably received more exposure in these 
months than in its entire political history. The spotlight fell particularly 
on three prominent spokespeople: Ted Drane, of the Sporting Shooters 
Association of Australia (SSAA); John Tingle, of the Shooters’ Party; 
and Ian McNiven, of the Queensland Firearm Owners’ Association 
of Australia (FOAA). A few supportive politicians, particularly West 
Australian Independent Graeme Campbell and Queensland National 
Party backbencher Bob Katter Jr, also had significant exposure. The 
great majority of Australians, urging governments to fulfil the 10 May 
Police Ministers’ agreement, found their views opposed by these wilful 
men. In an important way, the nation’s media hosted a social drama that 
retold an age-old ‘good versus evil’ story about the struggle between two 
groups. Whatever image the gun lobby hoped to project, to the great 
majority of the population it simply represented a dark force trying to 
block Prime Minister John Howard’s gun law reforms.
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If Howard and Attorney-General Daryl Williams were secular 
priests offering the new laws as a way of absolving governments from 
past sins of omission, gun lobbyists were the infidels intent on disrupt-
ing this attempt at reparation. The nation watched this drama unfold 
over the months after Port Arthur, with each new gun lobby strategy 
looming as a threat to force a retreat on reform.
Immediate reaction to the massacre
Voices from the gun lobby joined in the general expression of abhor-
rence over what happened at Port Arthur. Especially in the early days 
after the massacre, and at most of the gun lobby’s rallies, great care was 
taken to open their protest meetings with expressions of sympathy and 
outrage over Martin Bryant’s acts. These rallies would then quickly 
resume their bellicose chanting about shooters’ rights, ridiculing any 
politicians acting against gun violence. In what one editorial described 
as a ‘nakedly opportunistic drive for new members’,1 the SSAA ran 
full-page ‘fighting fund’ advertisements in major newspapers on the 
morning of the 10 May Police Ministers’ meeting, calling for dona-
tions.2 These advertisements opened with the words, ‘Responsible gun 
owners were shocked and horrified, as were all Australians, at recent 
tragic events in Tasmania.’ While these expressions of sympathy may 
well have been genuine, they were plainly calculated by the gun lobby 
to present itself as a group of compassionate, decent people whose first 
concern was to share the nation’s grief and outrage before getting down 
to the main agenda: opposing the new gun laws.
In the July/August 1996 edition of Guns Australia magazine, the 
editor appeared willing to dispense with all this grief talk and start put-
ting Port Arthur in a different, no-nonsense perspective: ‘Sure, innocent 
people lost their lives at the hands of a criminal, but innocents have 
1 Anon. ‘Historic pact on gun reforms’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
2 Sporting Shooters Association of Australia. ‘An urgent message to all gun 
owners’ (advertisement), Daily Telegraph, 10 May 1996.
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been losing their lives in a similar manner for thousands of years, and 
on a scale which makes the death toll of Port Arthur look insignificant,’ 
he shrugged.3 Apparently not realising that Port Arthur was the larg-
est civilian gun massacre by a lone gunman recorded this century, the 
editor went on, 
Why have this country’s governments, media and most of 
the general public reacted in such a way as to suggest that the 
massacre at Port Arthur is a tragedy on a global scale; that the 
loss of life is something this nation will never recover from, 
and that the world will never know the pain of Port Arthur. 
The world does know – it has known that kind of pain for 
many centuries and on a more frequent basis than us.
His blood brothers from the FOAA issued a statement on the Tuesday 
after the massacre saying: ‘A few hundred murdered by nut cases is 
infinitesimal in comparison to what Mao, Stalin . . . have committed.’4
The SSAA’s Ted Drane lost no time in turning to his principal task: 
to distract attention away from gun control and on to more ponderous 
solutions that would allow the passage of time to dissipate community 
demands for reform. On the Monday after the Sunday massacre, Drane 
told the 7.30 Report: ‘We don’t believe that any so-called tougher firearm 
laws will actually do anything. What we need is to look at the reasons 
. . . what went wrong with the laws that were in Tasmania now and try 
to come up with a solution.’5 The gun lobby made predictable calls to 
establish committees to examine the proposed reforms. Amid his crit-
icism of the actions taken by the Police Ministers, John Tingle said an 
inquiry was needed to find out why Australia had suffered a spate of 
gun massacres in the past 10 years. Neither Drane nor Tingle appeared 
to remember that the National Committee on Violence (NCV) had 
already carried out a two-year inquiry involving hearings throughout 
3 Bostock I. ‘From the editor’s desk’, Guns Australia, July/August 1996: 4–5.
4 Roberts G, Cornford P. ‘Buying spree as shooters try to beat the ban’, SMH, 
1 May 1996: 1.
5 7.30 Report ABC TV, 29 April 1996.
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Australia, and had recommended a national gun control scheme very 
similar to the one agreed on by the APMC in 1996.6
Formidable reputation
The gun lobby’s reputation as a politically powerful force derived not 
from the Shooters’ Party’s ventures into directly contesting elections 
(see Chapter 1), but by constantly talking up its ability to swing votes 
against any political party candidates supporting gun law reform. Gun 
magazines are full of gun lobby swagger about the role shooters claim to 
have played in the defeat of the Unsworth Labor Government in NSW 
in 1988, and threats about what they will do to any candidate stupid 
enough to run a gun law reform platform. The leaders of the lobby at 
times seemed drunk on the sense of their own power. Ted Drane said: 
‘The firearms lobby . . . are very powerful, we don’t resile from that, and 
there are a couple of governments in Australia that are just hanging on 
by the skin of their teeth at the moment.’7
The term ‘gun lobby’ referred to what one analyst described as: 
Something of a movement championing a reactionary, right-
wing political agenda including advocacy of individual 
liberty in the face of perceptions of excessive government, 
opposition to immigration, opposition to multicultural-
ism, rabid opposition to any group whose moral or sexual 
perspectives deviate from anything the far right considers 
normal, and claims that law and order is breaking down to 
the extent that citizens need weapons to defend themselves.8
Another writer, analysing the appeal of right-wing politicians like 
Campbell and Katter, suggested that the gun lobby was 
6 National Committee on Violence. Violence: directions for Australia. 
Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra 1990: 175–89. 
7 Gibson R, Chamberlain P. ‘Wheeling out the big guns’, The Age, 11 May 
1996: A20–21.
8 Economou N. ‘The far right makes its move on power’, The Age, 8 June 
1996: A8.
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reflecting and responding to a set of social and political fears 
that are widespread throughout rural Australia. To these 
rural people, the Federal Government’s move on automatic 
and semi-automatic weapons is the latest manifestation of 
broader concerns. Essentially, the problem is one of rural 
alienation and economic hardship, with lashings of personal 
paranoia and religious fundamentalism, encouraging a feel-
ing . . . that politicians either won’t respond to people’s needs 
and desires or are engaged in a conspiracy against them.9 
Many similar analyses were published during 1997 about the political 
appeal of federal MP Pauline Hanson – another independent politician 
who expressed open solidarity with many of the aims of the gun lobby.
But hundreds of writers emphasised that the gun lobby should be 
seen as a minority group of extremists. Here is a small selection from 
the print media: 
•	 ‘Powerful but misguided . . . an outspoken but blinkered minority 
whose political influence has traditionally been grossly out of pro-
portion to their numbers.’10
•	 ‘But the debate is also being driven by extremists – the ugly face of 
the nation.’11
•	 ‘A noisy, misguided minority.’12
•	 ‘We should not be put off by the rantings of the militant few.’13
•	 ‘Protect us from those rednecks of Australia’s deep north as well as 
from any lone madman with murderous intent.’14
•	 ‘Some, of course, are genuinely around the twist, others in the grip 
9 Barker G. ‘Rural rebels have Coalition on the run’, Australian Financial 
Review, 11 June 1996.
10 Anon. ‘Historic pact on gun reforms’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
11 Anon. ‘The people expect new gun laws’ (editorial), Weekend Australian 
22–23 June 1996: 20.
12 Anon. ‘Deaths can’t be in vain’ (editorial), SMH, 10 May 1996.
13 Anon. ‘Fair price for a peaceful society’, Sunday Telegraph, 12 May 1996: 129.
14 Benson R. (Letter), The Australian, 18–19 May 1996: 20.
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of a peculiarly paranoid obsession of the kind that has ugly mani-
festations in the United States.’15
•	 ‘What baloney the shooters come up with. Are only the uneducated 
and crazed allowed to become members of the shooters’ groups in 
Australia? Perhaps compulsory psychiatric tests are needed next?’16
•	 ‘Vociferous cowboys .  .  . self-centred and besotted by gun-toting 
America . . .’17
•	 ‘Extreme splinter groups whose frothing spokesmen have achieved 
notoriety in recent weeks.’18
•	 ‘The arguments of the gun group have proved incontrovertibly 
that it is little more than a shelter for a sad collection of right-wing 
extremists.’19
•	 ‘We are dealing with wilful children in grown-up bodies.’20
•	 ‘The tiny minority who oppose tougher gun controls are able to 
exercise an influence out of all proportion to their numbers because 
some political parties have been prepared to pander to them in a 
sleazy quest for votes.’21
•	 ‘Only a handful of gun lobbyists have attempted to defend the luna-
tic gun laws of Tasmania and Queensland . . . the puny gun lobby 
. . .’22
15 McGuinness PP. ‘Fanatics cause discomfort for the Nationals’, The Age, 8 
June 1996: A23.
16 Gilchrist BR. ‘Careless with the truth’ (letter), SMH, 18 May 1996.
17 McMahon P. ‘It’s not Dodge City’ (letter), The Age, 9 May: 14.
18 McGregor M. ‘Blow to fading National force’, Australian Financial Review, 
17 June 1996.
19 Akerman P. ‘Australia’s despair has turned to hope’, Sunday Telegraph, 12 
May 1996: 129.
20 Finney J. (Letter), SMH, 5 June 1996.
21 Anon. ‘Deaths can’t be in vain’ (editorial), SMH, 10 May 1996.
22 Akerman P. ‘Blasting the myths of the gun lobby’, Sunday Telegraph, 5 May 
1996.
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After a rally organised by the CGC on Saturday 4 May, the front-
page headline of the Sunday Telegraph borrowed a phrase used by 
Professor Charles Watson at the rally: ‘Gun crazy fools’.23 All this was 
clearly too much for Brian Robson, director of the Victorian Field and 
Game Association, who defiantly told a Wodonga pro-gun meeting: 
‘We are not a minority group. We are a majority and we are very angry.’24
The gun lobby was astounded by the scope and unanimity of the 
Police Ministers’ resolutions: ‘We believed John Howard was flying a 
kite of draconian laws which would be watered down at the conference 
. . . Everybody assumed that responsible shooters and farmers were still 
going to have access to [semi-automatics].’25 The SSAA claimed Howard 
had been ‘grandstanding’ as a tough leader to put himself in a good light 
for a double dissolution of both houses of parliament, so he could gain 
control of the Senate where his party lacked a majority. This prediction 
came to nothing. More than 12 months after the 10 May agreement, 
no double dissolution had been called. The SSAA claimed to have had 
‘politicians from all political parties expressing their disgust at what has 
happened here’.26 Few were ever named.
In addition to the contempt directed at the gun lobby from the 
public, many people commented on the act of shooting, focusing on 
the thrill hunters get from killing: ‘Sporting shooters kill for fun. Think 
of it: they actually enjoy killing, they like it!’27 One shooter attempted to 
sanitise this aspect of shooting: ‘A good hunter shouldn’t get pleasure 
from the kill, just an element of satisfaction,’28 an interesting distinction. 
The phallic shape of guns and the concept of guns as a means of express-
ing power, caused some to speculate unkindly that some gun owners 
23 Larkin J. ‘Gun crazy fools’, Sunday Telegraph, 5 May 1996: 1.
24 Millett M, Wright T. ‘Under fire’, SMH, 22 June 1996: 35.
25 Wainwright R. ‘We’ll take to streets, say sporting shooters’, SMH, 13 May 
1996.
26 Rees P. ‘Shooters call crisis talks’, Sunday Telegraph, 12 May 1996: 8.
27 Mauntner T. ‘A shooter’s choice beyond cruelty’ (letter), The Age, 6 June 
1996: 16.
28 Nolan S. ‘Against’, The Age, 7 June 1996: A11.
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cherished the gun as a means of sublimating sexual inadequacy. The 
Sun Herald – perhaps mischievously – included a large advertisement 
for an impotence clinic on the same page as its report on the Sydney 
shooters’ rally.
Respectable, responsible shooters
The gun lobby was acutely aware of its redneck public image and con-
stantly emphasised that its membership was diverse, intelligent and 
responsible. Tingle and Drane were articulate and highly plausible 
representatives, although Drane was easily provoked and frequently 
appeared to be only just suppressing his anger. When the SSAA brought 
Bob Corbin, president of the United States’ National Rifle Association 
(NRA), to Australia in 1992, Drane had explained the visit as a public 
relations exercise to counter the gun lobby’s image as ‘a bunch of raving 
lunatics, subversives and right-wing fanatics’.29 Defensively, he described 
Corbin as ‘an extremely intelligent, articulate guy. He’s not a redneck.’30 
In 1993 Drane told a journalist that through the SSAA’s magazine, ‘We 
belt the readers with ethics.’31
In defence of semi-automatics, a Tasmanian gun dealer told a 
reporter that people who bought these guns were ‘respectable people 
.  .  . They are not untrustworthy people. They are professional people, 
high up in the business world. They’re not Rambos or rough-heads.’32 
‘We [shooters] are such innocuous people. Really, no one could be more 
conservative than a shooter,’ said one speaker at a gun rally.33 
Some shooters were even prickly about having their guns described 
as ‘weapons’: ‘[They] keep referring to our sporting firearms as being 
“weapons” and the crowd reacted very strongly against that because 
29 Bicknell J. ‘Fears held over visit by US rifle club chief ’, SMH, 9 November 
1992: 5.
30 O’Neill M. ‘Other arms reach out . . .’, The Bulletin, 14 July 1992: 32–34.
31 Aiton D. ‘Out for a duck’, The Sunday Age, 21 March 1993: 4.
32 Hayes B. ‘Rifles sold near Bryant’s home’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
33 Gora B. ‘Protesters vow to keep fighting’, Sunday Telegraph, 16 June 1996.
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that’s part of the stigmatisation that firearm owners is being forced upon 
them [sic],’ said the Field and Game Association’s Ian McLachlan.34 In 
November 1996 National Party MP Peter Cochrane tried unsuccess-
fully in the NSW Parliament to have the Firearms Act amended so that 
guns would not be distastefully referred to as ‘weapons’ but as ‘devices’.
At the NSW National Party Conference in June 1996, a delegate 
named Jim Looney told the assembled members, ‘We all must remem-
ber that Australia was founded on guns, in the normal sense, and saved 
by the gun.’35 ABC Radio commentator Mike Carlton had a wonder-
ful time ridiculing Mr Looney’s comment, speculating on how the 
Aboriginal community would react to his comments about the ‘normal 
sense’ of Australia being ‘founded on guns.’
The NCGC took care to never besmirch gun owners as a general 
class. Philip Alpers, our New Zealand colleague, is a licensed shooter 
and I owned and regularly shot a .22 when growing up in the NSW 
country. We readily acknowledged that most gun owners were respon-
sible and ‘law-abiding’. This was not saying much, because the old gun 
laws demanded so little of them. Before Port Arthur, those who wanted 
guns but had no legitimate use for them could still buy and keep any 
number of weapons in most parts of Australia – and still be within 
the law. Anyone with an ordinary shooter’s licence could legally own 
rapid-fire weaponry. In three states one could buy guns without giving 
notice of any kind to the police. This was ‘law-abiding’ behaviour.
Associated negative publicity
During the first few months of the debate several incidents unrelated 
to Port Arthur amplified the call for gun control. In early June it was 
reported that a blind man who had held a shooter’s licence since 1987 
took his pump-action shotgun to work and threatened to kill his 
34 7.30 Report ABC TV 17 June 1996.
35 Aubert E. ‘National MPs endorse federal move on gun laws’, Newcastle 
Herald, 15 June 1996.
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supervisor,36 raising the obvious question: ‘What was a blind man doing 
with a shooting licence?’ Days later a licensed shooter with no history of 
mental illness, carrying a shotgun and a substantial amount of ammuni-
tion, held staff in a Melbourne suburban solicitor’s office hostage before 
surrendering. Again, the media did not fail to make the connection: 
‘New laws will ban gun used in siege’.37 And on the very day of the gun 
lobby’s biggest rally against the new laws, yet another man ran amok 
with a pump-action shotgun in Darwin, shooting five people including 
four police. No one was killed, but the man was charged with seven 
counts of attempted murder.38 The media nationwide ran the story of 
the Darwin shootings alongside the Melbourne gun rally story.
The gun lobby provided journalists with a constant supply of lurid 
copy that made a sinister contrast with the quiet, responsible, com-
munity-minded determination of people like John Howard and Daryl 
Williams. Members of the public, including ordinary reasonable shoot-
ers, often contacted the NCGC with tip-offs that we were happy to share 
with the media. For example, a suburban gun shop in Campsie, Sydney, 
featured in its window display a mannequin’s head marked out with 
the concentric circles of a shooter’s target, and we alerted a television 
crew to this valuable footage. A newspaper revealed that gun shops 
were selling videos explaining the best ways to kill with guns. One such 
video suggested which parts of the body to aim at, and the journalists 
noted, ‘which is how Martin Bryant allegedly shot dead his 35 victims’. 
The same video reportedly counselled its viewers to act confused when 
questioned by police after a gun death.39
36 Donovan P. ‘Blind man is placed on bond after shooting threat’, The Age, 7 
June 1996: 3.
37 Adams D, Costa G, Koutsoukis J. ‘New laws will ban gun used in siege’, The 
Age, 13 June 1996: A2.
38 Anon. ‘Man charged in police shootings’, The Age, 3 June 1996: A4; Anon. 
‘Gunman injures five in rampage’, Sunday Telegraph, 2 June 1996: 5.
39 Anon. ‘Guns summit just a start’ (editorial), Sun Herald, 12 May 1996: 30;. 
Cumming F, Abbott G. ‘Killer videos on sale’, Sun Herald, 12 May 1996: 1, 3.
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Three days after the Port Arthur massacre, the CGC alerted the 
media to the fact that in NSW – where military-style semi-automatic 
riles were already banned from sale – ammunition which could be 
used only in these weapons was freely available for as little as 20 cents 
a bullet. This received extensive coverage, and showed that the NSW 
Government had been half-hearted about the ban.40
An American mail order catalogue, US Cavalry, distributed from 
a Sydney suburban postal address, was sent to one of our colleagues 
presumably by a bulk mail house. The catalogue featured every 
conceivable accessory for gun lovers and those who like to dress up in 
military combat gear and play war games. It also invited mail orders for 
semi-automatic handguns that fired lead pellets. We also supplied this 
to the media.
The notorious backpacker serial killer, Ivan Milat, was tried for 
murder during the aftermath of the Port Arthur shootings. Extensive 
reportage was given to Milat’s obsession with guns,41 which added 
urgency to the argument that current laws allowed virtually anyone to 
own a gun. Sydney’s largest gun shop, the Horsley Park Gun Shop, was 
found to have handled the sale of Ruger rifle parts found in Milat’s home. 
By law, gun dealers are required to record full serial numbers of all guns 
they sell, plus the name and address of the purchaser and anyone selling 
them a gun second-hand. This requirement was intended to act as a de 
facto system of gun registration, at least for guns sold through licensed 
dealers. But it was found that the Horsley Park Gun Shop had not kept 
any such record and the shop was charged with more than 800 breaches 
of the law.42
40 Skelsey M. ‘The tools of slaughter’, Daily Telegraph, 2 May 1996: 4.
41 Curtin J. ‘Milat liked guns, ex-wife tells court’, SMH, 29 March 1996: 3.
42 Fife-Yeomans J. ‘Milat’s gun shop owner cited for 800 firearm register 
breaches’, The Australian, 25–26 May 1996: 7.
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The SSAA
The Sporting Shooters Association of Australia is the largest of the 
organisations that make up the gun lobby in Australia. In mid June 1996 
it was said to have a national membership of 45,000 spread throughout 
156 branches.43 This meant that it was bigger than some trade unions, 
yet the membership figure represented less than 5% of the number of 
licensed shooters in Australia. Annual membership of the SSAA costs 
$45, yielding it an annual income from fees of $2,025,000. Annual 
returns for 1995 showed that the Victorian branch had $519,034 in 
assets, while Queensland had $1,031,249.44
Sections of the Australian gun lobby openly revere the powerful 
gun lobby in the United States. Before Port Arthur, the SSAA declared 
its ambition to become a clone of the National Rifle Association (NRA). 
Ted Drane told an NRA board meeting in the United States in April 
1992: ‘I believe we could not do any better than become the NRA of 
Australia.’ He told The Bulletin, ‘I love it,’ when Australians linked him 
with the NRA. Drane said the NRA ‘frightens the shit out of [US politi-
cians]. We want to scare the shit out of them here too.’45 In 1993, Drane 
returned to the US and boasted to an Australian journalist that he had 
been given a hotel room right next to the NRA’s chief executive, Wayne 
LaPierre.46
NRA President Bob Corbin visited Australia and New Zealand in 
November 1992 at the invitation of the SSAA and the SSANZ. In his 
monthly column in American Rifleman, Corbin wrote: 
They’re [the SSAA] now studying NRA and building an Aus-
tralian Institute for Legislative Action. Modelled after our 
own NRA-ILA, the lobby will unite gun owners and shoot-
ers’ groups throughout Australia and New Zealand to defend 
43 ‘Thriving gun trade turns to dead stock’, The Age, 17 June 1996: A4.
44 Ibid.
45 O’Neill M. ‘Other arms reach out . . .’, The Bulletin, July 14: 1992: 32–34.
46 Clark P. ‘Mom, apple pie and guns’, SMH, 28 April 1993: 19.
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their rights as one united front. I’m . . . proud to help with all 
the guidance and advice I can give them.’47 
Corbin advised the SSAA to ‘go after the anti-gun politicians. Get 
rid of them.’48
Inviting Bob Corbin to Australasia in 1992 was possibly the worst 
public relations mistake the local gun lobby ever made. Years later, 
many Australians still retain a vivid memory of this wild-eyed elderly 
American barking on current affairs programs: ‘Guns made America 
free!’ The very idea that the leader of the American NRA – the group 
dedicated to defeating even the most modest controls on gun ownership 
in a country besieged by gun violence – could visit Australia and avoid 
being lashed with ‘Yankee go home!’ anger showed how profoundly out 
of touch some local gun lobby leaders were.
In an effort to harness whenever possible, the powerful discourse 
about avoiding ‘the American road’ on guns, the NCGC reminded 
the public of the connection between the two gun lobbies. After Port 
Arthur, I debated Ted Drane on ABC Radio’s AM program and intro-
duced this dimension as early as possible. I also said that the NCGC 
had heard that the US NRA had offered to bankroll the formation of 
local branches of the SSAA in rural areas. Drane went apoplectic at this 
suggestion. I had struck a raw nerve.
One of the most important routine tasks in advocacy is to maintain 
a file of instances where your opposition has said or written something 
that could be strategically useful in particular debates. The NCGC keeps 
numerous examples from gun lobby literature such as magazines and 
pamphlets, and quotes obtained from the mainstream media. The worst 
examples of gun lobby venom are received almost daily via email.
One such example occurred on the ABC’s Lateline, screened on 16 
November 1992, when two senior members of the SSAA made frank 
admissions about their organisation’s relationship with the NRA. We 
reviewed the tape of the program on 9 May 1996, the day before the 
47 Corbin R. ‘The President’s Column’, American Rifleman February 1993: 50
48 Lewis J. ‘Aust. gun lobby told to toughen up’, SMH, 27 November 1992: 15.
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Police Ministers’ meeting, and issued a press release resurrecting some 
of the most damaging quotes (see below). We knew that the next day’s 
press would contain full-page advertisements calling for donations to 
the SSAA. Our press release alerted journalists to the ads and to the 
NRA’s proposal to bankroll the SSAA.
Keith Tidswell (SSA): ‘We don’t differ a lot from the NRA (US 
National Rifle Association) at all. In fact we’re very close in 
terms of our overall philosophy. The only differences might 
be in the way in which we are structured.’
Kerry O’Brien (Lateline host): ‘On what basis did you accept 
money from the NRA’s political action arm, the Institute for 
Legislative Action?’
Ted Drane (SSA): ‘On the basis that they offered it to us. They 
offer it to us, we’ll take it. And I’ll ask for more and if they 
give it, that’ll be great.’
O’Brien asks then, how much?
Ted Drane: ‘They [people] can guess whatever they like. They 
can make it 250, 300, 4 [hundred thousand] .  .  . whatever 
they like.’
Drane maintained his coyness until at least June 1993 when he told 
The Sunday Age, ‘We did ask and we did receive. It’s specific. They don’t 
care what we do with it but they know what we’re going to do.’49 Drane 
has since claimed that the NRA gave the SSAA only $20,000.50 Never 
in the entire debate did anyone in the SSAA repudiate the relationship 
with the NRA.
The Shooters’ Party
Urbane radio announcer John Tingle and six friends from his pistol 
club formed the Shooters’ Party in June 1992. It contested its first 
49 Debelle P. ‘Brothers in arms’, The Sunday Age, 26 June 1993: 20.
50 Gibson R, Chamberlain P. ‘Wheeling out the big guns’, The Age, 11 May 
1996: A20–1.
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election in 1993, gaining 1.8% of the vote and exchanging preferences 
with the Australians Against Further Immigration Party. Tingle told 
the Sydney Morning Herald that the party was ‘a grievance party for 
people pushed around by governments and told what they can’t do.’51 It 
had no electoral success until Tingle himself stood as a candidate and 
scraped into the Upper House of the NSW Parliament, the Legislative 
Council, in March 1995. Apart from being a symbolic triumph, his elec-
tion gave the gun lobby a significant practical advantage: henceforth the 
NSW taxpayers, who overwhelmingly supported tighter gun laws, were 
obliged to fund his campaign against gun control. In addition, the tight 
numbers in the Upper House gave Tingle a disproportionate amount 
of voting power. Soon after his election it became clear that the Labor 
Government was doing deals: in return for his support on other legisla-
tion, the Government had apparently agreed to take no positive action 
on gun control (See Chapter 3). As a Member of the Legislative Council, 
Tingle was elected for a term of eight years. If the Port Arthur massacre 
had not occurred, NSW might have continued to block the push for 
national uniform gun laws into the next century. Tingle’s media skills 
and status as a politician made him one of the gun lobby’s most prom-
inent spokespeople. The letters editor of the Sydney Morning Herald 
noted in her summary of the first week’s massive mail on the massacre, 
‘Not surprisingly, one politician was singled out for special mention – 
John Tingle of the Shooters’ Party.’52
As discussed later in this chapter, the Australian gun lobby is bitterly 
divided, apparently due to personality clashes as much as to disagree-
ments on policy and strategy. The Shooters’ Party shared many policy 
directions with the SSAA, but made a much greater effort to appear 
reasonable and moderate in the debate after Port Arthur. By cultivat-
ing this moderate image, Tingle presented himself as a more mercurial 
and reasoned opponent than Ted Drane and the SSAA, whose routine 
51 Loane S. ‘They’re Shooters’ Party men, and they’re going to war’, SMH, 4 
March 1995: 7.
52 Walsh G. ‘Postscript’, SMH, 6 May 1996: 14.
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outbreaks of anger and incitement to shooters to hold onto their guns 
contrasted starkly with their claim to be peaceful, law-abiding citizens.
Angling for support from an outraged community, Tingle claimed 
to have criticised the Tasmanian gun laws as a national disgrace. In a 
letter to a newspaper he stated that he did ‘not believe civilians need a 
fully automatic firearm; and I do not support military firearms in the 
civilian population.’53 This statement seemed to contradict his admission 
in 1993 that he belonged to a military rifle club.54 And fully automatic 
firearms had long been banned throughout Australia except for bona 
fide ‘collectors’, so Tingle was flying a kite for a position that was not 
even under debate. Tingle claimed to agree that some law reforms were 
needed, but he objected to every major element in the APMC agree-
ment. He refused to admit there was any benefit in national uniformity, 
railed against firearm registration, and predicted mass flouting of the 
ban on semi-automatics. In fact, he declined to nominate which main 
gun law reforms he would support, insisting that the solution lay in 
harsher penalties for offenders.
Ian McNiven and the Firearm Owners’ Association of 
Australia
On 15 May 1996 a significant development in the debate occurred in 
the Queensland town of Gympie. One of the lesser-known enclaves of 
the gun lobby, the Firearm Owners’ Association of Australia (FOAA), 
held a meeting in the town’s bowling club. Among those who addressed 
the meeting of about 200 were the vice-president and president of the 
FOAA in Queensland: Ian McNiven, a ruddy-faced electrician; and Ron 
Owen, a portly Gympie gun dealer and publisher of the extreme pro-
gun magazine Lock, Stock and Barrel. In what became one of the most 
repeated news items of the debate, McNiven blustered in front of the 
TV cameras: 
53 Tingle J. ‘Don’t blame me’ (letter), SMH, 9 May 1996: 14.
54 Palladino T. ‘Men of calibre. John Tingle’, Guns Australia, January/
February 1993: 60–61.
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You can send a message all the way down to Canberra to that 
sawn-off little dickhead Jackboot Johnny .  .  . The only cur-
rency that you can purchase freedom back with is blood. I 
know that you’re [the meeting] a bit angry about this shit. 
You’re a bit pissed off. Well I can assure you I haven’t calmed 
down yet. I’m still wild!55 
McNiven provided a hint of theatrical menace two days before 
when he said on Today Tonight: ‘I would point out to Mr Howard and 
his Liberal ministers that we also know where they live.’56
In the March 1996 federal elections, McNiven had stood for the 
Senate as number one on a ticket of three candidates for a party called 
The Constitutionalists. Between them they attracted 152 votes, McNiven 
himself getting all of 121 votes. This was the man who now threatened 
to ‘purge our Parliament’ of left-wing traitors.57 McNiven’s appear-
ance on television after the Gympie meeting unintentionally gave the 
gun control lobby one of the most enduring and damaging images of 
our opponents. If ‘the gun lobby’ had previously conveyed something 
vaguely sinister and obsessive to many Australians, here now were two 
men who embodied it.
McNiven was a glutton for media attention and made himself avail-
able for dozens of interviews. Several feature articles were written about 
him and other extremists.58 Politicians repeatedly commented that his 
performance had destroyed much of the gun lobby’s credibility. The 
Sydney Morning Herald published eight scathing letters under the title 
‘Gun lobby proves PM’s point’. One joked that Drane and Tingle must 
have hired actors to play rabid shooters at Gympie to make the SSAA 
and the Shooters’ Party look moderate;59 several made the point that the 
55 TV News Channel 7, 15 May 1996.
56 Today Tonight Channel 7, 13 May 1996.
57 Chan G. ‘Gun lobbyist stood for Senate’, The Australian, 18–19 May 1996: 2.
58 For example: Roberts G. ‘Pineapple extremists arm for freedom’, SMH, 25 
May 1996: 37.
59 Wong W. ‘Gun lobby proves PM’s point’ (letter), SMH, 18 May 1996.
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Gympie performance ‘convinced the peaceful majority that these are 
exactly the type of people that should not be bearing arms’.60
•	 ‘Having just read the manic ravings of Mr Owen and Mr McNiven 
. . . I’m convinced the only gun I’d feel safe with in their hands is a 
water pistol.’61
•	 ‘It has flushed out some of the mega-nutters who make up the gun 
lobby.’62
•	 ‘.  .  . there are some real ratbags out there, like Mr Ian McNiven, 
vice-president of the Firearm Owners Association, which is 
headquartered, you will not be surprised to learn, in darkest 
Queensland.’63
•	 ‘A couple of rounds short of a full magazine.’ (description of Ian 
McNiven)64
•	 ‘After watching highlights from the Firearm Owners Association’s 
Gympie rally, I’m no longer sure [the film Deliverance] wasn’t a 
documentary.’65
Journalist Richard Glover’s analysis was particularly penetrating: 
That’s what’s alarming about Gympie: it revealed the way that 
those who care deeply about guns also have a world-view 
that’s startlingly unhinged . . . the gun is central – these are 
people who define the removal of their guns as the removal 
of a central part of themselves. The gun is a prop to their 
personality and they see themselves dissolving without it. It’s 
a crutch without which they cannot walk as men . . . It was 
all there – a textbook lesson in the features of the socially 
inadequate: the pathological fear of community, the anger at 
60 Ellis G. ‘Gun lobby proves PM’s point’ (letter), SMH, 18 May 1996.
61 Breeze BH. ‘Killing animals for sport’ (letter), SMH, 24 May 1996: 14.
62 Carlton M. ‘Mike Carlton’ (column), SMH, 11 May 1996.
63 Ibid.
64 Carpenter B. ‘Gun lobby proves PM’s point’ (letter), SMH, 18 May 1996.
65 Fleming T. ‘Alive and well’ (letter), SMH, 5 June 1996.
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authority, the tendency to talk about blood and violence as 
the proper response when you don’t get your own way .  .  . 
And yet these are the people who ask us to believe than the 
gun lobby has different values [from mass killers] .  .  . They 
remind us that the more sick passion these people show, the 
less we should budge. Every cry that their very soul has been 
removed is proof of their weirdness.66
A few days after the Port Arthur massacre, McNiven debated 
Rebecca Peters on Channel 7’s Today Tonight program. After a com-
bative few minutes the pre-recorded segment ended and McNiven, 
who was in a Queensland studio, said to the film crew, ‘If I were mar-
ried to Rebecca Peters I’d probably commit domestic violence too.’ 
The recording had officially ended, but Peters and the program’s host, 
Helen Wellings, heard the remark clearly down their lines. Most of his 
words were still being recorded on sound tape. Several weeks later, 
after McNiven’s notoriety ballooned due to his ‘purchase freedom back 
[with] blood’ remark, the program brought Rebecca back to the studio 
and replayed the sound tape of McNiven’s remark.
In a truly remarkable incident, McNiven poured petrol on the fire 
of community speculation that some gun lovers were sublimating some 
form of sexual inadequacy or anxiety into their love of guns. In June 
two Federal Police visited him at his home. Afterwards, live on Sky TV, 
he said he believed the police were trespassing and that he was entitled 
to use his gun ‘to defend my family’. Asked if he was armed, he replied: 
No – I was in my pyjamas. The only weapon I had with me 
was my short arm, which was my stalk, and the gentlemen 
said to me that they would tell everyone that they’d seen me 
in my pyjamas. So that incensed me somewhat. So I climbed 
up on the verandah rail and dropped my pyjamas and 
shouted at them, ‘I don’t care if you tell everyone in the world 
I’ve got a small dick.’ It was pretty small at the time because 
all the fear and harassment had shrunk it back to nothing.
66 Glover R. ‘Unhinged and unbelievable’, SMH, 18 May 1996: 30.
Over our dead bodies
172
Other media reported the story,67 which was repeated widely by 
bemused Australians.
McNiven’s bizarre theories – delivered in interviews without a hint 
of leg-pulling – included his belief that Australians had a right to bear 
arms ‘guaranteed to us in law by the English Bill of Rights 1688 that’s 
part of Queensland’s law.’ He also urged shooters to refuse to accept 
Australian currency when handing in their guns, and accept only gold. 
He argued that Australian currency was somehow not legal tender. 
These crackpot views just kept on coming.
There was considerable debate over the way the media’s fascination 
with people like McNiven gave them exposure completely out of pro-
portion to their numbers in the community. McNiven and his type were 
obviously seen by many journalists as wonderful copy – people who 
unselfconsciously linked gun control advocacy with every silly theory 
about homosexuals, Zionist world conspiracies, Asian invaders, and the 
British monarchy. All that was missing was defence against UFOs.
Many people urged the NCGC to try to persuade journalists to stop 
covering these extremist views. Others wrote to newspapers urging 
them to show ‘moral responsibility’ by refusing to give them coverage.68
The intense media debate .  .  . has unintentionally provided 
the gun lobby with a credibility it neither deserves nor has. 
While breath-taking to see in print, the impertinent non-
sense incanted by Messrs Drane and Tingle, none of which 
bears repeating, their mere reportage in a journal of record 
delivers a status and forum not otherwise available . . .69
To some extent we shared this concern. The continuing media 
focus on McNiven and his ilk certainly created extra work for us, and 
for the politicians and public servants who were trying to make the 
new gun laws happen. In addition, the NCGC has always opposed fear-
mongering, and several members of the public told us they felt afraid 
67 Anon. ‘Stay in touch’, SMH, 17 June 1996: 24.
68 Walsh G. ‘Postscript’, SMH, 20 May 1996: 14.
69 Watson B. (Letter), SMH, 9 May 1996: 14.
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to speak out in support of gun control lest they attract the attention 
of unhinged gun-nuts like those they had seen on television. We were 
also conscious that somewhere in Australia there could be an individual 
who might take McNiven’s call to arms too much to heart, and might 
fantasise about being the hero in a real-life violent tableau. On the other 
hand, McNiven and his friends had greatly boosted the cause of gun 
control by becoming the gun lobby’s public faces. McNiven’s foot-in-
mouth disease caused more outrage about the gun lobby than we might 
ever have hoped to generate ourselves.
Others in the gun lobby were plainly horrified at the damage 
McNiven was inflicting on their efforts to portray gun owners as decent, 
moderate people. John Tingle referred to the FOAA as the ‘fulminating 
fruitcakes from the North’. A Queensland politician said the publicity 
surrounding the Gympie meeting had ‘knocked the stuffing out of our 
case’ (to water down the new gun laws). The SSAA stated: ‘We com-
pletely dissociate ourselves from these people. They are doing a great 
deal of damage to our cause.’70 Bob Katter Jr, who strongly opposed 
the new gun control proposals, said the ‘extremist right-wing’ views of 
McNiven and Owen ‘make me sick . . . That fellow is . . . part of a disrup-
tive element that does not reflect mainstream views.’71
Other extreme groups such as the Christian Patriots Association, 
Christians Speaking Out, the Home Security Association, the Australian 
Right to Bear Arms Association (all from the Queensland Sunshine 
Coast area), the Confederate Action Party, the Canberra-based Loyal 
Regiment of Australian Guardians and the AUSI (Australians United 
for Survival of Individual) Freedom Scouts were covered in articles 
about extremist gun groups in Australia,72 as were the gun lobby’s links 
with far right-wing anti-Semitic and anti-immigration groups.73 On 4 
June the Deputy Prime Minister, Tim Fischer, asserted that sections 
of the Australian gun lobby had been infiltrated by supporters of the 
70 Roberts G. ‘Pineapple extremists arm for freedom’, SMH, 25 May 1996: 37.
71 Lamperd R. ‘Fortress Katter’, Daily Telegraph, 7 June 1996.
72 Roberts G. ‘Pineapple extremists arm for freedom’, SMH, 25 May 1996: 37.
73 Button J. ‘Gun ho’, The Age, 11 June 1996: A11.
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anti-Semitic, anti-British, pro-gun American Lyndon H. LaRouche.74 
A Sydney Morning Herald report was captioned ‘America’s best-known 
political psychopath’.
Letter bombs and threats
In June 1996, several anonymous threats were made to at least four 
politicians in the form of letters, crude ‘letter bombs’ (a parcel contain-
ing pre-detonated cartridges) and white feathers marked with black 
dots – wartime symbols for cowardice.75 The Federal Member for the 
Queensland seat of Groom told Parliament: ‘I had two meetings in my 
electorate last week involving over a thousand people . . . After one of 
the meetings I was physically threatened and told, ‘We would like to 
shoot you, Mr Taylor.’‘76 These incidents dug the gun lobby further into 
the deep hole that McNiven had opened with his ‘blood in the streets’ 
remark.
Gun dealers
Gun dealers have always been a central part of the gun lobby. It is they, 
along with the importers, who stand to profit most from the free avail-
ability of firearms. Before the Police Ministers’ agreement, some gun 
dealers proclaimed that a ban on semi-automatic weapons would be 
disastrous for their businesses. The usual hyperbole was paraded with 
one shop owner proclaiming: ‘Come Monday morning gun shops will 
be left with only 10 per cent of their business.’77 Another said: ‘If we go 
74 Wright T. ‘Extremist plants in gun lobby: Fischer’, SMH, 4 June 1996: 1; 
Attwood A. ‘Poisoned political seed finds its ground’, SMH, 5 June 1996: 9; 
Hogarth M. ‘Fischer fingers bizarre world of conspiracies’, SMH, 5 June 1996: 9.
75 English B. ‘Gun fanatics send “letter bomb” to MP’, Daily Telegraph, 15 
June 1996; Loane S. ‘Extremists white feather taunts fail to intimidate MPs’, 
SMH, 15 June 1996.
76 Australian House of Representatives Hansard for 17 June 1996. Grievance 
debate: gun control. 
77 Delvecchio J, Lamont L, Byrne A. ‘Traders fear they may go broke’, SMH, 
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on what John Howard said last night, he has banned every single rifle 
in this shop.’78
But some dealers took a radically different line. Serge Zampatti, a 
Sydney suburban dealer, told the Sydney Morning Herald he believed 
the ban on semi-automatics was ‘long overdue’ and would have ‘little 
economic effect on the industry’. He claimed the industry had ‘been 
in decline for at least 30 years, and most shops in NSW sell very few of 
the weapons which will be banned’. Zampatti stated that ‘you would be 
lucky if you get two dealers who would agree on anything’ and that the 
industry’s decline was partly because ‘kids tend to play computer games 
nowadays, which is probably a lot safer.’79
In fact, once the buyback of prohibited weapons began, the media 
carried stories of dealers crowing about a boom in business, claiming 
that shooters surrendering semi-automatics were replacing them with 
bolt-action rifles. The dealers claimed these extra sales proved the new 
gun laws were a failure, since the total number of guns in the commu-
nity would not decrease. Like most gun lobby claims, this one was not 
backed up by the evidence. For example, the Victorian buyback brought 
in 130,000 semi-automatics in its first six months. In that period, some 
23,000 new guns of all types were sold. However, since normal sales in 
that period would have been around 15,000, it seems that about 8,000 
additional non-semi-automatic guns had been bought, making the net 
reduction of rapid-fire weapons more like 122,000. It was difficult to 
see this as anything other than a huge success. In any case, the APMC 
agreement included provision for compensating dealers for loss of busi-
ness, and there was no shortage of dealers queuing up for their cheques.
10 May 1996.
78 Creer K. ‘Clampdown “may shut gunshop doors” ’, Sunday Telegraph, 12 
May 1996.
79 Wainwright R. ‘Fading trade to lose little from ban’, SMH, 13 May 1996.
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Divide and rule
An old Australian expression says ‘if it walks like a duck, sounds like a 
duck and looks like a duck, it must be a duck.’ In other words, loudly 
proclaimed differences between similar interest groups or individuals 
are usually unimportant. This became a strategic axiom in the gun con-
trol debate. Like most areas of right and left wing politics, the gun lobby 
in Australia consists of several sometimes bitterly opposed factions. 
In several cases, the animosity between these groups severely reduced 
their ability to cooperate during the Port Arthur campaign.
Few Australians would be interested in the often technical policy 
difference between groups who were nevertheless united in their oppo-
sition to the core elements of the Police Ministers’ agreement. The 
NCGC sought to exploit the public’s indifference to such technical 
disparities, and many times various gun lobbyists wasted media oppor-
tunities by spending time attempting to differentiate themselves from 
the other groups. The public probably couldn’t have cared less: a gun 
lobbyist was a gun lobbyist.
Shooters’ Party leader John Tingle, in two letters published in the 
Sydney Daily Telegraph, protested at being ‘unfairly blamed’ for Port 
Arthur: ‘If I am demonised, I ask only that it be for what I might have 
done, not for what somebody beyond my control has done.’ In these 
letters he disavowed the NRA’s slogan ‘Guns don’t kill people. People 
kill people.’ Declaring the slogan ‘ludicrous and offensive’, he wrote that 
it had been ‘taken up by a large shooting organisation in Australia. Not 
by us . . . We have a resolution on our books, directing our committee to 
decline any involvement with the NRA.’80 He was referring to the SSAA.
Graeme Campbell
The right-wing Independent member for the Western Australian 
mining town of Kalgoorlie, Graeme Campbell, was the only federal pol-
itician who spoke out publicly against the proposed gun laws before 
the 10 May Police Ministers’ meeting. Campbell blasted away at the 
80 Tingle J. ‘Targeting semi-automatics’ (letter), Daily Telegraph, 8 May 1996.
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‘smug, sickening bipartisanship’, calling the move a ‘populist, knee-jerk 
reaction’. He added: ‘That rifle hanging on the wall of the working-class 
flat or labourer’s cottage is a symbol of democracy. It is our job to see 
that it stays there.’81 Campbell became for the gun lobby ‘their man in 
Canberra’. The Sydney Morning Herald prophesied: ‘Do not imagine 
Graeme Campbell is alone among Federal MPs prepared to rationalise 
the means of mass murder. He is just the only one prepared, for the 
moment, to do so aloud.’82
The media put the spotlight on MPs who were known to be gun 
lobby supporters – who were ‘sleeping with the enemy’. On the week-
end after the Police Ministers’ meeting, Queensland National Party 
MP De-Anne Kelly was questioned about officiating at the opening of 
a shooting competition for weapons ‘similar to those used in the Port 
Arthur massacre’.83 Mrs Kelly responded that the event’s organisers ‘had 
arranged for flags to fly half-mast in memory of the Port Arthur victims’.
Queensland National Party backbencher Bob Katter Jr. – constantly 
described as a ‘maverick’ – openly supported the gun lobby and became 
the subject of intense criticism from his party’s leaders, who alluded to 
disciplinary action.84 Katter described his home to journalists: 
If you come to see my house it’s built like a fortress. You 
retreat through one set of locked doors and another set of 
locked doors and another set of locked doors and there’s a 
siren and three locks on the door and every bed has a rifle, so 
if we’re out and the kids are at home they can protect them-
selves. To leave my wife and kids unprotected because I’m 
away is absolutely appalling. I believe in it as an article of 
religious faith .  .  . I’m just the epitome of people who feel 
strongly about guns.85 
81 Australian House of Representatives Hansard for 9 May 1996. 
82 Anon. ‘Campbell’s lone stand in the Parliament’, SMH, 11 May 1996: 37.
83 Roberts G. ‘MP to open shooting contest’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
84 Nason D, Taylor L, Emerson S. ‘Whelan casts doubt on quick gun 
agreement’, The Australian, 12 June 1996.
85 Lamperd R. ‘Fortress Katter’, Daily Telegraph, 7 June 1996.
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Since Katter’s son-in-law was the manager of Queensland’s largest 
firearms importer, Nioa Trading, Katter’s participation in public debate 
on gun control was somewhat compromised.
New political parties
With the unanimous endorsement of the proposed laws by the Police 
Ministers and the national bipartisanship immediately proclaimed on 
the issue, the gun lobby’s much-flaunted political power disintegrated 
suddenly and unceremoniously. At the time, I commented that ‘the gun 
lobby have been reduced to political eunuchs’.86 The lobby’s main form 
of political leverage – threatening candidates supporting gun control 
by urging shooters to votes for other candidates – was made obsolete 
by the bipartisan support for gun control which Port Arthur had estab-
lished. No longer could one candidate be played off against another. 
Henceforth, the gun lobby’s only political hopes lay in breaking down 
the bipartisan agreement, or in directly entering the political process by 
establishing its own political parties. This had been the Shooters’ Party’s 
strategy since its formation. After the parliamentary vote in NSW, John 
Tingle admitted in his column in Guns Australia, ‘The Shooters’ Party 
cannot make any headway in making any changes to this legislation 
while anti-gun proposals have bipartisan support.’87
Two political parties overtly sympathetic to guns were formed 
just after Port Arthur. At a pro-gun rally in Hobart on 23 June, the 
formation of the Australia First Reform Party was announced, with 
the SSAA’s Ted Drane and the Western Australian Independent MP 
Graeme Campbell as its co-founders.88 Whether coincidentally or oth-
erwise, ‘Australia First’ had also been the name of an anti-Semitic, white 
supremacist group during World War II. One journalist wondered 
86 Delvecchio J. ‘Violation of civil rights, claims shooters’ group’, SMH, 11 
May 1996.
87 Tingle J. ‘An act of betrayal’, Guns Australia September/October 1996: 65.
88 Grattan M, Watkins S. ‘Pro-gun party accused of following US path’, The 
Age, 24 June 1996: A2.
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whether Campbell had chosen the same name in the hope that ‘a whole 
lot of cranks and nuts and bigots and eccentrics will be attracted to his 
new organisation’.89 Drane visited Pauline Hanson – the Queensland 
Independent MP who had drawn controversy over her views on immi-
gration and Aborigines and whose party, in June 1998, was to attract 
nearly one in four votes throughout Queensland in the state election 
– in an unsuccessful attempt to convince her to join him and Campbell 
in the new party.90
The first branch of the new party was launched at Victoria’s 
Rowville Football Club near Dandenong on 1 July 1996. An ABC radio 
Background Briefing program revealed the political sophistication of the 
new party officials: 91
Emma Martin: I’m Emma Martin. I have been recently 
elected by the committee, the Knox branch committee, as 
the spokesperson for the Australia First Reform Party, Knox 
branch.
Andrew Dodd (interviewer): And what will that entail?
Emma Martin: Secretarial duties I imagine, and you know, 
being up front and answering any questions that people may 
have about the group.
Andrew Dodd: I notice here you have some notes in front 
of you where it says very clearly that you’re not a racist, you 
wanted to get that across to the media.
Emma Martin: Well I come from a multicultural background 
and I know one of the issues is immigration, and I mean my 
background is both English and southern European, and I 
just think it’s very important that we’re not seen as being a 
racist group. Employment is one of our main concerns, and 
89 Oakes L. ‘Campbell cranks up his separatist bandwagon’, The Bulletin, 11 
June 1996: 35.
90 ‘Stalking Ted’, Background Briefing transcript. ABC Radio National, 21 July 
1996.
91 Ibid.
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we believe that once we’ve got employment under control, 
well then immigration will not be a problem.
Andrew Dodd: But there’s no difference between that policy 
and the policy that is espoused by Australians Against Fur-
ther Immigration, because that’s exactly their line as well.
Emma Martin: Right. To begin with, I’m not strong on poli-
tics, I’m not strong on the policies of other groups. Ted is the 
best person you should speak to about our policies.
Andrew Dodd: But you’re the spokesperson for the party.
Emma Martin: And I am learning.
But the unity in this new ‘force’ in Australian politics did not last 
long. Just over two weeks after the announcement of the new party, 
Drane was due to meet Campbell to discuss its development. Drane 
suspected that Campbell had invited members of the racist League of 
Rights to the meeting: 
Andrew Dodd: This is the end of the alliance with Graeme 
Campbell then?
Ted Drane: Well it’s looking that way, yes, it’s looking that 
way. I won’t have anything to do with the League of Rights 
at all. And I understand that this meeting that was planned 
for Canberra on Saturday has some members of the League 
of Rights at it, and I won’t be involved in any way at all with 
the League of Rights.
In a speech at the National Press Club on 10 July, where he criticised 
Victorian Premier Jeff Kennett for ‘shaking hands with the gay com-
munity’, Drane confirmed that he was no longer planning to join with 
Campbell’s Australia First Party because it was too racist and sought 
alliances with right-wing interests in the US.92 Drane must have been 
the last person in Australia to become aware of Campbell’s right-wing 
leanings. Campbell had openly teamed up with an anti-immigration 
group to contest the March 1996 federal election. His announcement 
92 Middleton K. ‘New party takes swipe at Kennett’, The Age, 11 July 1996: A8.
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that he planned to form the party was enthusiastically welcomed by the 
ultra-right-wing League of Rights.93 John Tingle, who had shared a rally 
platform with Drane at the Sydney pro-gun rally, disassociated himself 
from both Campbell’s and Drane’s parties, saying they were ‘too far to 
the right’.94
Within three months of Port Arthur, the gun lobby’s much-vaunted 
‘new force’ in politics had splintered into the old enmities, with no less 
than three political parties now on offer to disgruntled shooters: Tingle’s 
Shooters’ Party, Drane’s Australian Reform Party and Campbell’s 
Australia First Party. In mid July Drane claimed his as-yet-unregistered 
Australian Reform Party was receiving ‘three or four hundred registra-
tions a day’.95 Campbell later estimated the total membership attracted 
to his new party at ‘between 2,000 and 5,000’.96
Early electoral tests
What should we make of the movement to other gun lobby political 
parties? Before the Port Arthur shootings, the Shooters’ Party had con-
tested one state and two federal elections. At the March 1996 federal 
poll, confident after John Tingle’s election in NSW, the Shooters’ Party 
ran candidates in four states. But despite being organised for four years, 
having a formidable recruiting infrastructure through gun shops and 
clubs, and with the media-savvy Tingle as leader, the party polled just 
114,724 votes across the country. In Queensland, home of the redoubt-
able Ian McNiven, it polled a resounding 0.63% of the primary vote. If we 
were to generously double this number, this would amount to 230,000 
people who believed owning a weapon like those used by Martin Bryant 
was more important than all other political considerations when they 
voted. Across Australia, this would not give the Shooters’ Party a squint 
at one Senate seat.
93 Savva N. ‘Gun party gets rightist support’, The Age, 4 June 1996: 3.
94 Middleton K. ‘New party takes swipe at Kennett’, The Age, 11 July 1996: A8.
95 Ibid.
96 Walsh K-A. ‘Party unfaithful’, The Bulletin, 17 September 1996: 16–17.
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In late May, a month after the massacre, by-elections were held for 
two NSW state seats – the north coast seat of Clarence, and the central 
western seat of Orange. In both cases a 13% swing was recorded against 
the sitting National Party member. In Clarence this gave the seat to the 
Labor Party. The gun lobby attempted to capitalise on this, claiming that 
the swing against the National Party was a backlash against the party’s 
‘betrayal’ of shooters. But this was quickly revealed as arrant nonsense: 
editors of local newspapers told the media that guns had barely been 
mentioned in local debate and, in any case, attempts to punish the 
National Party electorally would only deliver votes to Labor – which 
also supported the new gun laws.97
The gun lobby’s first real electoral test came in a by-election in 
Queensland in October 1996 in the suburban Brisbane seat of Lytton. 
Wendy Kelly ran for the Shooters’ Party and received 750 votes, or 
3.74%. Also in October, a by-election was held for the federal seat of 
Lindsay in Sydney’s predominantly working-class Penrith area, said 
to be one of the heartlands of the Shooters’ Party. The Liberal Party 
won comfortably with a swing of 6.1%. The Shooters’ Party candidate 
received 1,865 votes, just 2.91%.98 The party fared slightly better in the 
Port Macquarie by-election on 30 November 1996, when its candidate 
polled 2,528 votes (6.73%). State MLC John Tingle lives in the Port 
Macquarie area, on the NSW mid-north coast, and could have bolstered 
the vote for the local candidate.
In the West Gippsland Victorian state by-election in February 1997, 
candidates stood for the Shooters’ Party and Ted Drane’s Australian 
Reform Party. Together, both parties polled nearly 15% of the primary 
vote. This was not enough for either of them to win the seat, but their 
preferences directed to another independent candidate helped oust the 
sitting government member. Drane talked up the vote’s importance to 
the shooting parties, claiming it bode well for a future attempt at a Senate 
97 Goot M. ‘Guns fail as election issue’, Australian Financial Review, 11 June 
1996.
98 Kitney G. ‘Battered Labor must have finally got the message’, SMH, 21 
October 1996: 4.
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seat. But if 15% was all the shooters could attract in their rural heart-
land, the hope of such a result statewide was pure fantasy. Support for 
shooting parties in the Melbourne area showed no signs of reaching this 
level. In May 1997, a Shooters’ Party candidate obtained only 1.9% of 
the vote in the Queensland Kurwongbah by-election. In October 1997, 
the pro-gun Australia First Party polled only 7,764 votes out of 786,213 
(0.99%) cast for seats in the South Australian Legislative Council.
The consistently poor electoral showing of Australian shooters was 
nothing compared to the fate of their equivalents in the UK. One of 
the UK’s pro-gun leaders, Mike Yardley, ran a high-profile campaign 
against the anti-hand gun Tory MP David Mellor in the London seat 
of Putney in the UK’s general election in May. Yardley, who had drawn 
huge publicity over his views in the wake of the Dunblane massacre and 
the British Government’s subsequent introduction of tougher handgun 
laws, received only 90 votes, 11 less than the candidate from the anar-
chic Freedom to Party Party.99
One Nation in Queensland
The Queensland state elections held on 13 June 1998 saw nearly one 
in four voters voting for the ultra-nationalist, racist, anti-Aboriginal 
land claims, economic protectionist One Nation Party led by Pauline 
Hanson. Since the formation of the party in 1997, Hanson and her 
advisors had courted every disaffected, anti-government cause in the 
country. They wooed the shooting vote by promising to work to repeal 
the new gun laws, and parroting the SSAA line that ‘Measures to control 
and apprehend those who illegally or irresponsibly use firearms are not 
to be used as tools to obstruct, harass or penalise legitimate, law-abiding 
firearm owners.’ As the election neared, the SSAA declared its national 
backing for Hanson’s policy on guns and vowed to spend ‘thousands’ 
backing her candidates at the upcoming Queensland state election100.
99 http: //www.bbc.co.uk/election97/constituencies/468.htm [no longer 
active, 2013].
100 Porteous C. ‘Hanson sets sights on gun club support’, Melbourne Herald-
Sun, 19 May 1998.
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One Nation’s momentous vote was widely analysed as having 
attracted the support of many of Queensland’s elderly, rural, proudly 
parochial, Royal Family loving and minimally educated voters who were 
attracted by Hanson’s vacuous slogans and economically illiterate pre-
scriptions – such as establishing a bank that would peg interest rates at 
2%. Appropriately, one of the party’s successful candidates, Ken Turner, 
was described as having made his claim to public office based ‘on his 
nine-year reign as Santa Claus at a major local shopping centre.’101 On 
the day after One Nation’s victory, the harridan Hanson named pro-gun 
law reform as her party’s first priority in the new Queensland govern-
ment,102 along with her ambition to replicate her support at the federal 
level. As I finish writing this book, this ambition remains to be tested, 
but such has been the success of Hanson’s drive into the comfort zone 
of two party Australian politics, that it would be cavalier to predict her 
success.
What part did shooters play in One Nation’s success in Queensland? 
Anyone wanting to argue that the pro-gun vote was a major factor in 
One Nation’s showing needs to explain the abject failures of shoot-
ing candidates in all by-elections held in four states including in 
Queensland. All these were held closer to the passing of the new guns 
laws than the Queensland election. What coherent argument could 
explain lack of shooter electoral backlash lasting two years, and then 
its sudden revival? Were the nation’s shooters somehow too stunned 
to vote for their representatives for two years? A far more plausible 
explanation is that Hanson’s pro-gun policy was just one facet of her 
broad anti-government, Australia right-or-wrong sentiment that struck 
a chord with that section of the community hurting and disillusioned 
by the false gods of economic rationalism. The gun lobby will doubtless 
rush to translate her success as being largely a product of their efforts.
101 ‘One Nation winner’, SMH, 15 June 1998: 4.
102 Kingston M. ‘Fischer’s nightmare sitting in a chintz chair’, SMH, 15 June 
1998: 4.
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Talking up and talking down
After the historic agreement by the Police Ministers, gun lobby 
chest-beating predictably turned to talk of the vast sums that would be 
needed to buy back semi-automatics: ‘We’re talking about a billion dol-
lars to buy them back,’ said Ted Drane.103 Throughout the gun control 
debate, the gun lobby made extravagant claims without any attempt to 
prove their veracity. Big figure cliams concerned: 
•	 The number of gun owners in the community
•	 The number of guns in their possession
•	 The number of semi-automatics owned
•	 The dollar value of guns to be compensated
•	 The number of people the gun lobby claimed to represent and who 
would vote for it in an electoral showdown
•	 The number of supporters attending pro-gun rallies
•	 The amount of money the gun lobby would raise from its support-
ers to fight the new laws.
How many shooters?
It was plainly in the gun lobby’s interest to promote the view that large 
numbers of Australians own guns. Gun owners can be licensed or unli-
censed. Of course, there are no records of unlicensed shooters. Licensed 
shooters can be readily counted from the records of government licens-
ing authorities. Table 5.1 shows a recent tally showing the approximate 
number licensed in each Australian state and territory.
The President of the Cessnock branch of the Shooters’ Party claimed 
that ‘only 36% of the town’s gun owners were registered’104 (presumably 
meaning licensed). How did he know this? We were never told.
103 Drane T. 7.30 Report, ABC TV, 9 May 1996.
104 Hoy A. ‘7,000 shooters take aim at anti-gun plans’, SMH, 27 May 1996: 2.
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Table 5.1: Licensed shooters in Australia105 (June 1995)
State Shooters’ licences Population (million) Licensing rate
NSW 150,000 6.115 1: 40.8
Vic 272,000 4.502 1: 17.3
Qld 302,000 3.277 1: 11.7
SA 125,000 1.474 1: 11.8
WA 110,000 1.732 1: 15.7
Tas 60,000 0.473 1: 7.9
NT 20,480 0.174 1: 8.5
ACT 7,451 0.304 1: 40.8
Total 1,046,931 18.051 1: 17.24
As of June 1995, there were an estimated 13,433,680 adults aged 
18 and over in Australia, of whom about half were males. Most gun 
owners are men. A Sporting Shooter editorial titled ‘A man and his gun’, 
ruminated that gun owners ‘are a peculiar mob. You see, most will quite 
contentedly plonk themselves down after dinner in their favourite chair 
and do one of four things: read hunting/gun magazines; play with his 
guns; watch hunting videos; or sit around with his like-minded mates 
and talk.’
The only comprehensive attempt to measure gun ownership in 
Australia was the 1978 General Social Survey (GSS), which found that 
only 1.1% of women aged over 15 reported owning a gun.106 Everything 
about the representation of shooters in Australia suggests that men dom-
inate this pursuit. The pool of potential gun owners is thus about half 
the adult population (ie men), plus the GSS estimate of 1.1% of women. 
This equates to around 6.79 million people in Australia. Discounting 
this figure by 10% to account for those who are very elderly (few of 
105 Data on licensed shooters provided by Commonwealth Law Enforcement 
Board.
106 Harding R. Firearms and violence in Australian life. Perth: University of 
Western Australia Press, 1981.
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whom would be shooters), we might then consider some 6.11 million 
adults as potential gun owners. During the debate Ted Drane repeat-
edly argued that ‘two to three million’ Australians owned guns. Drane 
was deliberately vague because, like everybody else, he had no way of 
actually knowing. Yet he claimed that two to three million of some 6.11 
million adults, or between one-third and one-half of all Australian men, 
were gun owners.
How credible is this number? The most recent community survey 
on gun ownership was a 1994 NSW Health Department study. Out of 
a statewide survey of 16,165, a sub-sample of 2,251 people were asked 
questions on guns. This survey found that 11.7% of those interviewed 
reported a gun being in their home (6.6% urban, 26.3% rural).107 Of 
course, some respondents may have known there were guns in their 
homes belonging to unlicensed owners and may not have admitted 
this to the interviewers. Also, the survey question asked about guns in 
homes, not numbers of owners. To account for these two complicating 
factors, we could generously lift the proportion from 11.7% to 20% – a 
figure almost matching the 19.6% reported in the 1989 International 
Crime Victimisation Survey (see Table 2.1).
If this proportion were extrapolated nationally, Australia would 
have 1.343 million gun owners – about 33% short of Drane’s lower esti-
mate of two million. As there are about 1,047,000 licensed shooters in 
Australia (see Table 5.1), this suggests 22% of Australia’s gun owners 
(296,000) are unlicensed.
John Tingle offered an object lesson in the way the gun lobby talks 
up its numbers. Our files on Tingle’s utterances on unlicensed shooters 
in NSW alone include ‘half a million’ (11 July 1995); ‘as high as 700,000’ 
(13 July 1995); ‘as many as 750,000’ (8 August 1995); and ‘about 1 mil-
lion gun owners’, of whom only 150,000 were licensed, leaving 850,000 
unlicensed (22 September 1995).108 This 70% gain in less than three 
107 National Centre for Health Promotion. NSW Health Promotion Survey 
1994. Technical report. December 1995: 50–51.
108 Lagan B. ‘Gun fee waived to tempt illicit owners’, SMH, 22 September 
1995: 3.
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months would put Pinocchio’s nose in the shade! Tingle’s starting point 
of 500,000 unlicensed shooters in NSW compares to our national esti-
mate of 296,000 unlicensed shooters.
How many guns?
And what about guns? Because there has been no national gun regis-
ter, there is no reliable estimate even of legal guns in civilian hands. 
As John Tingle admitted in 1995: ‘There could be anything up to three 
million [guns in NSW], but nobody knows for sure.’109 Yet during the 
Port Arthur debate the gun lobby dramatically quoted everything 
from three million to 10 million guns. Nice round numbers. A state-
ment signed by 12 officials from shooters’ groups in the June 1996 issue 
of Australian Gun Sports claimed that, ‘Registration of long-arms in 
Western Australia, Northern Territory, South Australia and Victoria has 
seen only around 50% of firearms actually registered.’
Richard Harding’s 1978 surveys of gun ownership in NSW and 
South Australia for the Criminology Research Council110 estimated that 
the average gun owner in NSW had 1.9 guns and in South Australia, 1.6. 
Acknowledging that ‘moderate under-reporting’ should be expected, 
Harding estimated that in Australia: 111
– 1,220,000 people aged over 15 owned . . .
– 2,055,000 firearms (other than airguns) giving an average of . . .
– 1.68 guns per owner, or . . .
– 156 guns per 1000 population, that is . . .
– 478 guns per 1,000 households, with about . . .
– 25.3% of households having guns.
Harding has twice since updated his estimates from data on gun 
imports and population growth and from estimates of the proportion 
109 Tingle J. ‘The crossfire on gun legislation’, SMH, 11 July 1995: 15.
110 Harding R. Firearms and violence in Australian Life. Perth: University of 
Western Australia Press, 1981: 47–48.
111 Ibid, 50.
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of imports put to military and police uses. In 1983 he estimated that 
there were 2.8 million guns of all types in civilian hands. In June 1996, 
he estimated the following figure: 
2,800,000 (the 1983 figure), plus
375,000 imports from 1982–88, plus
330,000 imports from 1988–1996, for a total of . . .
3,505,000 firearms in private ownership in a population of 18 million. 112
The NCGC lampooned the gun lobby’s dubious figures: ‘Without 
registration, no one knows how many guns are in the community. If the 
gun lobby claims to know the size of this group, and claims to represent 
law-abiding shooters, why doesn’t it report them?’113
How many semi-automatics and other banned guns?
So how many semi-automatics are out there? Ted Drane’s highest bid for 
the buyback cost was $1 billion. Assuming an average price of $500 per 
gun, Drane was asking us to believe there were two million semi-auto-
matics and pump-action shotguns owned by our 1.343 million shooters.
Table 5.2 shows data collated by the Commonwealth Law 
Enforcement Board for the Police Ministers, from information and esti-
mates provided by firearms registries in each state and territory.
The estimate of almost 1.5 million prohibited weapons presented in 
this table is a worst-case scenario, almost certainly exaggerated, yet it 
was still 25% below Drane’s estimate of two million.
112 Harding R. Numbers, types and distribution of firearms in Australia, 1996. 
Crime Research Centre, University of Western Australia, June 1996.
113 Chapman S. ‘Now, about those guns . . .’, SMH, 9 May 1996: 15.
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Table 5.2 Estimates of numbers of prohibited firearms in each jurisdiction 
(thousands).
State Semi-auto 
shotguns 
rifles
Semi-auto 
centrefire 
rifles
Semi-auto 
rimfire 
firearms
Pump-
action 
shotguns
Total
prohibited
NSW 55.3 46.3 216
State by state 
estimates 
not available
450
Vic 70.4 6 91 400
Qld 47.4 39 185 386
SA 11.486 8.982 40.723 87
WA 4.342 0.562 25.578 43
Tas 12.3 10.3 48 100
NT 2.478 1.2 5.39 19
ACT .808 0.119 1.916 3.793
Total 204.514 113.263 613.607 557,409 1,488.793
How many would refuse to surrender their guns?
After the buyback began, the gun lobby continued to claim that many 
shooters would refuse to hand in their guns. John Tingle said: ‘My read-
ing of the situation is that only 40–50% of private gun owners will hand 
the guns in.’114 Not to be outdone, shooting official Ted Leong claimed to 
have ‘met . . . over 5,000 shooters’ in three months who ‘because of their 
trust, have indicated to me they will be burying their rifles when the 
laws are implemented.’ He claimed that 96% said they would bury their 
rifles, but all would hand in a ‘sacrifice’ rifle to appease the authorities.115 
Leong’s precision here is interesting: 96%, not 95% or 97%.
Despite the gun lobby’s bluster, opinion polls indicated that sup-
port for the new gun laws was high even among gun owners. This was 
to be expected – after all, as both sides in the gun debate agreed, most 
114 Passey D. ‘Guns head for smelter as Tingle fires warning’, SMH, 2 
October 1996: 9.
115 Humphries D. ‘PM over a barrel on gun buy-back funds’, SMH, 30 
September 1996: 5.
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gun owners were no more inclined to break the law than other citizens. 
The large number of guns brought in for buyback also confounded the 
predictions of mass non-compliance. When the buyback began, accom-
panied by advertisements highlighting the financial compensation 
payable, shooters mobbed the collection centres, even though they had 
a year to hand in their semi-automatics.
Plainly, the gun lobby was now desperate to talk up its support base. 
Graeme Campbell predicted his new party would quickly attract 50,000 
members.116 In September, Campbell openly admitted that his support 
was nowhere near that number: ‘I really don’t know what the num-
bers are, but that was wildly optimistic.’117 To register a federal political 
party with the Electoral Commission, a minimum of members in each 
state are required, with 300 members required in the least populated 
state. Campbell was reported as saying he ‘thought’ he had this num-
ber.118 One claim was that membership inquiries were coming in to the 
Shooters’ Party at the rate of ‘200 a day’, but this was just one of many 
fantastic claims about the party’s support. Soon after its formation, 
John Tingle bragged that a membership drive would attract ‘more than 
250,000’ supporters.119 Five months later, Tingle claimed his party had 
‘more than 20,000’ members.120 Clearly the other 230,000 were taking 
their time joining up. The SSAA claimed in early June that more than 
10,000 members had joined in the past month.121 Needless to say, none 
of these claims were accompanied by any proof.
One of the gun lobby’s most common tactics was to claim that 
it spoke for all gun owners. For example, a statement released by ten 
firearms groups on the day after the Police Ministers’ agreement claimed 
116 Savva N. ‘I won’t buckle, PM pledges’, The Age, 3 June 1996: 1.
117 Walsh K-A. ‘Party unfaithful’, The Bulletin, 17 September 1996: 16–17.
118 Ibid.
119 Fitzpatrick E. ‘Shooters Party to fight new gun laws’, SMH, 18 May 1992: 2.
120 Macey R. ‘Govt may link mental health to gun ownership’, SMH, 29 
October 1992: 2.
121 Milburn C. ‘How the gun lobby marshals its troops’, The Age, 8 June 1996: 
A6.
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they represented ‘1.8 million [gun] owners’.122 But the largest group 
of the ten was the SSAA, which had only 45,000 members nationally 
(often expressed as ‘up to 50,000’).123 If we included all 114,724 people 
who voted for the Shooters’ Party at the March 1996 federal election, the 
total could reach 165,000. The other eight groups included the Greek 
Hunting and Fishing Clubs – together unlikely to muster even 20,000 
members. In aggregate, these numbers were hardly 10% of the 1.8 mil-
lion gun owners these groups claimed to represent.
Interesting, too, are the circulation figures for two Australian gun 
magazines monitored by the Audit Bureau of Circulations. In the period 
1 July–21 December 1995, Australian Sporting Shooter had an average 
circulation of 19,830 per month and Guns Australia 9,865. These mag-
azines are among the main vehicles promoting gun lobby propaganda 
in Australia, yet these figures suggest that only a fraction of shooters 
buy them.
How many at their pro-gun rallies?
Rallies and mass meetings both supporting and opposing the new gun 
control laws were held around Australia, all covered prominently by the 
media.124 Judging from television coverage, men appeared to outnumber 
women at pro-gun rallies by perhaps 200 to one. The gun lobby organ-
ised buses to take its supporters to their rallies. The Federal Member 
for Groom in Queensland told Parliament: ‘To give you an extreme 
example, last Wednesday evening there was a meeting in Toowoomba 
involving something like 700 or 800 people from outside my electorate; 
122 Lawnham P, McGarry A. ‘Shooters will defy news laws, MP warns’, The 
Australian, 11 May 1996.
123 Grattan M, Farouque F. ‘National ban on weapons’, The Age, 11 May 1996: 1.
124 Ryan R. ‘A ‘silent’ majority’, Daily Telegraph, 3 June 1996: 5; Anon. ‘Gun 
control: for and against’, The Age, 7 June 1996: A11; Passey D. ‘Gun-law protest 
to draw 85,000’, SMH, 15 June 1996; Passey D. ‘Even softly spoken Wilf says 
it’s time to march’, SMH, 15 June 1996; Millett M, Wright T. ‘Under fire’, SMH, 
22 June 1996: 35.
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a lot of these people are being bussed and driven in to beat the whole 
thing up.’125
All the rallies in support of gun control attracted much smaller 
numbers than those organised by the gun lobby. Many supporters told 
us they would not attend gun control rallies, fearing confrontations with 
the sort of aggressive shooters they had seen on television at pro-gun 
rallies. A rally organised by the Federal Liberal MP for North Sydney, 
Joe Hockey, had a smaller attendance than expected. People delivering 
leaflets in the area told us they had been followed by people, presumed 
to be from the gun lobby, who removed thousands of leaflets from let-
terboxes. A report of a rally held in Sydney on 28 July described the 
attendance as ‘several thousand . . . by far the biggest anti-gun gathering 
yet’.126 The day was wet, but the attendance at this extensively advertised 
event was estimated at only 5,000–6,000. In fact the biggest anti-gun 
rally took place in Melbourne on 2 June, when 30,000 people marched 
to Parliament House.
Gun lobby supporters sought solace from the onslaught of the new 
laws by pointing to the far larger crowds they were able to attract to 
their rallies.127 They believed this disproved their opponents’ claim that 
the community was firmly behind gun control. But media commenta-
tors saw through the vocal and self-interested minority: ‘The amount 
of noise and placard-waving, and even substantial numbers, is no indi-
cation of public opinion .  .  . In the case of the gun lobby, there is no 
doubt that strict gun control and uniform legislation is supported by an 
overwhelming majority.’128
The largest pro-gun rally took place in Melbourne on 1 June. 
Organisers estimated the crowd at 150,000, but the official police 
125 Australian House of Representatives Hansard for 17 June 1996. Grievance 
debate: gun control. 
126 Macey R. ‘Sydney takes to the streets in anger’, SMH, 29 July 1996: 2.
127 Krivanek JF. ‘Well done’ (letter), SMH, 1 August 1996: 14.
128 McGuinness PP. ‘Fanatics cause discomfort for the Nationals’, The Age, 8 
June 1996: A23.
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estimate was 60,000;129 in any case, it was the largest demonstration in 
Melbourne since the anti-Vietnam war rallies in the early 1970s. The 
organisers of the Sydney pro-gun rally on 15 June predicted that 85,000 
would attend,130 and another boast went as high as 100,000.131 The offi-
cial police estimate was 35,000,132 but the organisers afterwards insisted 
that 100,000 had attended. ‘The anti-gun lobby could only draw 1,500 
but we’ve pulled in 100,000, so who is the real minority?’ asked John 
Tingle.133 In messianic style, Tingle told the 35,000 they had the power 
to overthrow the Government,134 declaring: ‘We are not going to end 
the campaign we started until they listen to us and they give us our way.’
One shooter sent us the following message via email: 
The official count of relative numbers at pro and anti fire-
arms rights rallies (1/2 Jun 96) were initial figures by manual 
estimation; not known for their precision. We now have an 
official (but officially not released) count from the Police 
spy cameras installed on buildings within the Melbourne 
CBD. The official numbers are: 170,000+ for the pro side 
and 3,000–3,500 for the anti! Note: these figures were con-
firmed by an independent authority count using overhead 
photos taken by helicopter followed by an accurate grid by 
grid count.
Needless to say these ‘official’ figures were never released, nor did 
the media run any stories about a police ‘cover-up’ of attendance figures.
129 Anon. ‘Thousands march against gun laws’, Sunday Telegraph, 2 June 
1996: 4.
130 Passey D. ‘Gun-law protest to draw 85,000’, SMH, 15 June 1996.
131 Gora B. ‘Protesters vow to keep fighting’, Sunday Telegraph, 16 June 1996.
132 Scott L, Stapleton J. ‘Attorney-General targets state gun ads’, The 
Australian, 17 June 1996.
133 Warnock S. ‘Shooters storm city’, Sun Herald, 16 June 1996: 3.
134 Gora B. ‘Protesters vow to keep fighting’, Sunday Telegraph, 16 June 1996.
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How much money in their fighting funds?
There was much posturing, too, about the amount of money the gun 
lobby would throw at its campaign to overturn the laws. The Shooting 
Sports Council of Victoria suggested that a ‘multi-million dollar fund’ 
could be raised.135 Ted Drane declared the day after the Police Ministers’ 
agreement that the SSAA’s national executive would commit ‘up to $1 
million’ to fight the laws.136
The SSAA’s internet site stated: ‘The media has refused since the 
Port Arthur murders to run any PAID advertising to put the pro-gun 
viewpoint before the public.’ This was arrant nonsense. The SSAA had 
run full-page advertisements in several newspapers before the 10 May 
Police Ministers’ meeting, calling for shooters to donate money. The 
Sydney Morning Herald also noted that the organisers of the 15 June 
pro-gun rally in Sydney had run ‘saturation advertising’ . . . throughout 
NSW that week.137 The SSAA’s ads calling for donations appeared in the 
newspapers only once; surely, if they had succeeded in attracting large 
donations, they would have been repeated.
135 Gibson R, Chamberlain P. ‘Wheeling out the big guns’, The Age, 11 May 
1996: A20–21.
136 Farouque F, McKay S. ‘Angry shooters plan a $1 million protest’, The Age, 
11 May 1996: A6.
137 Passey D. ‘Gun-law protest to draw 85,000’, SMH, 15 June 1996.
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The gun lobby’s arguments . . . and the 
responses
Gun lobbies the world over have developed an extensive repertoire of 
arguments against gun control. For years, these have been repeated in 
their magazines, newsletters and on the Internet. The aftermath of the 
Port Arthur massacre produced an unprecedented daily media cam-
paign run by a lobby desperate to defend its position. This chapter 
considers each of the arguments advanced by the gun lobby to reduce 
support for the proposed new gun control laws.
I summarise each argument, showing how these were used, and 
then describe how the NCGC, other gun control groups, journalists and 
the public responded. In particular, I’ll highlight the vital role played 
by analogies in the debate. Along with personalisation – attaching a 
real person’s experience to debate about issues – analogy and simile are 
probably the single most powerful rhetorical devices in public health 
advocacy. In essence, they allow links or parallels to be drawn between 
the issue under discussion and other issues or discourses with which an 
audience might be expected to readily concur. Analogy allows readers 
and audiences to draw parallels between events, policies or lines of rea-
soning that they accept in one circumstance, with the issue in question.
‘We have not been consulted’
The gun lobby argued that the Police Ministers’ resolutions ‘struck a blow 
against democracy and justice in Australia . . . the new draconian gun 
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laws are undemocratic because the firearm fraternity was not consulted. 
The new gun laws are unjust because they punish innocent people who 
have obeyed the law . . .’1 The ‘undemocratic’ bluster was empty rhetoric, 
for the gun lobby knew every recent opinion poll showed overwhelm-
ing public support for gun law reform (see Table 3.1). Nobody took this 
argument seriously.
The calm face of reason
Gun lobbyists recognised that the law reforms had been born out of 
the immensity of the carnage at Port Arthur. An entire nation had been 
horrified by the killings there and more than 90% of the community 
endorsed the view that government should respond with appropri-
ately serious reforms. While many in the gun lobby were apoplectic 
at the turn of events in gun law reform, some forlornly tried to call 
for calm, counselling that politicians and the community were acting 
emotionally because the ‘anti-gun lobby . . . fills the public’s heads with 
many uninformed inaccuracies and sometimes blatant lies based on 
emotion rather than fact’.2 Predictably, the gun lobby fell back on the 
cliché that new demands for tough gun laws were a ‘knee-jerk reaction’. 
Independent MP Graeme Campbell told Federal Parliament: 
It is quite clear what the House is going to do, but I want it 
on record that this is a knee-jerk reaction and one that will 
not address the problem. Neither the Government nor the 
Opposition will ever look at issues that do address the prob-
lem. We have been party to letting people out of institutions 
because it became politically correct to release people from 
institutions onto the street.3 
Martin Bryant had never been in an institution.
1 Tingle J, Shelton B, Borsak R, Kounaris G et al. ‘Shooters’ response’, 
Australian Gun Sports, June 1996: 21.
2 Roudenko A. ‘One in 10,000’ (letter), SMH, 8 May 1996: 16.
3 Australian House of Representatives Hansard for 9 May 1996.
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The SSAA’s Sebastian Ziccone wrote an article for The Age in which 
he promised readers ‘the facts’ and ‘a rational approach.’4 A Shooters’ 
Party official said arguments for gun registration were ‘high on emo-
tion and sensationalism but lacking in reason and logic’.5 This discourse 
sought to position shooters as people who could rise above the base 
emotionalism engendered by massacres. Its corollary was that those 
advocating gun control had let emotions cloud their judgment and that 
shooting representatives were the ones who should be heard amid this 
irrationality. Unfortunately for the gun lobby, as we saw in Chapter 5, 
people like Ian McNiven were presenting the media with rather differ-
ent images of ‘rational approaches’. These people belied any hope of a 
calm, unified and dispassionate voice from the gun lobby. They were 
easily provoked and little strategic thinking was required to cause them 
to further damage the gun lobby’s reputation.
‘These laws will turn law-abiding citizens into criminals’
The new gun laws would require all current gun owners to demonstrate 
that they had a legitimate ‘reason’ to own a gun; to register all guns 
which they were deemed eligible to own; and to surrender for com-
pensation any guns now declared illegal. Anyone refusing to take out a 
shooter’s licence, to have guns registered or to surrender banned guns 
would be breaking the law. This sudden change in the gun regulations 
seemed all wrong to some: ‘I get up this morning as an unfair [sic] 
person to keep a gun that I’ve had for 20 years,’ a shooter told Channel 
7 News on 11 May 1996.
‘My guns have suddenly become dangerous’
Ted Drane told the 7.30 Report on the night before the first Police 
Ministers’ meeting: 
4 Ziccone S. ‘In defence of arms’, The Age, 10 May 1996: A15.
5 Howden J. ‘Shooting from the hip on gun debate’, Newcastle Herald, 3 April 
1996.
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You’re dealing with private property. In my case it’s a firearm 
that is considered being banned – it’s a .22 rim-fire, self-
loader. I’ve had it for 36 years. And you tell me today that 
it’s a danger to public safety and that if I keep it, I’ll go to jail. 
That’s pretty hard for people to comprehend, as why they can 
have something for so long and all of a sudden it’s illegal . . . 
it’s a danger to public safety.6 
On the same night Drane told ABC News: 
The fact is that there are hundreds and hundreds of thou-
sands of these firearms out there and they’ve been there since 
1904. And all of a sudden they’ve become a danger to public 
safety. And I’d like to know how. I’d like to know why.7 
The gun lobby thus sought to frame the changes as the Government 
‘criminalising’ people who had previously possessed guns totally within 
the law. It would turn ‘ordinary, law-abiding shooters into criminals’, 
they claimed. But this claim failed to recognise that it would be only 
those shooters who deliberately chose to break the law who would 
become ‘criminals’.
The argument was that there were hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions of shooters who did not pose a threat to anyone and who were 
being forced to obey new, stupid, politically inspired laws. The implica-
tion was that it would be entirely reasonable for such people to ignore 
these new laws, thereby turning themselves into criminals’.
•	 ‘We’re being punished for one man’s crime . . . They wouldn’t treat 
any other group with such disdain. We’ll never give up, even if it 
takes years . . . It’s natural to look for someone to strike out at. But 
we didn’t do it.’8
•	 ‘I absolutely refuse to be held responsible for something somebody 
else did. I didn’t do it, you didn’t do it, and I’m not going to pay the 
6 Drane T. 7.30 Report, ABC TV, 9 May 1996.
7 Ted Drane on ABC News, 10 May 1996.
8 Condon M. ‘On the bus with the diehards’, Sun Herald, 16 June 1996: 2.
The gun lobby’s arguments . . . and the responses
201
price for it.’ (Ted Drane at a gun rally.)9
•	 ‘Laws that make criminals of decent people are dangerous laws, and 
they threaten the very fabric of our society.’ (Graeme Campbell at 
the same rally.)10
The gun lobby and its political supporters sought repeatedly to 
present gun owners with impeccable backgrounds who challenged 
interviewers to say why they should suddenly be ‘made into a criminal’ 
by the new laws. NSW MP Peter Blackmore described himself as ‘a 
perfect example of a responsible shooter who would be disadvantaged 
by the ban’, going on to describe his 25-year-old Remington 1100 self-
loading shotgun.11
Responses: The gun lobby considered this was perhaps their most com-
pelling argument: they had not pulled the trigger on Martin Bryant’s 
gun, and the great majority of them would never use a gun irresponsibly 
or in anger. So why should they be restricted by tougher gun laws? This 
presented a classic instance of a problem public health and community 
safety advocates face: selling impositions on whole communities or on 
large parts of the population to reduce the probability of harm to others.
The NCGC and many among the public pointed to instances of 
impositions and outlays we are all obliged to endure to make life in our 
communities safer. In Federal Parliament on 17 June, Michael Cobb, 
National Party Member for Parkes, said: 
If I may deal with some of the objections, they say that these 
proposals ‘brand innocent people as criminals’. I think this 
was best answered by Associate Professor Simon Chapman, 
who, in the Sydney Morning Herald, said: ‘This is rather like 
feeling insulted at being required to open your bag at the 
supermarket checkout, at having to walk through a metal 
detector at an airport, at being pulled over for random 
9 Ibid.
10 Anon. ‘Thousands march against gun laws’, Sunday Telegraph, 2 June 1996: 4.
11 Aubert E. ‘Blackmore digs in over weapons decision’, Newcastle Herald, 11 
May 1996.
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breath-testing.’ I remind these people that you cannot iden-
tify who will offend. Only 15% of those who do offend have a 
previous history of mental instability.
We argued that anyone claiming to be insulted at the implication 
that they were a potential terrorist by airport inspections should be 
taken as seriously as those in the gun lobby who claimed to be insulted 
because they were being branded as potential murderers.
An interesting comparison was made about the decision in the 
1980s to ban radar scanners used by motorists to detect police speed 
radar traps. These scanners were heavily advertised when legal, and 
many thousands were sold to motorists who, after their ban, would be 
‘criminalised’ if found using one. Unlike the ban on semi-automatics, 
no compensation was paid to radar scanner owners. No one could recall 
any community outrage from scanner owners.
Similarly, changes in consumer product technology frequently left 
people with redundant products for which they were not compensated. 
For example, the gradual abandonment in the 1980s of the video beta 
system in favour of the VHS system left many beta owners with a com-
ponent that often cost more than $500 and which was now useless. 
One letter writer told how his Ping golf clubs, worth $1,800, had been 
declared illegal for competition use by the sport’s governing bureau-
cracy, forcing him to buy new ones. He wasn’t compensated, despite 
being willing to use them ‘for peaceful, recreational purposes’!12
One gun lobby supporter displayed an intriguing degree of under-
standing of the arguments by urging gun control lobbyists to ‘lobby for 
the prohibition of automatic cars and set severe restrictions on the pos-
session and use of manual cars’, arguing that cars killed people too.13
‘Gun violence is committed by criminals or madmen’
The core argument of the gun lobby’s opposition to the new gun laws 
was that gun violence is committed by criminals and the mentally 
12 Wong B. ‘Compo club’ (letter), SMH, 18 June 1996.
13 Chiswell JC. ‘Killer motor cars’ (letter), SMH, 18 June 1996: 16.
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unstable who are capable of being identified, and so it is wrong that 
people who had never committed or threatened an act of violence with 
a gun should be controlled, blamed or ‘punished’14 by stricter gun laws. 
From the very start of the debate that followed the Port Arthur massa-
cre, the gun lobby argued that gun laws would do nothing to stop such 
incidents. ‘Tighter gun laws are not the answer – laws become irrelevant 
in situations like this .  .  . Laws don’t affect people who are going mad 
with guns,’ said John Tingle.15 Then demonstrating an ability to contra-
dict himself within two sentences, Tingle went on: ‘The NSW Shooters’ 
Party thinks the Tasmanian laws are a disgrace.’
Banners at pro-gun rallies read: ‘Madmen get trials. We get penal-
ties’. A statement signed by the leaders of 12 shooting groups embodied 
this argument. It spoke of the Police Ministers’ resolutions having ‘cast 
a serious stigma on law-abiding citizens, especially legitimate firearm 
owners’ and that ‘legitimate gun owners are now being made to pay 
the price for what criminals and the mentally unstable have done .  .  . 
Declaring war on the law-abiding, and doing nothing to address the 
vast armoury of firearms held by unlicensed people – including crimi-
nals – the Police Ministers have attacked the wrong people!’16
This theme of being insulted and made to feel guilty, of being 
denied natural justice, of being convicted before being tried, and of all 
gun owners being considered potential mass murderers, was expressed 
by many gun owners contacting the media. One letter writer rebuffed 
this claim in a reply to a shooter who had written that ordinary shooters 
should not be judged by the actions of a madman: ‘And he is right. They 
should be judged by the large number of gun suicides . . . the children 
accidentally injured or killed by unsecured loaded guns .  .  . and the 
senseless murder suicides perpetrated by estranged husbands .  .  . the 
14 Lawson JB. ‘Punished just for being a gun owner’ (letter), The Age, 15 May 
1996: A16.
15 Pitt H. ‘Atrocity sparks gun law plea’, SMH, 29 April 1996: 4.
16 Tingle J, Shelton B, Borsak R, Kounaris G et al. ‘Shooters’ response’, 
Australian Gun Sports, June 1996: 21.
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522 guns deaths recorded in 1994 . . . were mostly the actions of men 
who were angry, miserable and depressed – not mad, just human.’17
‘The gun lobby has clean hands’
Before Port Arthur, the gun lobby had regularly boasted about the way 
it had derailed gun law reform in Australia. John Tingle crowed in the 
May/June 1996 issue of Guns Australia (presumably printed before Port 
Arthur) that the Shooters Party had ‘helped persuade the NSW Police 
Minister to refuse to take part in Uniform National Firearms Laws 
proposed by the Federal Government. These laws would have meant 
universal firearm registration. NSW staying out has made national laws 
impossible.’18 Yet in a letter to the Daily Telegraph on 8 May 1996 Tingle 
wrote: ‘I have expressed my support for uniform gun laws, applied by 
the States.’19 Tingle seemed prepared to express his full support for ‘uni-
form gun laws’ if these were weak and did not include gun registration.20
Responses: The NCGC sought to show that the gun lobby should take 
a large part of the responsibility for what happened at Port Arthur – 
to take some of the blame. An article in The Age argued that part of 
the gun lobby’s proud record of ‘success’ was to keep the Tasmanian 
Government from changing the very laws that allowed Martin Bryant 
to gain access to the sort of weapons he used. Yet now it was arguing 
that its decent, law-abiding members were being ‘blamed’ for the mas-
sacre. ‘What other word is there for it?’21 The lobby’s highly strategised 
opposition to national uniform gun laws had been at the heart of the 
failure of Tasmania to fall in line with tougher legislation in other states, 
17 Worth C. ‘Guns the link in so many deaths’ (letter), The Age, 10 May 1996.
18 Tingle J. ‘The great Australian guilt industry’, Guns Australia, May/June 
1996: 64–65.
19 Tingle J. ‘Targeting semi-automatics’ (letter), Daily Telegraph, 8 May 1996.
20 Morris R. ‘I’ve become the whipping boy, says Tingle’, Daily Telegraph, 1 
May 1996.
21 Chapman S. ‘Hit ‘n’ myth of the gun lobby’, The Age, 12 June 1996: 15.
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and yet Tingle argued: ‘I was not responsible for [the massacre], nor 
have I done anything to make it more likely to happen.’22
The gun lobby’s constant habit of describing perpetrators like 
Bryant as ‘criminals’ was a self-serving piece of sophistry. All murderers 
are by definition criminal after they commit their crimes. Yet to the gun 
lobby, all shooters with no criminal records and who haven’t yet com-
mitted murder are ‘honest, hard-working, tax-paying and law-abiding 
citizens’23. The moment one of these commits a gun crime they instantly 
are described as ‘criminals’, with the implication that they were always 
different to ordinary shooters.
Just as Philip Alpers had shown in the case of mass killings, a NSW 
Bureau of Crime Statistics study of 1,393 homicide offenders had shown 
that only 16% (223) were known to have some kind of mental disorder 
at the time or at some time before the offence, and only 17% (246) had 
any previous history of violent crime such as assault.24
‘Guns don’t kill people . . . people kill people’
The NRA’s favourite slogan was widely aired during the debate. Two vic-
tims of shootings spoke out against the new gun laws. Kay Nesbitt, who 
had been shot in the face eleven years before, was pictured on the front 
page of The Age with a story in which she argued that gun owners were 
being unfairly blamed, and that Howard’s response was ‘emotional’. She 
voiced the argument that ‘mad buggers out there .  .  . someone loopy’ 
would always be able to get hold of a gun.25 If she was right, loose gun 
laws just made it all so much easier. At a Sydney pro-gun rally on 15 
June a former security guard who had been shot six years previously 
in an armed holdup and had since been confined to a wheelchair was 
invited onstage. He told the crowd: ‘Unlike this Government, I possess 
22 Tingle J. ‘Don’t blame me’ (letter), SMH, 9 May 1996.
23 Bostock I. ‘From the editor’s desk’, Guns Australia, July/August 1996: 4–5.
24 Wallace A. Homicide: the social reality. Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research, Sydney 1986.
25 Watkins S. ‘Ban guns? Kay Nesbit has her say’, The Age, 6 June 1996: 1.
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common sense – common sense enough to know that a gun did not 
put me in this wheelchair. A person did. Guns don’t kill. People kill 
people.’26
Responses: There were obvious retorts to this asinine slogan. Three of 
the more powerful included: 
•	 ‘This is the same as saying . . . bare wires don’t kill, electricians do.’27
•	 ‘The point is that people who, for whatever reason, are inclined to 
kill will be able to kill more, according to how efficient as killing 
machines their weapons are and how readily available they are.’28
•	 ‘People kill – guns make it possible.’29
John Tingle, to his credit, realised what a silly statement the NRA 
slogan was. He explicitly repudiated the slogan several times, claiming 
he never used it.30 This was a jibe at the SSAA, who were very enam-
oured with their US counterparts’ anthem.
‘They should set up prohibited persons registers’
Hand-in-glove with the gun lobby’s position that people who are violent 
with guns are ‘madmen’ was their belief that it was possible to identify 
such people in advance and to place them on a ‘prohibited persons reg-
ister’ for gun licences. Doctors, psychiatrists and social workers, they 
argued, would come across many people in their work who they could 
predict were likely to become violent. They should have a duty to report 
such people, whose names would then be placed on a register.
The trouble with this solution was that no one with any credibility 
in medicine, psychiatry or social work gave it a shred of credence. The 
26 Gora B. ‘Protesters vow to keep fighting’, Sunday Telegraph, 16 June 1996.
27 Flanagan M. ‘Why the gun lobby’s rhetoric misses its mark’, The Age, 8 
May 1996: A15.
28 Anon. ‘A cool look at gun laws’, SMH, 30 April 1996.
29 Monteith A. Letter, SMH, 21 March 1996.
30 J. Tingle. ‘Don’t blame me’ (letter), SMH, 7 May 1996.
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vast majority of people with mental disorders are not violent. Most vio-
lent people do not have identified mental disorders,31 and 88% of people 
shot in massacres in Australia and New Zealand in the past decade were 
not killed by anyone with a history of mental illness.32
Tellingly, the gun lobby’s enthusiasm for these registers did not 
cause them to apply the same arguments that they used to attack the 
folly of banning semi-automatics: that criminals and those intent on 
getting these guns would get hold of them regardless of registration. 
Prohibited persons registers would somehow stop people on the reg-
isters from illegally getting guns; but the ban on semi-automatics was 
stupid because everyone knew these guns could still be obtained on the 
black market.
Again, to its credit, the Shooters’ Party had been on record as sup-
porting gun control groups’ criticisms of prohibited persons registers. 
But the registers were never far from the minds of the SSAA. 
A prohibited persons register is what the SSA has been 
suggesting for years .  .  . It is obvious that the hundreds of 
millions of pounds spent in Britain on cracking down on 
semi-automatic rifles would have been better spent on 
mental health in an effort to identify such a murderer before 
the event.33
John Tingle’s wife wrote in his defence after Tingle had been attacked 
in a letter to the Sydney Morning Herald. Discussing the Dunblane killer, 
she asked why her husband’s critics had not done something to stop 
Thomas Hamilton before he shot the children: 
People .  .  . who appoint themselves as society’s conscience, 
after the fact, did not have the moral fortitude to do some-
thing about this man. All the signs were there . . . If Thomas 
Hamilton had walked the streets with a neon sign around his 
31 Dudley M, Gale F. ‘Fewer arms, fewer deaths’, SMH, 9 May 1996: 15.
32 http: //www.health.usyd.edu.au/cgc/fp_6_2_2.htm [no longer active, 
2013].
33 Ziccone S. ‘In defence of arms’, The Age, 10 May 1996: A15.
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neck flashing ‘one day I am going to self-destruct, and take 
some of you with me, to punish you’, it could not have been 
more obvious.’34
Responses: Twelve crown prosecutors and public defenders jointly 
responded to Tingle’s wife in this way: 
If we understand correctly, Gail Tingle has the capacity to 
identify prospective perpetrators of horrific crimes such as 
that committed in Dunblane. She is able by reference to a 
certain profile to predict such offenders .  .  . Is she suggest-
ing that all persons who fit this profile be arrested/detained; 
subjected to medical/psychiatric treatment against their will 
merely so that others might possess firearms?35
On registers, we retorted: 
The AMA’s code of ethics already allows doctors to report 
those who endanger the community, whether it be the poorly 
sighted who refuse to stop driving or the shooter who exhib-
its violent intent. However, prior to Port Arthur, in Australia 
and New Zealand’s thirteen gun massacres where five or 
more died, resulting in 92 deaths, 71 (88%) of the victims 
in these incidents were killed by someone with no record of 
mental illness. Besides further stigmatising the mentally ill, a 
register of the mentally suspect would still allow the majority 
of potential killers to get guns.36
The Institute of Australian Psychiatrists noted that: 
Most people who are dangerous are not mentally ill and 
in fact, the record for prediction of dangerousness by psy-
chiatrists, let alone doctors, is poor. The predictors of 
dangerousness are such things as being male, previous his-
tory of dangerousness, being young, etc and mental illness 
is low on the list.
34 Tingle G. ‘Everyone’s an expert on killers’ (letter), SMH, 21 March 1996.
35 Nicolson J et al. ‘Stand up to the gun lobbyists’ (letter), SMH, 23 March 
1996: 36.
36 Chapman S. ‘Now, about those guns . . .’, SMH, 9 May 1996: 15.
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Their representative pointed out: ‘Psychiatrists already had a duty 
to warn those who might suffer as a consequence of recognised danger-
ousness in a patient.’37 One psychiatrist wrote: 
The risk of people becoming mentally ill increases over the 
decades. Being mentally stable when obtaining a gun licence 
means little when the psychotic or depressive episode occurs 
10 years later. Moreover . . . even if the gun owner and licensee 
is mentally stable, others with access to the gun may not be.38
Many writers were quick to point out that any register should start 
by listing members of the gun lobby. ‘This same gun-toting group 
claims that its own members, on the other hand, act ‘responsibly’ at all 
times. Really? Who gave them the all clear?’39 One letter writer from 
the Humanist Society of Victoria defined sport as ‘a contest between 
equal opponents’ and argued that semi-automatic weapons were there-
fore unsporting.40. Others argued that anyone who enjoyed shooting 
animals for ‘sport’ had suspect mental health.
Finally, a writer in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Psychiatry made the following calculation: 
If the annual rate of serious violence in the community is 20 
per 100,000 [persons], then with a predictor with a sensitiv-
ity [detecting true positive cases] and a sensitivity [detecting 
true negative cases] of 95% for a society the size of New 
Zealand (3 million), you will be able to prevent in each year 
570 assaults, will miss 30, but the price will be confining 
150,000 innocent Kiwis. If you insist, as a matter of social 
justice, on not locking up more than one innocent man for 
each three potential assaulters, for the same base rate of vio-
lence, you would require a predictor with a level of accuracy 
of 99.99993%.41
37 Boettcher B. ‘Alarming suggestion’ (letter), SMH, 11 May 1996: 36.
38 Murphy R. ‘The danger in a ‘sleeping gun” ’ (letter), The Age, 8 June 1996: 22.
39 Brownlee E. ‘The hills are alive with them’ (letter), SMH, 20 May 1996: 14.
40 Strand H. ‘Wary of freedom, jungle-style’ (letter), The Age, 21 June 1996: 12.
41 Mullen P. ‘Mental disorder and dangerousness’, Aust NZ J Psychiatry 1984, 
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Stigmatisation of the mentally ill
The widespread speculation that Martin Bryant had a history of mental 
illness fuelled the gun lobby’s argument. A SSAA advertisement stated: 
‘The Port Arthur perpetrator[‘s] . . . mental condition has been widely 
reported on.’42 The implication here was that press reports on Bryant’s 
mental health were to be believed.
The assumption that Bryant was mentally ill and that this was piv-
otal to both understanding what had occurred and preventing future 
massacres angered advocates for people with mental disabilities.43 The 
directors of the Victorian Schizophrenia Fellowship wrote: ‘To the best 
of our knowledge, the man charged has not had a psychiatric assess-
ment. If he has, no diagnosis has been made public.’44 Their concerns 
were that the event would fuel calls for blanket isolationist policies, 
noting that callers to radio were bellowing, ‘Lock them up and throw 
away the key!’45 One person wrote: ‘Behind all the labels used so far, 
stand tens of thousands of Australian citizens with disabilities waiting 
to see if they too are on trial, merely because they live with their dis-
ability.’46 In Hobart alone, at least three cases have been documented of 
schizophrenics committing suicide following the allegation that Bryant 
had that condition.
Significantly, the Secretary of the Tasmanian Department of 
Community and Health Services wrote about ‘unsubstantiated alle-
gations about past contact between community service and health 
authorities in this State and Martin Bryant . . . This Department would 
18: 8–17.
42 SSAA. ‘An urgent message to all gun owners’ (advertisement), Daily 
Telegraph, 10 May 1996. 
43 Nicholls R. ‘Why the stigma on the ill has to stop’ (letter), The Age, 6 May 
1996: A14. 
44 Crowther E, Burger J. ‘Targeting more innocent victims’ (letter), The Age, 6 
May 1996: A14.
45 Ibid.
46 Green D. ‘Mentally ill should not be stigmatised’, The Age, 10 May 1996.
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wish to counter the allegations . . . but because of the pending proceed-
ings against Mr Bryant, is not free to do so.’47 This letter all but indicated 
that stories about Bryant having a history of mental health problems 
known to authorities were unsubstantiated. The following excerpts 
from the assessment provided to the court show that while Bryant had 
been assessed by a psychiatrist who considered him to be ‘intellectually 
handicapped and personality disordered’, he had never been diagnosed 
as having schizophrenia: 
In February 1984 Mr Bryant was assessed by a very expe-
rienced clinical psychiatrist, Dr Cunningham-Dax. This 
assessment was initiated to consider Mr Bryant’s eligibility 
for a disability pension. Dr Cunningham-Dax stated that 
Mr Bryant was intellectually handicapped and personality 
disordered. He also raised the possibility that he might be 
developing an illness of a schizophrenic type. On the basis of 
this report and subsequent assessments which relied upon it, 
Mr Bryant was granted a disability pension. There are subse-
quent references to Mr Bryant having a schizophrenic illness 
and of being a paranoid schizophrenic in the records of Dr 
Mather (December 1991) and Dr PM McCartney (Decem-
ber 1991). These diagnostic formulations, it transpired, were 
not the results of the doctors own conclusions, but based on 
the report of Mr Bryant’s mother that he had been diagnosed 
by Dr Cunningham-Dax as suffering from this illness. This 
was a misunderstanding on Mrs Bryant’s part and it is this 
misunderstanding which lead to an opinion by Dr Cunning-
ham-Dax that Mr Bryant might develop schizophrenia being 
transmuted into a diagnosis of this severe mental illness. Mr 
Bryant has had no contact with the psychiatric services since 
this time.
When Bryant changed his plea to guilty before the trial set to begin 
on 19 November, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that his counsel 
and his mother had worked for weeks to help him understand that his 
denials of guilt were not defensible. ‘Most particularly, no psychiatric 
47 Biscoe G. ‘Bryant concern’ (letter), Sun Herald, 12 May 1196: 43.
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evidence could be found by the defence to argue Bryant was not guilty 
on the grounds of diminished responsibility – or insane.’48 Psychiatrists 
who had interviewed Bryant in prison concluded that he had a low IQ 
of 65, a mental age of 11 and that if any diagnosis could be applied to 
him at all, it was possible that he had Asperger’s syndrome – a form 
of autism characterised by emotional disengagement, lack of affect and 
empathy.49 The trial judge, Justice William Cox, described Bryant as ‘a 
pathetic social misfit’. A defence of insanity was not available to Bryant.
John Wyche, range captain of the NSW SSAA, implied that only 
cheap guns would be used in massacres, arguing for a form of income-
based link between ‘madmen’ and the purchase of such weapons: ‘The 
bulk of licensed sporting shooters would have quality guns worth more 
than $4,000 each. You don’t buy those sorts of weapons to kill people. 
It’s the madmen who buy the cheaper variety.’50 Ironically, it emerged 
that Bryant had purchased his AR–15 for $5,000.
‘This won’t prevent another Port Arthur’
The gun lobby became fond of arguing that the new gun laws would 
not prevent ‘another Port Arthur’. ‘It will not stop the likes of Martin 
Bryant,’ said Roy Smith of the SSAA;51 ‘Focussing on the semi-auto-
matic style of arm as a solution to a possible mass murder is pathetic 
political tokenism. In England, there were already extremely restrictive 
gun laws before the Hungerford shootings . . . Yet some years later came 
the Dunblane killings. Restriction did not work.’52
Responses: As discussed in Chapter 2, no regime of gun control prom-
ises to eliminate all gun violence. Reduction is a realistic goal. Many 
48 Darby A. ‘Why Bryant changed plea’, SMH, 9 November 1996: 9.
49 Montgomery B. ‘Inside the mind of Martin Bryant’, Weekend Australian, 
23–24 November 1996: 25.
50 Wainwright R. ‘Fading trade to lose little from ban’, SMH, 13 May 1996.
51 Wainwright R. ‘We’ll take to streets, say sporting shooters’, SMH, 13 May 1996.
52 Ziccone S. ‘In defence of arms’, The Age, 10 May 1996: A15.
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commentators accepted this argument, but re-framed the importance 
of the laws in terms of reducing the chances of future massacres, not 
preventing them. ‘The agreement will not ensure that there can never 
be another Port Arthur–style massacre. No legislation can ever do that. 
But the legislation . . . will make Australia a safer place . . . The news laws 
will not prevent future tragedies but they might make them less likely.’53
The Dunblane massacre was not proof that gun laws are ineffec-
tive. It was evidence that insufficiently tight laws will permit the wrong 
person to have access to a rapid-fire weapon. Semi-automatic pistols 
were not restricted in the UK after the Hungerford massacre; nor was 
the British licensing system sufficiently rigorous or properly enforced. 
That Thomas Hamilton had a gun licence demonstrates evidence of 
poor screening of shooters.
One commentator argued that ‘acts of theft have been committed 
for millennia and no one suggests that we scrap the crime of stealing. 
Very few laws, if any, succeed in eliminating crimes. Their aim is to 
minimise them and express a community standard.’54
‘Guns are vital for self-defence’
Before Port Arthur, self or family defence was not officially recognised 
as a justifiable reason for being granted a firearms licence in any juris-
diction in Australia. But it was certainly the case that many applicants 
for licences acquired them with this reason in mind and simply ticked a 
box on gun licensing forms indicating that they wanted a gun for other 
purposes, like hunting.
The debate about the right to use a gun in repelling or defending 
oneself against the new nomenclature of the ‘home invader’ had greatly 
amplified this aspect of the gun debate. In 1993, the SSAA set up a fight-
ing fund to contribute $60,000 to the legal defence of Laurie Morris, a 
former executive of the SSAA who had hidden in wait for the return of 
53 Anon. ‘A worthwhile victory on guns’ (editorial), The Age, 24 July 1996: A12.
54 Flanagan M. ‘Why the gun lobby’s rhetoric misses its mark’, The Age, 8 
May 1996: A15.
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a housebreaker and then shot and permanently crippled the man with 
a military rifle.55 Morris was charged with attempted murder and var-
ious firearms offences including possessing 15 unregistered rifles. He 
was subsequently acquitted of the attempted murder charge.56 The 1995 
shootings of 16-year-old Matthew Easdale in Brisbane and of another 
intruder by an 84-year-old disabled man in Adelaide – in both cases 
those firing were subsequently acquitted by courts – galvanised the gun 
lobby’s infatuation with self-defence even further.57 As Queensland gun 
lobbyist Ian McNiven said – when discussing a previous incident where 
a trespasser was shot dead in a Brisbane house – such acts were the 
regrettable ‘blood price’ the community had to pay from time to time to 
allow citizens to be freely armed.58
The Shooters’ Party’s Mike Ascher located the issue in terms of his 
ideas on masculinity: ‘I would use whatever force was necessary and 
take the consequences afterwards . . . Whether I would be legally enti-
tled to do so or not would make no difference . . . Anyone who is half a 
man would do the same.’59 Commenting on the Easdale shooting, John 
Tingle said: ‘It’s time to put all potential intruders on notice that they 
leave their rights at the door when they invade someone’s home.’60 In 
1995, Tingle gained publicity for his plan to introduce a bill allowing 
home occupants to avoid criminal liability if they used ‘deadly force’ 
against home intruders.61
55 Catalano A. ‘Gun lobby aids householder in intruder case’, The Age, 16 
April 1993: 6; Lewis J. ‘Shooters seek cash to defend gunman’, SMH, 17 April 
1993: 9.
56 Greene G. ‘Shooters defend the right to use guns’, The Sunday Age, 20 
August 1995: 5.
57 Zdenkowski G. ‘Coroner must decide in home invasion killings’, SMH, 18 
May 1995: 17.
58 Roberts G. ‘Break, enter and die’, The Bulletin, 9 May 1995: 15, 17–19.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Lagan B. ‘Tingle’s gun law aimed at home intruders’, SMH, 17 November 
1995: 1. 
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Less than a week before the Port Arthur massacre, a Shooters’ Party 
official wrote: ‘Yesterday, I read with disgust how yet another family . . . 
was forced to endure a home invasion that resulted in, among other 
things, the repeated rape of the family’s adolescent daughter.’62 A shooter 
wrote: ‘As a father, my primary duty is to protect my wife and family. 
The Government is planning to force me to surrender my gun, the only 
means by which I can defend them.’ After explaining that he would 
refuse to hand in his gun he continued, ‘I am certainly no extremist. I 
am a middle-of-the-road Australian, a law-abiding citizen.’63
Such arguments raised the spectre of those opposed to liberalising 
access to guns preferring to stand by and let one’s family be assaulted, 
raped and murdered rather than act to defend them. Support for access 
to guns was thus a sign of bravery, decency and coming to the defence 
of victims being attacked by vicious criminals. By implication, anyone 
questioning open access to guns stood – as the NRA’s Bob Corbin had 
said on TCN 9’s A Current Affair in 1992 – for a spineless set of values 
that said: ‘If you’re going to be raped, lay down and be raped .  .  . if 
you’re going to be robbed – hand over your money!’ This was powerful 
rhetoric.
One Age letter writer cited the case of the suburb of Kennesaw, 
Atlanta. He wrote that the local government had enacted a law ‘requir-
ing every household to own a firearm’, except for religious conscientious 
objectors and those with criminal records. He claimed that ‘in the first 
seven months of the law’s enactment the burglary rate fell by 89%. This 
result was not unexpected because it had been assumed that criminals 
would avoid these homes for fear of being apprehended by an armed 
owner.’64
62 Guest M. Letter, SMH, 22 April 1996.
63 Reitze RN. ‘How will I protect my family?’ (letter), The Australian, 18–19 
May 1996: 20.
64 Brimblecombe CJ. ‘Guns: what is the American path?’ (letter), The Age, 8 
July 1996: 10.
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In this context, the work of the gun lobby’s favourite criminologist, 
Gary Kleck, was championed by several people.65 Kleck’s US research 
purports to show that, in the US, armed communities with liberal gun 
laws have less gun violence than less armed communities with tighter 
gun laws. Kleck argues that when criminals and violent people expect 
there is a good chance that a victim is armed, they will think twice about 
committing the crime. While Kleck’s research is the subject of serious 
debate in the US, its bottom line is that even the US states and cities 
which have the most liberal gun laws have levels of gun violence that 
are generally much higher than those in nations with tougher gun laws. 
Applying Kleck’s arguments to Australia is like saying to people living in 
peace time ‘let’s start a war, but make sure everyone is properly armed 
. . . that way we can minimise the killing’.
Some in the gun lobby smugly pointed to instances of people who 
previously favoured gun control arming themselves during the Rodney 
King–inspired riots in Los Angeles in 1992. At the time, Ted Drane 
stated that if everyone in the city had been armed ‘I don’t think there 
would have been any toll at all’.66 To this, one commentator replied: ‘I 
dare say that many an otherwise peaceful man caught up in the mad-
ness of the Bosnian war sought to arm himself to defend his family. But 
Australia is not Bosnia.’67
Responses: The NCGC sought to deflate this argument as nonsense 
perpetrated by people overwhelmed by unrealistic fears imported from 
America. We repeatedly emphasised that by far the most probable vic-
tims of a gun kept in any house were the gun owner (from suicide), 
followed by members of the gun owner’s immediate family (through 
suicide, domestic homicide or unintentional firearm discharge), fol-
lowed by neighbours or other persons known to the gun owner (through 
homicide by the gun owner). In Australia, taking up a distant last place 
65 Stanfield S. Letter, SMH, 20 June 1996: 16.
66 Offord J. ‘Guns would have made riots “safe” ’, Daily Telegraph, 9 May 1992; 
Anon. ‘Guns would have saved LA: shooter’, SMH, 9 May 1992: 6.
67 Flanagan M. ‘Why the gun lobby’s rhetoric misses its mark’, The Age, 8 
May 1996: A15.
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on this list of victims, came intruders shot in some act of self-defence 
by the gun owner or another family member. In this analysis, we drew 
on a study of all firearm deaths recorded by the Brisbane coroner from 
1980 to 1989.68 In this period, 587 deaths were recorded and of these 
only one involved the killing of someone who was involved in a crime at 
the time of the incident.
One person wrote a tongue-in-cheek letter saying that he and 
his wife planned to travel to Queensland and had been disturbed by 
reports about the need to have guns for self-defence. He asked: ‘Should 
we endeavour to purchase automatic shotguns, automatic rifles of a 
heavy calibre, or would repeating rifles, 12-gauge single-shot shotguns 
or rifles of only .22 calibre be sufficient?’ He also asked if it would be 
sensible to ‘advertise for other like-minded people who are travelling 
[to Queensland] to join us and travel in convoy’.69
The issue of repelling armed home invaders was not prominent 
during the post Port Arthur debate, but in the past the NCGC had 
always responded by adding to the above arguments and saying that 
‘Australia had not yet introduced the Iranian system of summary exe-
cution for people involved in break and entering houses and theft of 
video-recorders’.
‘We have the right to own guns’
One of the most significant statements to emerge from the Police 
Ministers’ agreement was the reaffirmation that: ‘The ownership, pos-
session and use of firearms is a conditional privilege, not a right.’70 The 
gun lobby in Australia had long claimed, like its US counterparts, that 
there was some sort of constitutionally defined or guaranteed ‘right’ to 
own a gun. There was not and never had been any such right in the 
Australian constitution, nor in Australian law.
68 Cantor CH, Brodie J, McMillen J. ‘Firearm victims – who were they?’, Med 
J Aust 1991, 155: 442–46.
69 Ringland DW. ‘Packing to travel’ (letter), SMH, 13 June 1996: 14.
70 Howard J. ‘We must act now or lose the chance’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
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Response: Attorney General Daryl Williams appropriated the word 
‘right’ by saying: ‘I am more attracted to an argument that all Australians 
have a right to exist in a society where they are not subject to the need-
less risk of being injured or killed as a consequence of the widespread 
availability and irresponsible use of firearms.’ He went on to use a vari-
ation of the analogy with car registration that the NCGC had promoted 
for years: 
Citizens are subject to regulation with respect to other, less 
inherently dangerous activities such as driving motor vehi-
cles . . . Moreover, persons are not allowed to drive any vehicle 
on roads simply because they want to. It would be ludicrous 
to suggest that a person has a right to drive Formula One cars 
simply because of their performance.71
In a similar vein, one writer cleverly appropriated the usual claim 
on the word ‘right’, inverting it to make the powerful point: ‘The “right” 
to life must outweigh the “privilege” of gun ownership.’72 The fact that 
fireworks had long been banned without the emergence of a Fireworks 
Users Rights Party73 was used many times as an example of the way that 
concern for public safety had overridden the right of some to have fun 
with those dangerous goods. Even Tasmania had limited public access 
to fireworks by 1993.
‘This is a violation of our civil rights’
After the 10 May APMC announcement, Ted Drane went into hyperbolic 
overdrive claiming: ‘This amounts to one of the greatest infringements 
on the liberties of individuals in Australia’s history. It is a draconian 
penalty against thousands of law-abiding Australians.’74 A SSAA press 
71 Anon. ‘Ownership not a right’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
72 Phelps G. ‘Ban guns and give the world a lead’ (letter), The Age, 7 May 
1996: A14.
73 Armstrong H. Letter. SMH, 23 March 1996: 36.
74 Delvecchio J. ‘Violation of civil rights, claims shooters’ group’, SMH, 11 
May 1996.
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release described the new South Australian firearms legislation as ‘the 
most infamous legislation ever passed by an Australian Parliament and 
an outright abuse of civil rights . . . a contemptuous assault on the rights 
of law-abiding shooters.’75
Responses: This caused the editor of The Age, Michelle Grattan, to 
comment: ‘The shooters’ lobby which, judging from its over-the-top 
reaction alleging liberties are being dramatically threatened, borders 
on the fanatical.’76 The public response produced dozens of examples of 
curtailments on the freedoms of citizens with which they taunted the 
gun lobby: 
Since our democratic right to throw dwarfs was taken away, 
it has removed our strong possibility of producing a future 
Olympic gold medal winner . . . Don’t the bleating gun lobby 
realise how pathetic it sounds when it sings a similar tune?’77
Our rights are similarly taken away when we are ‘unjustly’ 
forced to sit for a licence to drive a car, take out third party 
insurance, observe the speed limit, or drive with our head-
lights on after sunset.78
‘We’re going to lose all our guns’
After the initial announcement about which guns were to be banned, 
the gun lobby sought to incite its followers into believing that just 
about all guns were implicated. Kel Vickers, a former Commonwealth 
Games silver medallist in pistol shooting, told a gun rally in Sydney 
that Howard’s policy was the thin edge of a much wider agenda.79 They 
tried to put the view abroad that the new laws were but a prelude for 
what was to come. This was said by the editor of a gun magazine to 
75 http: //www.tnet.com.au/~ssaa/ [no longer active, 2013].
76 Grattan M. ‘Howard shows mettle’, The Age, 11 May 1996: A6.
77 Perry C. ‘Sound pathetic’ (letter), SMH, 13 May 1996.
78 Ibid.
79 Gora B. ‘Protesters vow to keep fighting’, Sunday Telegraph, 16 June 1996.
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be ‘a hidden agenda which will ultimately result in completely disarm-
ing all Australians. This is a view reinforced by the previous Keating 
Government being a signatory to a UN treaty which promises to disarm 
all Australians by the year 2000.’80 This claim was made on the basis of 
a Japanese UN resolution which called in general terms for the global 
control of firearms!
One National Party member sympathetic to the gun lobby even 
tried to get publicity for a technical argument that the rusted, inop-
erable memorial cannons and Bofors guns that can be found in many 
Australian country town parks would now be illegal under the wording 
of the new laws. His efforts were mocked by appearing in a column 
known for its lampooning of political idiocy.81
Responses: It was simply not the case that all guns were to be banned. 
It was very easy to point this out. Several writers knocked this nonsense 
on the head by listing, at great length, the wide range of guns that would 
still be available to shooters: 
Anyway, Australian’s can bear arms. Here are some of the 
guns you can own under the new laws: bolt action centre-fire 
military rifles; lever action centre-fire sporting rifles; pump-
action centre-fire sporting rifles; rimfile rifles with bolt, level 
or pump actions; double-barrel shotguns. If you can’t knock 
down a fox with one of the above, the solution is perhaps not 
a semi-automatic but an ophthalmologist with a centre-fire 
laser.82
The Federal National Party Member for Parkes, Michael Cobb, told 
Federal Parliament: 
I condemn the misinformation that is going around on this 
matter and which has been whipped up by some groups. 
The Sporting Shooters Association of Australia (New South 
Wales) Inc. has written something that has been put on my 
80 Harvey N. Letter. Guns Australia, July/August 1996: 8.
81 Anon. ‘Gossip’, SMH, 2 August 1996: 20.
82 Carlyon L. ‘A half-cocked debate on guns’, SMH, 1996: 17.
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desk today. I am disappointed to see what they say because 
my own 13-year-old son is a junior member of this Associ-
ation. They say that 80% of Australian target shooting will 
be banned. On another page of the document, they say that 
about 80% of gun owners will be banned with no compen-
sation. That is absolute, ridiculous nonsense. Indeed, if they 
cared to read what is being put out, some of it is quite rea-
sonable indeed. I am pleased to say that I am now receiving 
letters from the farming community around my electorate in 
particular saying, ‘Hang in there. We support what is being 
proposed. It is quite reasonable and it will help make Austra-
lia a safer place for our children.’83
‘Hitler tried to disarm the Germans’
Internationally, the gun lobby is fond of comparing gun control agenda 
with that of Hitler in pre–World War II Germany. Hitler, they argued 
knowingly, also sought to disarm the population. Queensland’s Ian 
McNiven argued: ‘Once they’re disarmed, as we saw with Hitler when he 
disarmed the Jewish people, the Government can basically do whatever 
they like with those people.’ An editor of Guns Australia wrote: ‘Once 
the Government has complete records of who owns what guns, what’s 
to stop them from instructing police and the military to confiscate all 
privately owned firearms? This was the strategy used by dictators like 
Hitler and Stalin to disarm the populace of Russia and Germany and 
turn them into police states.
And there was still more: ‘We are ruled by politicians who would 
have no compunction about asking help from foreign governments to 
enforce these bans if all else fails.’84 Those who promoted these perspec-
tives wanted the community to understand that they were enemies of 
tyranny, sympathisers with oppressed groups and armed to the teeth 
prepared to resist any neo-Hitlerian pretenders.
83 Cobb M. Federal Hansard, 17 June 1996.
84 Harvey N. Letter, Guns Australia, July/August 1996: 8.
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Others argued that the community needed to be armed to defend 
itself against the Government. They insisted that Howard’s agenda was 
to disarm the population while simultaneously increasing the armed 
capacity of the police to establish a totalitarian state: ‘Are you not even 
curious as to why our police force is being issued with outrageously 
powerful handguns and military-style bullet-proof vests, while the rest 
of us are slowly being disarmed?’85 This writer offered to buy me and 
Rebecca Peters a one-way ticket to Romania, China or North Korea 
where ‘civilians do not own firearms’, and hoped that police would soon 
raid our houses so we could experience the sort of ‘peace and freedom 
you will no doubt find when you migrate to a country where civilians 
do not own firearms.’
Responses: The columnist Mike Carlton ridiculed this claim by specify-
ing the sort of consequence McNiven’s rhetoric was presumably alluding 
to: ‘Uh huh. Possibly fearful of being trucked off to a gas chamber by 
the Liberal-National Coalition.’86 Carlton then guffawed about how 
McNiven had lodged a rejected complaint with the Australian Federal 
Police accusing the Prime Minister of having prejudiced ‘the safety or 
defence of Australia by disarming its citizens’.
Another writer suggested that ‘the chances of disarmed Australian 
citizens being gassed by their Government is somewhat less than that of 
being shot by an armed fellow Australian’,87 while another put it that the 
‘more valid comparison is between the cunning propaganda practised by 
the shooters and the Nazis’.88 Significantly, the Jewish Board of Deputies 
attacked the Hitler analogy, claiming that ‘the Jewish community finds 
[it] repugnant and offensive, and totally rejects the comparison’.89
One writer challenged the very notion that in modern societies, 
tyrannies were overthrown with guns. He pointed to the examples of 
85 Eyre C. ‘Can’t you see what’s happening?’ (letter), SMH, 6 June 1996: 14.
86 Carlton M. ‘Mike Carlton’ (column), SMH, 11 May 1996.
87 MacAdam T. ‘No comparison’ (letter), SMH, 21 May 1996: 10.
88 Simmons A. ‘No comparison’ (letter), SMH, 21 May 1996: 10.
89 Anon. ‘Row over gun rally remarks’, SMH, 27 July 1996: 6.
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the unarmed ‘people power’ revolutions in the Philippines, Russia, 
Poland and East Germany and contrasted this with chaotic nations 
where armed civilian militias roamed the country (Somalia, Rwanda, 
Cambodia, Afghanistan).90
‘We want to defend the nation’
Those who wanted to defend themselves against a future tyrannical 
government nearly always believed that they had big roles to play in a 
para-military citizens’ army that would defend the nation against exter-
nal attack. These people argued that ‘disarming the population’ would 
make the nation defenceless if Australia was invaded by a foreign power. 
This was nearly always said to be Indonesia. Indonesia’s expansionism 
into the former West New Guinea (now Irian Jaya) and into East Timor 
were given as evidence of the threat Australia faced.
The Federal Member for Herbert told Parliament: 
I received a mock media release dated the year 2000 in the 
mail just this week and I will read two paragraphs from it. 
It states: ‘Last Sunday night Northern Australia was invaded 
by up to 1,000,000 Asian soldiers and militias using thou-
sands of new plastic landing craft deployed from high speed 
aluminium supercats .  .  . The invading forces are concen-
trating on every outlying community and isolated station 
owners and mining sites. They are shooting the males from 
long range then dismembering them, raping the women and 
shooting or slashing the kids and babies to death.’91
Some of the anti-Asian propaganda being circulated was 
particularly sick. Tony Pitt, national chairman of ‘The Australians’, 
widely distributed an article at gun rallies which described Indonesians 
as ‘those gentlemen [who] would cut out your genitals, sew them into 
your mouth and prod your bum with a bayonet, driving you through 
the streets as a spectacle, making la-la noises with your new tongue. 
90 Gillin T. ‘Rule of law over .303’ (letter), SMH, 17 June 1996: 16.
91 Australian House of Representatives Hansard for 24 June 1996. 
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This game would last until your blood supply ran out and you could no 
longer respond to the stabbing pain in the bum’.92 In 1997 Pitt joined 
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party.
Responses: This argument mixed xenophobia, racism and folk memo-
ries of citizens’ defence forces belonging to eras of warfare long before 
the contemporary warfare of the Gulf War era. To people who sub-
scribed to these sort of values, no amount of argument about it being 
unrealistic and plain silly was likely to make any impact. Whenever we 
could, we ridiculed those advocating an armed population as propo-
nents of a ‘Dad’s Army’ view of Australian defence (a reference to the 
former BBC TV comedy series about a bumbling group of aged and 
eccentric home guardsmen in England during World War II).93
One press story reported the views of 63-year-old Vietnam War 
Victoria Cross winner, Keith Payne. The story pictured a crusty and 
grim-faced Payne cradling his gun, together with an archival photo 
of him receiving his Victoria Cross from the British Queen in 1970. 
Payne, speaking from ‘his home in the gun lobby stronghold of Mackay, 
Queensland’ was said to be ‘blast[ing] gun lobby elements who claim 
an armed population is vital for Australia’s safety against an invading 
Indonesian army’. Payne pilloried these elements as ‘cowboys’ saying 
that ‘the idea of them defending Australia is ridiculous’ and urging 
them ‘to try to join the military reserve, that is if they are psychologi-
cally fit to join and were admitted’.94
‘Why don’t you ban knives and clubs?’
A perennial gun lobby argument is that restricting access to guns is 
folly, because those who want to kill themselves or others can chose 
from a variety of lethal weapons. ‘People hang themselves . . . are you 
going to ban ropes?’ they argue. In dozens of letters and emails sent 
92 Steketee M. ‘Backlash: targeting the gun vote’, The Australian, 8 June 1996.
93 7 Days. SBS Television.
94 Warnock S. ‘Gun lobby claim “stupid” ’, Sun-Herald, 14 July 1996: 25.
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during the debate, people supporting the gun lobby declared gun con-
trol supporters (especially people who worked in public health) were 
hypocrites for not simultaneously trying to ‘ban’ every other cause of 
death in the community. The logic behind this argument ran: ‘There 
are many public health problems in the world. If you aren’t willing to 
instantly fix all of them, it is hypocritical to try and fix any of them!’ One 
erudite writer told Age readers: 
If they were genuine about lowering the suicide rate, they’d 
advocate the immediate banning of cigarettes . . . they would 
argue that the only ones who should have cars are taxi driv-
ers, truck drivers and bus drivers . . . cars, which weren’t even 
designed to kill, are killing 2,000 Australians a year.95 
We formed the view that letters editors at newspapers published 
such inanity as ‘all in their own words’ examples of gun lobby reasoning.
The SSAA’s Sebastian Ziccone argued: ‘Anyone giving the matter a 
moment’s thought would realise that the Dunblane murderer . . . could 
have easily achieved his deranged ends by other means, such as flame 
accelerant.’96 We took this challenge, gave it a moment’s thought, but 
searched for a long time to find any examples of mass killings by flame 
accelerant. Mass killing with guns were far easier to locate. A pro-gun 
American letter writer pointed out that tyre levers, bottles, kitchen 
knives, scissors, chemicals and many other ‘weapons’ had been used in 
murders.97
Responses: A barrage of replies to this letter included: 
Twenty-five people massacred by a bottle-wielding bottle-
man? The bottleman owned a large arsenal of bottles? Do 
they make semi-automatic bottles?98
95 Wegman J. ‘Zealots miss out on the big killers’ (letter), The Age, 4 June 
1996: A12.
96 Ziccone S. ‘In defence of arms’, The Age, 10 May 1996: A15.
97 Shyne M. ‘Blaming the guns instead of killers’ (letter), The Age, 21 June 
1996: 12.
98 Bond J. ‘Risks compared’ (letter), The Age, 22 June 1996: A22.
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Once again the word ‘mass’ has been followed by the word 
‘shooting’. Not stabbing, clubbing, choking or bashing, but 
shooting.99
The NCGC emphasised the difference between guns and other 
weapons by arguing: ‘Fists and knives leave people hurt, but the prob-
lem with firearms is that they are a permanent solution to what is often 
a temporary problem.’100
A machete attack on children attending a picnic in Wolverhampton, 
England – where the assailant was found to have kept files on the 
Port Arthur killings – was reported in Australia in July.101 Again, one 
letter writer put it simply: ‘Gun plus criminal intent equals 17 dead 
(Dunblane). Gun plus criminal intent equals 35 dead (Port Arthur). 
Machete and criminal intent equals seven injured (Wolverhampton). 
Guns do kill people.’102
The research evidence on the lethality of weapons was also useful 
here. Police records from Atlanta in the US found that assaults on 
family members and intimates using guns were three times more likely 
to result in death than assaults with knives and 23.4 times more than 
assaults involving other weapons or bodily force.103 The gun lobby has 
retorted here that people intent on killing choose guns, while those less 
determined might choose less lethal weapons.104 This assertion is con-
tradicted by research which examined the location and number of knife 
wounds as a basis for judging the assailants’ intent to kill. More attackers 
99 Alvaro F. ‘Something must be done, now’ (letter), SMH, 1 May 1996: 14.
100 Sutton C, Gilmore H. ‘Ban these games and toys of war’, Sun Herald, 5 
May 1996: 3.
101 Reuter. ‘Briton held after machete attack “kept file on Port Arthur 
killings” ’, The Age, 11 July 1996: 9.
102 Neyle DA. ‘Irrefutable’ (letter), SMH, 12 July 1996: 10.
103 Saltzman L, Mercy J, O’Carroll P, Rosenberg M, Rhodes P. ‘Weapon 
involvement and injury outcomes in family and intimate assaults’, JAMA, 
1993, 267: 3043–47.
104 Kleck G. Point blank: guns and violence in America. New York: Aldine de 
Gruyter, 1992.
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with knives than those using guns appeared intent on killing.105
Two writers described killing with guns as a way of allowing the 
perpetrator to put some distance between him and his victims, allowing 
for a psychologically ‘easier’ act of killing to occur: ‘Killing with a gun 
is easy, instant: it allows for ‘remote control’ death where the reality of 
the victims’ terror and agony are minimised compared with ‘hands-on’ 
killing’;106 and ‘Murder by remote control must stop now.’107
Our reply to the ‘why are you picking on guns .  .  . cars kill many 
more people’ argument was to produce it in parallel in the form of a 
question: ‘Isn’t your argument like accusing a cancer specialist of being 
a hypocrite for helping people with cancer because people also are dying 
of heart disease? Or a road safety advocate of being a scoundrel because 
children are also drowning in backyard pools?’
‘This will only cause a black market to thrive’
The gun lobby, which opposed the ban on semi-automatics, warned 
that a black market in the banned guns would develop with ‘an endless 
supply of illegal guns’.108
Response: Black markets have always existed for guns and doubtless, 
the new laws would cause many guns to go underground and be sold 
illegally that would otherwise have been traded openly. Those very 
intent on getting them would be able to buy these guns in the future as 
they had in the past. But yet again, this argument sought to dichotomise 
gun users into the unproblematic, simplistic categories of good and bad. 
The new laws would make it very much more difficult for the ordinary 
shooter, unfamiliar with ways of acquiring illegal guns, to get such a 
105 Zimring F. Is gun control likely to reduce violent killings? University of 
Chicago Law Review, 1968, 35: 721–37.
106 Monteith A. Letter, SMH, 21 March 1996.
107 Nissen P. Letter, SMH, 1 May 1996: 14.
108 Dunlevy S. ‘Lobby warns of black market’, Daily Telegraph, 11 May 1996; 
Rees P. ‘Shooters call crisis talks’, Sunday Telegraph, 12 May 1996: 8.
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weapon. Anyone wanting such a gun would henceforth have to deal 
with criminals, break the law themselves and live with concern about 
being apprehended and being charged with a serious offence. Such a 
distribution system contrasted with any shooter being able to walk into 
any gun shop and buy a semi-automatic weapon.
‘Many shooters will disregard these stupid laws’
On the announcement of the Police Ministers’ resolutions, the gun 
lobby began to emphasise that many shooters would disregard the new 
laws: they would not surrender their banned guns and they would not 
register those deemed legal.109 This allowed them to wallow in ambigu-
ity about whether they were predicting lawlessness or actually urging 
it. With their association with other historical examples of principled 
civil disobedience, Tingle sought to infer that the laws that would be 
broken were objects of understandable contempt in the eyes of sensible, 
knowledgeable people (‘laws made by people who understand abso-
lutely nothing about guns’110). He stated: ‘You can keep a gun forever 
and no one would know. Many shooters are saying they will not hand in 
or register their guns.’111 Ted Drane joined in the chorus, prefacing his 
remarks with the obligatory: ‘I would never advocate that people break 
the law. But shooters are bitter . . .’.112 A previously unknown group call-
ing itself ‘The Gun Lobby’ dispensed with the ambiguities and openly 
advised gun owners to break the law, saying its aim was to create ‘a 
nation of more than one million passive criminals’.113
The day before the 10 May Police Ministers’ meeting, Drane 
was publicly stating that he would obey the law if it required him to 
surrender his guns: 
109 Passey D. ‘Owners of guns will resist, say lobbyists’, SMH, 24 July 1996: 7.
110 Lawnham P, McGarry A. ‘Shooters will defy new laws, MP warns’, The 
Australian, 11 May 1996.
111 Vass N. ‘Owners won’t give up weapons: Tingle’, SMH, 13 May 1996.
112 Passey D. ‘Owners of guns will resist, say lobbyists’, SMH, 24 July 1996: 7.
113 Hayes B, Patty A. ‘Shooters plan gun law revolt’, Sun Herald, 12 May 1996: 3.
The gun lobby’s arguments . . . and the responses
229
Interviewer: Mr Drane, would you hand your weapons in?
Drane: Yes, I would, that’s right.114
But by the time of the Sydney pro-gun rally on 15 June Drane was 
telling the crowd: ‘And I’m not gunna give up any guns that they’re 
going to take off me! Are you gunna give yours up?’115
Others in the gun-owning community were more candid about the 
proportion of shooters who would not merely actively disobey the law, 
but who would try to offload their guns to criminals rather than hand 
them in for market value compensation. A writer to a gun magazine 
said: 
Howard is hopelessly naive to think that any more than 
10% of the total number of semi-automatic weapons will be 
handed in under the Howard ban. The vast majority are just 
going to disappear until they resurface again in the hands of 
criminals. There are many people not wanting to be caught 
with the weapons but they are unwilling to hand them in. 
They are going to sell them.116
Tony Warner, of the Western Australian division of the SSAA, 
wrote in July to WA Premier Richard Court arguing that shooters who 
would refuse to obey the new laws would be somehow compelled to 
break them: 
I urge your Cabinet and Government to reject the Prime Min-
ister’s intractability and enact laws in this State that reflect 
the sovereignty of the State and to enact laws that all normal 
law-abiding people see as reasonable. To do otherwise is to 
invite involuntary lawlessness by otherwise law-abiding citi-
zens. (my emphasis)117
114 Lateline, ABC TV, 9 May 1996.
115 Drane T. Channel 9 TV News, 15 June 1996.
116 Ellis M. Letter, Guns Australia, September/October 1996: 18
117 SSAA website, July 1996.
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The gun lobby wanted it both ways on the question of how many 
shooters would surrender their guns. It expediently argued that few gun 
owners would hand in their banned guns; and that so many would be 
handed in that the estimated costs of the compensatory buyback were 
ludicrously low. It argued: ‘The new gun laws will not significantly 
reduce overall gun numbers .  .  . Banning self-loading long-arms and 
pump-action shotguns will remove only the few held by people who 
comply with the law.’ (my emphasis)118
‘Where will the surrendered guns go?’
In mid June 1996, claims surfaced that Victorian police had re-sold 
semi-automatics surrendered during a 1987–88 amnesty to a Victorian 
gun dealer.119 The guns were to be sold overseas by the dealer. Another 
claim was that a gun Bryant used at Port Arthur had previously been 
surrendered to police in another state.120 A gun collector claimed he 
‘believed’ an AR–15 rifle he had surrendered in 1993 was the weapon 
used at Port Arthur. He was reported as saying: ‘I hope and pray it 
wasn’t my rifle which was used . . . but in my heart I believe it was.’ This 
was enough for some media to report his claims, despite noting that 
‘police claim records show that Mr Drysdale’s gun was destroyed’.121 It 
was revealed at Bryant’s sentencing that he had bought his gun brand 
new from a Hobart gun dealer.
A by-now desperate gun lobby milked these stories for all they 
were worth,122 trying to build a spectre of mistrust in the bureaucratic 
118 Tingle J, Shelton B, Borsak R, Kounaris G et al. ‘Shooters’ response’, 
Australian Gun Sports, June 1996: 21.
119 Anon. ‘Anger over police amnesty rifle sale’, SMH, 17 June 1996: 4; Green 
S, Adams D. ‘Outcry sparks gun destruction order’, The Age, 18 June 1996: 1.
120 McGuire P, Jones W. ‘Port Arthur rifle came from police’, Sunday 
Telegraph, 9 June 1996.
121 Anon. ‘My gun killed 35 – farmer’, Sunday Mail (Adelaide), 23 June 1996: 2.
122 McGuire P, Jones W. ‘Port Arthur rifle came from police’, Sunday 
Telegraph, 9 June 1996.
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process by arguing that guns handed in following Port Arthur could 
similarly find their way back into the community after police sold them. 
This argument was baseless, relying on the assumption that surrendered 
semi-automatics could be sold in states that did not ban them. Because 
the ban would be nationwide, the speculation would not hold up, but 
the gun lobby believed the claim would nonetheless fuel its supporters’ 
mistrust of police.
Responses: NCGC members were interviewed many times on our reac-
tion to the gun lobby’s claims that the ban would be futile and establish 
a black market. We responded by painting the gun lobby as a group that 
was inciting law breaking.123 We challenged them to act responsibly, 
and linked the accusation of irresponsibility with one of self-interest 
and naked opportunism: ‘They should voluntarily hand in excess arms, 
cooperate with the new laws, and most importantly abandon their spu-
rious campaign for funds and direct that money towards the victims of 
the massacre.’124
This was an important definitional exercise. The gun lobby had 
sought to define the ban as a futile exercise that would fail because it 
was unjust. They thus sought to speak using a voice of principled civil 
disobedience, and we saw it as our task to re-frame this voice into one 
seen to be coming from people who were not just dispassionately pre-
dicting lawlessness, but actively encouraging it.
Another core NCGC response to talk of mass lawlessness over regis-
tration was to advocate a mechanism whereby people in the community 
should be encouraged to alert police to people who owned illegal guns. 
Registration will only work if it is accompanied by a high 
profile confidential hotline, like Operation Noah for drugs, 
where people can report those they know who are keeping 
illegal guns. Penalties for possession of unregistered guns 
after the amnesty period must also be spectacular and police 
123 Wainwright R. ‘We’ll take to streets, say sporting shooters’, SMH, 13 May 
1996.
124 Dunlevy S. ‘Lobby warns of black market’, Daily Telegraph, 11 May 1996.
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directed to take all reports seriously. Anything less will be an 
abject failure.’125 
This idea was supported by trenchant critics of current state-based 
firearms registration systems, who argued that without a ‘dob in’ scheme 
and harsh penalties, many guns would continue to be held unregis-
tered.126 Describing the Police Ministers’ resolutions, Attorney General 
Daryl Williams said of penalties ‘the adjective we used was “severe” ’.127
Accusations about police selling guns back to the community were 
never heard again when television news reports began to show film of 
guns being crushed and smelted down.
Arguments for exemptions
In the run-up to the Police Ministers’ meeting and from the time its 
terms were announced, the gun lobby and sections of the National Party 
argued the case for categories of shooters to be exempt from the ban. 
These arguments focused on: 
•	 the need for farmers to have semi-automatics
•	 endangered and hungry pilots being forced down in the Australian 
outback
•	 rural women
•	 competitive target shooters
•	 collectors and heirlooms.
‘Farmers need semi-automatics’
Much publicity was given to a public apology made by the Prime 
Minister to ‘tens of thousands of law-abiding Australians, particularly 
125 Chapman S. ‘Now, about those guns . . .’, SMH, 9 May 1996: 15.
126 Fife-Yeomans J. ‘Call to dob in, imprison illegal firearm owners’, The 
Australian, 11 June 1996.
127 Daryl Williams. 7.30 Report, ABC TV, 10 May 1996.
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in the country areas’ for being inconvenienced by the new gun laws.128 
But as the debate unfolded, it became doubtful that there would in 
fact be widespread demand for such an apology. Many farmers called 
radio programs to express their support for the reforms. Typically, 
they stressed five arguments: that it was a myth that farmers needed an 
arsenal of guns; that semi-automatics were largely unnecessary on the 
average farm; that they had experienced drunken and drugged aggres-
sive shooters coming onto their properties and shooting stock and 
equipment; that they wanted to make it clear they fully supported the 
proposed new laws; and that the ‘gun lobby’ was not speaking for them.
When the gun lobby insisted that farmers needed semi-automatics 
to cull wild and feral animals and destroy sick or drought-stricken 
stock, it was difficult for anyone without first-hand experience to refute 
this with authenticity and plausibility. The gun lobby had no shortage of 
farmers willing to insist that city people knew nothing about the rigours 
of country life and shooting.
Media advocacy for gun control during the debate was voiced 
by five groups: politicians, editorial writers, gun control advocates, 
gun victims and their families, and the general public. Between these 
groups, there was a huge depth of experience, authority and perspective 
that allowed powerful, compelling statements to be made in support of 
gun control. However, a sixth category of gun control advocate – who 
might be termed the responsible shooter – also received considerable 
and often invaluable news coverage.
Letters were published from ordinary gun owners who quietly 
explained that, ‘I realised that there was a more important issue than 
any love of the sport – the safety of the community and the obvious fact 
that fewer guns means fewer deaths.’129
Professional shooters also often supported the new laws. The 
Queensland representative of the Association of Professional Shooters, 
128 Grattan M, Savva N. ‘Howard to tour rural areas to sell gun laws’, The 
Age, 6 June 1996: A5.
129 Anderson B. ‘Why I handed in the 12 gauge’ (letter), The Age, 6 June 
1996: 16.
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Greg Carlsson, was among several who stated doubts about whether 
farmers needed semi-automatics. His comments were picked up by the 
media as a standard refutation of the claim.
Carlsson, a professional kangaroo shooter from western Queensland 
with 22 years experience, pilloried claims about shooters needing 
semi-automatics, saying such statements applied only to amateurs from 
the city: ‘The basic people who own semi-automatic firearms come from 
the city and are more interested in blowing away anything that moves 
. . . The common terminology out here for them are weekend shooters 
– that’s when we are being nice about them . . .’.130 Carlsson went on to 
describe the need to use more than one bullet on an animal as ‘inhu-
mane, unprofessional and a breach of the wildlife harvesters’ code of 
practice’ and said semi-automatics were ‘too inaccurate to be humane’.
A similar story featured a professional kangaroo shooter who 
described semi-automatics as inaccurate saying: ‘I can drop five roos 
in 15 seconds [with his single-shot, bolt-action rifle] if everything is 
running right and still get another crack at the mob after reloading.’131 
A similar letter came from a country man who had previously oper-
ated a hunting safari business and had abandoned the enterprise as too 
dangerous, having seen ‘too many fools with firearms to believe that 
anyone has an ordained right to possess such a weapon . . . a percentage 
of clients would arrive travelling high on various drugs’.132
The Land newspaper featured an article on archetypal farmers, 
father and son Garth and Scott Dutfield, who told how single-shot rifles 
were adequate for their needs to cull kangaroos, rabbits and foxes. They 
had banned shooters from their property after complaining about ‘city 
hunters coming up on weekends and ‘shooting everything on sight’, 
including sheep.133
130 Collins C. ‘Single-shot Greg takes aim at the semi-automatics lobby’, The 
Australian, 11 May 1996.
131 Bearup G. ‘Son of a gun town’, SMH, July 6 1996: S5.
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133 Johnson P. ‘Single shot’s fine at Mumbil’, The Land, 9 May 1996.
The gun lobby’s arguments . . . and the responses
235
A Sydney Morning Herald journalist who had grown up in the coun-
try wrote a long piece describing how most people on the land would 
be either untroubled or openly welcome the ban on semi-automatics, 
and how deeply they resented being lumped together with what she 
described as 
this sub-species of rural hoodlum . . . [who] live in country 
towns and may or may not lease a few hectares. They wear 
flannel shirts and American baseball hats. And they love 
guns. On weekends . .  . they blast the daylights out of road 
signs, mailboxes and native birds. If you have stock in the 
paddock beside the highway, they’ll take pot-shots at hapless 
sheep or steer. They call it hunting.134
One writer wrote a lengthy article where many of the gun lobby’s 
arguments about farmers needing semi-automatics were addressed. 
These are worth quoting at length: 135
The true feelings of farmers towards guns and gun control 
are being manipulated and misrepresented by the fierce 
vested interests of the arms dealers and their pro-shooter 
lobby groups.
The farmer’s single shot rifle is occasionally dusted off for 
the unpleasant but effective task of destroying injured live-
stock or the occasional rogue sheep dog. The average farmer 
today simply does not have a need for an armoury of rifles, 
let alone high-powered semi-automatics – that is a myth pro-
moted by the arms dealers and recreational shooters.
Modern pest control on the Australian farm has seen guns 
replaced in the main by safer and more cost-effective poison, 
trapping and biological control methods. Shooting, except 
for professional contract shooting of pigs and kangaroos, is 
time-consuming, ineffective . . . and expensive.
134 Loane S. ‘Real farmers a long shot from gun-ho marchers’, SMH, 5 June 
1996.
135 Cocky. ‘Farmers, too, fear a belly full of beer and a magazine full of lead’, 
The Bulletin, 28 May 1996: 95.
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What the farmer knows – but the sporting shooter ignores – 
is that if you miss the rabbit or kangaroo with your first shot, 
your target takes off. To respond by spraying the paddock 
with lead, which the semi-automatic allows, does nothing but 
threaten livestock, signs, water tanks and farming families.
Displaying an ignorance of basic livestock management, the 
NSW National Party leader Ian Armstrong, this month said 
[on radio] that graziers might need semi-automatic rifles to 
shoot crows at lambing time. Perhaps Armstrong should talk 
quietly to a real lamb breeder, who would almost certainly 
be appalled at the thought of automatic rifle fire anywhere 
near lambing ewes . . . Who is feeding Armstrong such mis-
information?
The National Farmers Federation ‘applauded’ the new laws after 
‘extensive talks had produced unanimous agreement on tightening 
the rules’.136 This was despite, as one journalist noted, ‘being one of the 
groups most disadvantaged by them’.137
While much publicity was given to dissent over the new laws 
within the rural-based National Party, it soon became apparent that 
many women in the party strongly supported the reforms. ‘Women, 
the National Party has discovered, overwhelmingly support the Prime 
Minister’s proposals on guns.’ One delegate to a meeting said: ‘We need 
to take a broader view and look at how this affects the community as a 
whole . . . To not support tighter gun controls is to condone the action 
of the gunman at Port Arthur.’138
A great deal of attention was given to the feelings about the new 
laws among people living in the bush and in country towns. One fea-
ture article, for example, profiled the views of people living in the New 
England town of Guyra, population 2,000.139 The article began with a 
136 Dunlevy S. ‘Lobby warns of black market’, Daily Telegraph, 11 May 1996.
137 Ibid.
138 Loane S. ‘Extremists’ white feather taunts fail to intimidate MPs’, SMH, 15 
June 1996.
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description of the gun murder-suicide 11 years ago of a local family 
of four, and its impact on the town. It ended with the story of a youth 
who had committed suicide after a split with his girlfriend. Most of 
the story covered the different reactions of shooters in the community, 
from those who said they would not surrender their guns, to those who 
planned to willingly do so, concluding that the town was ‘divided’.
The head of the Anglican Parish of Broken Hill, the Venerable Dr 
Edwin Byford, wrote to the NCGC describing a meeting of the Synod 
of the Diocese of Riverina, which covers about one third of the state 
of NSW. A motion supporting the new gun controls was put to the 
meeting. 
The debate was characterised by speaker after speaker getting 
up and saying that they were land owners and that the last 
thing they wanted was people on their properties or in their 
districts with automatic or semi-automatic guns. This was 
very passionately put by one grazier from near Wilcannia. 
When he got up to speak most of us had expected that he 
would oppose the resolution, but he was one of the strongest 
speakers in favour.
Earlier he had written to the press: 
Only 1 to 2% of the [Broken Hill] population had turned 
out for the free barbecue that the gun lobby put on to attract 
people to its Sunday meeting. The 98 to 99% of the popu-
lation that stayed away clearly demonstrated that the gun 
lobby . . . [is] out of step with the sentiments of the people of 
this city.140
Because of the notoriety that Ian McNiven and Ron Owen had 
brought to the gun debate, their hometown of Gympie in South 
Queensland became shorthand for the ‘unofficial redneck capital of 
Australia’. Many locals deeply resented the reputation a few had brought 
to the town of 14,000, and several stories were written about their efforts 
to restore the town’s good name, their support for gun law reform and 
140 Byford E. ‘Broken Hill: an oasis on the edge’ (letter), SMH, 13 June 1996.
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the anonymous death threats they had received.141 In late August 1996 
the town was back in the news when a local gun enthusiast shot dead 
three of his family before fleeing into the bush.
In Tasmania, the Firearm Owners Association argued that semi-au-
tomatics were needed to cull sheep as ‘recommended by the RSPCA 
(Royal Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals)’. No source for this 
assertion was ever provided.
‘How are we to keep wild beasts at bay?’
The notion that parts of the outback were crawling with predatory wild 
beasts intent on attacking defenceless humans developed into another 
favourite gun lobby argument for availability of semi-automatics. Talk 
of crocodiles, charging water buffaloes142 and wounded wild pigs turn-
ing on shooters (‘With wild pigs, you need one .  .  . because one shot 
might not stop them’143) was typical. Perhaps the most remarkable claim 
was made by Queensland National Party MP Mrs De-Anne Kelly, who 
argued that semi-automatics were necessary for killing snakes: ‘I live in 
taipan [a highly venomous snake] country and you only get one chance 
if you have a small child and a taipan.’144 Given the slender and highly 
mobile nature of snakes, and the usual way of killing them in the bush 
– with a stick or shovel – the scenario of a parent fetching the semi-au-
tomatic to blast away at such a small and elusive target in Mrs Kelly’s 
‘one chance’ was worth some reflection. Presumably, a bazooka or flame 
thrower would serve this purpose even better, yet Mrs Kelly did not 
argue for the liberalisation of laws allowing the public in taipan country 
to have access to these.
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142 Farr M. ‘Rednecks, whingers unite for greater good’, Daily Telegraph, 11 
May 1996.
143 Chapman S. ‘For the Howard plan’ (vox pops), SMH, 10 May 1996; 
McNicoll DD. ‘Urban cowboys take shot in the dark on gun control’, The 
Australian, 9 May 1995.
144 Roberts G. ‘MP to open shooting contest’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
The gun lobby’s arguments . . . and the responses
239
Response: Former NSW Labor Premier Barrie Unsworth said: ‘They 
argue they need them for wild pigs – that’s bullshit. There is more trou-
ble with pit bull terriers in Sydney suburbs than with wild pigs in the 
country.’145
‘What about pilots forced down in the outback?’
A rather bizarre variation of this argument asked us to consider pilots 
forced down in the outback: ‘Pilots who serve Australia’s remote Gulf 
region should have a semi-automatic for protection against wildlife – 
and to kill for food – if the aircraft is forced down.’146 This suggestion 
had also been supported by the Northern Territory’s Chief Minister 
Shane Stone.147 But neither Stone nor the reporter of this story ventured 
into the questions of how many pilots are ever ‘forced down’ in the Gulf 
region (few, if any); how many so forced down have been threatened by 
wildlife (again, none to speak of); and why single shot weapons would 
not suffice in such (wildly improbable) situations anyway.
A Northern Territory Department of Primary Industries officer 
provided a more sobering consideration. He expressed concern that 
a blanket ban on high-powered semi-automatics would preclude his 
department from contracting aerial shooters armed with such weap-
ons in helicopters to efficiently destroy tubercular cattle and buffalo in 
the vast outback expanses.148 But in the course of this news report, it 
was revealed that a mere 23 D-class shooting licences were currently 
issued in the Northern Territory for such purposes. This figure placed 
in perspective generalised claims being made by the gun lobby and its 
political supporters that ‘people in the outback’ required high-powered 
semi-automatics. The reality was that only 23 professional shooters 
in the Northern Territory needed to apply for a licence to use such 
weapons.
145 Byrne A. ‘Unsworth gloomy on summit’, SMH, 3 May 1996.
146 Warnock S. ‘Gun lobby claim “stupid” ’, Sun Herald, 14 July 1996: 25.
147 Lateline, ABC TV, 9 May 1996.
148 Alcorn G. ‘Flying shooters need fast power’, SMH, 10 May 1996.
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‘How will isolated rural women defend themselves?’
Some chivalrous types in the gun lobby were very concerned about 
women on isolated rural properties. These women would often be 
alone with their men away, so the argument ran. So they would need 
semi-automatics to defend against escaped criminals, rapists and other 
undesirables. Woe betides any anti-gun advocate from the city who 
might imply that these rural women should be left defenceless.
Response: Several women were scathing in their rebuttal of this 
argument. One, who had lived for ten years alone in isolated remote 
Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory asked: 
Who does Mr Stone wish to arm in these communities? Does 
he want Aboriginal people to have greater ability to slaughter 
their families, when upset, than the rest of the community? 
Or does he want to give whites the ability to slaughter 
Aboriginal people?149 
Sara Henderson, a bestselling author whose books tell of her life 
in the Australian outback, declared her support for tougher gun con-
trols.150 The Country Women’s Association also supported the changes. 
Its NSW state president declared: ‘It’s sad it takes such a public tragedy 
to get action, but we need some sort of register so we know who has 
these guns. It’s amazing to think someone can just walk into a shop and 
buy one.’151
‘The laws discriminate against the aged and frail’
The gun lobby argued that the bans on self-loading shotguns would 
severely disadvantage ‘women, young people, the elderly and disabled’ 
who participated in clay target shooting.152 The recoil or kickback from 
149 Roberts R. ‘Offensive’ (letter), SMH, 11 May 1996: 36.
150 Anon. ‘Gun lobby silenced by poll reality’, Daily Telegraph, 9 May 1996.
151 Dick A. ‘Reforms needed: survey’, The Land, 9 May 1996.
152 Bearup G. ‘Son of a gun town’, SMH, 6 July1996: S5; Savva N, Farouque F, 
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self-loading shotguns is often appreciably less than that from dou-
ble-barrelled shotguns, so the gun lobby argued that frail members of 
the community would deeply resent the ban. Said the Federal Member 
for Riverina: 
I had a phone call today from some elderly shooters. They 
were saying that they need automatic [sic] shotguns because 
of the recoil on their shoulder. The women who shoot in 
clubs would prefer to use that type of firearm also, because it 
is less restrictive and does not hurt their shoulders.153
Response: We made no attempt to respond to this claim, judging it 
as one of the more desperate appeals that would be seen by most as 
plain silly. The idea that politicians would consider placing the shoul-
der comfort of perhaps a few hundred elderly shooters above the 
reasons for one of the central platforms of the new reforms was not 
worth any effort at response. But we were proved wrong on this when 
the NSW Government passed amendments to its Firearms Act to allow 
exemptions in this regard and the Tasmanian Government adopted the 
exemption as well.
‘Our Olympic shooters will be disadvantaged’
1996 was the year of the Atlanta Olympic Games and we expected that 
this would provide an extra pretext for the gun lobby to claim that 
Australia would be severely disadvantaged in Olympic shooting if the 
ban on semi-automatics went ahead. With support for Olympians being 
a virtual sign of patriotism, the shooters probably felt they held a pow-
erful card. We did not have to wait long. Roy Smith of the SSAA said on 
13 May: ‘How do you compensate someone for removing their sport; 
people who have spent years becoming an elite athlete?’154 A former 
Graham D. ‘Hard-liners buckling on uniform gun laws’, The Age, 19 July 1996: 
A7.
153 Federal Parliament House of Representatives Hansard. 
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Olympic shooter said he was ‘outraged’ at the decision and that the 
‘changes seemed to mean sporting shooters would not have sufficient 
reason to own and fire guns’.155
With huge irony, Australia’s first gold medal at Atlanta was won by 
Michael Diamond in the trap shoot on the same day (22 July) that Prime 
Minister Howard forced the states to abandon their calls for crimping. 
Shooters’ Party head John Tingle climbed aboard the victory to try to 
portray government and media criticism of shooters as unsportsman-
like: ‘They had to compete knowing that an opportunist Prime Minister 
had labelled them and their fellow shooters as threats to society.’156
The gun lobby argued that restrictions placed on shooting by chil-
dren would disadvantage Australians in future Olympic competition 
because the children would not have enough years to build the experi-
ence needed to compete at the highest level. They also argued that the 
new laws would reduce the pool of shooters needed to produce Olympic 
champions.157
In Tasmania the gun lobby suffered a major setback when the 
Tasmanian Rifle Association publicly agreed with the Tasmanian CGC 
to support the Howard gun law proposals. Representing competitive 
shooters, the TRA did not hesitate to support bans on self-loading rifles, 
a policy it adopted in 1991 after the Strathfield massacre. As a result of 
that policy the TRA was expelled from the Firearm Owners Association 
of Tasmania.
Response: An editorial stated that the argument about disadvantaging 
Australian children from becoming future Olympic champions was 
akin to arguing that having legal limits on driving age disadvantaged 
potential race car champions.158
155 Creer K. ‘Clampdown “may shut gunshop doors” ’, Sunday Telegraph, 12 
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Whatever advantage the gun lobby sought from these remarks was 
rapidly extinguished when the Attorney General pointed out that no 
Australian shooter in Atlanta was using a gun that would be banned 
under the new laws, and that target shooting was explicitly included as 
a legitimate reason to own a gun.159
‘You’re snatching back family heirlooms’
Another angle used by the gun lobby to attack the resolutions concerned 
what they chose to refer to as guns that were ‘family heirlooms’.160 This 
description sought to evoke sentimental notions of doting fathers on 
their deathbeds handing their prized guns onto loving sons. One story 
profiled a Bathurst man shown holding his recently deceased father’s 
photograph and the gun he had bequeathed to his son. ‘My father had 
this gun for 40 years .  .  . It’s worth $500. But to me it’s worth a mil-
lion. I could never give it up. My father died of cancer a few weeks 
ago. It’s something I could never hand over,’ he said.161 Guns were thus 
positioned as symbols of rites of passage or the continuity between gen-
erations of decent men. The Government, the gun lobby now argued, 
would become engaged in ‘raiding homes to seize banned weapons’,162 
evoking notions of police and bureaucrats wrestling grandfather’s 
antique semi-automatic out of the hands of the owner who had gazed 
at it lovingly on its wall mount for the last 20 years. Others sought to 
draw a contrast with cultural concerns to preserve historic buildings 
and ‘governmental cultural vandalism at its very worst’ in destroying 
guns, ‘which are equally important as our buildings’.163
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Response: The NCGC elected not to engage with this argument. Had 
we chosen to, the obvious retort would have been to draw an analogy 
between the way war souvenirs such as mortar bombs and grenades 
are frequently confiscated by the police from home mantelpieces and 
garages despite protests from their owners claiming sentimental attach-
ments. When the laws were passed throughout Australia, those wishing 
to retain firearm heirlooms were able to do so if the guns were made 
permanently inoperative before the heirloom licence was issued.
‘This does not address the “real” causes of violence’
The gun lobby’s stock explanation about violence in the community was 
that guns were merely one means through which violent individuals 
expressed their anger. Controlling guns, they argued, would not work 
for many reasons, but even assuming that it did, violent individuals 
would simply choose other means of inflicting violence. Violent people 
had underlying psychosocial problems that were the real cause of their 
violence. If society was sincere in wanting to reduce violence, it would 
commit resources to address these real causes of violence. ‘What we 
should be asking ourselves is why we have seen this upsurge of vio-
lence in the community in the last 15 years or so. Firearms have been in 
the Australian community since 1788, but until very recently they were 
never the cause of the sort of problems we see now,’ wrote John Tingle, 
sweeping over 200 years of violence against Aborigines under the con-
venient historical carpet. ‘Isn’t it time we started asking what’s changed 
in the behaviour of some of our citizens that they really believe that an 
act of outrageous violence can in some way resolve their problems?’164
Plainly there is much sense in any analysis of community violence 
that seeks to move beyond controlling the weapons used in violent acts. 
But the gun lobby’s argument about real causes always goes one step 
further: it argues ‘go ahead and address these “real” causes, but do little 
or nothing to restrict access to guns’.
164 Tingle J. ‘The crossfire on gun legislation’, SMH, 11 July 1995: 15.
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Response: The NCGC tried to expose the poverty of this argument with 
an analogy developed by psychiatrist and youth suicide prevention spe-
cialist Dr Michael Dudley, who argued that ‘patients bleeding to death 
may suffer from any number of underlying problems, but doctors look-
ing for causes do not ignore the immediate threat to life – they first stop 
the bleeding’.165
‘. . . which are violent videos, movies and games’
Almost immediately after the news of Port Arthur broke, the issue of the 
role of violence in the media as an influence on violence in the commu-
nity resurfaced. Calls began for further restrictions on these films and 
games. The American actor Dustin Hoffman’s comments were widely 
reported when he attacked Hollywood’s obsession with violence, saying 
this was directly linked to massacres like Port Arthur and Dunblane.166
A report in two News Ltd newspapers (the Herald-Sun and the Daily 
Telegraph) on 14 May stated that police had removed from Bryant’s 
house 2,000 ‘violent and pornographic’ videos that included ‘violence 
and explicit sex acts including bestiality’. A former girlfriend and a video 
storeowner confirmed that he liked violent videos. These ‘facts’ rapidly 
entered the national folklore that circulated about Bryant until the Chief 
Censor, John Dickie, rapidly deflated the story at an Australian Medical 
Association conference on 28 June. Dickie contacted the Tasmanian 
Department of Justice and Trustees that was holding all Bryant’s assets. 
The person who removed the videos told Dickie the collection consisted 
mostly of early musicals and classics with stars such as Clark Gable, 
Myrna Loy and Bette Davis. These belonged to the elderly woman who 
owned the house in which Bryant lived.167
The gun lobby were enthusiastic members of the chorus about 
movie violence, arguing that violent films and games were the issues 
165 Dudley M, Gale F. ‘Fewer arms, fewer deaths’, SMH, 9 May 1996: 15.
166 Lusetich R. ‘Stars lash Hollywood over violence’, The Australian, 13 May 
1996: 1; Cumming F, Abbott G. ‘Killer videos on sale’, Sun Herald, 12 May 
1996.
167 Riley M. ‘Censor slams tabloids over Bryant stories’, SMH, 29 June 1996: 2.
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on which governments should take action, while leaving guns alone. 
SSAA advertising stated: ‘The public must realise that the problem is 
not simply about guns. We must look carefully at the impact of violent 
videos and movies, drugs, alcohol and our mental health system.’168
A parliamentary committee was rapidly convened to examine 
questions of media depictions of violence. Despite there having been 
12 largely inconclusive inquiries into media depictions of violence since 
1987,169 the official revisiting of this issue largely diffused the gun lob-
168 SSAA. ‘An urgent message to all gun owners’ (advertisement), Daily 
Telegraph, 10 May 1996.
169 Australian Institute of Criminology. Video viewing behaviour and 
attitudes towards explicit material: a preliminary investigation. Joint project 
by The Australian Institute of Criminology and the Attorney-General’s 
Department, Australian Institute of Criminology 1987; Australia. Parliament. 
Report of the Joint Select Committee on Video Material, (R.Klugman, 
Chair). Canberra: AGPS, 1988; Victoria. Parliament. Social Development 
Committee. Third and Final Report, Inquiry into Strategies to Deal with 
the Issue of Community Violence, with Particular Reference to the Mass 
Media and Entertainment Industries, Government Printer 1989; Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal. TV Violence in Australia, Report to the Minister 
for Transport and Communications, Vols I–IV, Parliamentary Papers Nos. 
131–34, 1990; Australian Institute of Criminology. National Committee 
on Violence. Violence: Directions for Australia (Duncan Chappell, Chair). 
Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1990; Australia. Parliament. 
Senate Select Committee on Community Standards Relevant to the Supply 
of Services Using Electronic Technologies. Report on video and computer 
games classification issues. (Margaret Reynolds, Chair). Parliamentary 
Paper, Canberra 1993; Australia. Parliament. Senate Select Committee on 
Community Standards Relevant to the Supply of Services Using Electronic 
Technologies. Report on Overseas Sourced Audiotex Services, Videos and 
Computer Games, R-Rated Material on Pay TV (Margaret Reynolds, Chair) 
Parliamentary Paper 131, Canberra 1994; Australia. Parliament. Senate Select 
Committee on Community Standards Relevant to the Supply of Services 
Using Electronic Technologies. Report on R-Rated Material on Pay TV 
Part 1 (Margaret Reynolds, Chair). Parliamentary Paper 9, Canberra 1995; 
Australia. Parliament. Senate Select Committee on Community Standards 
Relevant to the Supply of Services Using Electronic Technologies. Report 
on R-Rated Material on Pay TV, Regulation of Bulletin Board Systems, 
Codes of Practice in the Television Industry (Margaret Reynolds, Chair) 
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by’s argument. The new inquiry allowed the Government to point to 
a comprehensive concern about violence in the community and thus 
avoid gun lobby accusations that only one element in gun violence – 
guns – was being addressed. The focus on media violence created a 
substantial parallel debate that ran simultaneously for many weeks of 
the gun control debate.170
‘Doctors kill more people than guns’
There has been a long antipathy between sections of the gun lobby and 
the medical profession. The reasons for this are obvious. Doctors have 
been prominent among those who have advocated gun law reform. 
Doctors became the targets of three attacks from the gun lobby during 
the debate. In their advertising, the SSAA suggested that ‘the medical 
profession has a major role to play and, after Port Arthur, may see their 
responsibilities more clearly’171 – plainly an allusion to their call for doc-
tors to set up registers of those unfit to have gun licences.
Sections of the gun lobby are also preoccupied with a convo-
luted theory that there is an international conspiracy by doctors and 
pharmaceutical companies to medicate the community with psycho-
active ‘control’ drugs like Prozac. When Joe Wesbecker, who had been 
Parliamentary Paper 153, Canberra 1995; Australia. Parliament. Senate Select 
Committee on Community Standards Relevant to the Supply of Services 
Using Electronic Technologies. Report on Operations of Codes of Practice 
in the Television Industry part 1 (Margaret Reynolds, Chair) Parliamentary 
Paper 463, Canberra 1994; Australia. Parliament. Senate Select Committee on 
Community Standards Relevant to the Supply of Services Using Electronic 
Technologies. Report on Regulation of Computer On-Line Services part 
2 (Margaret Reynolds, Chair) Parliamentary Paper 464, Canberra 1995; 
Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Employment, Education and Training. Sticks and Stines: Report on Violence 
in Australian Schools (Mary Crawford, Chair) Canberra: AGPS, 1994. 
170 Wright T, Humphries D. ‘All-out attack on film violence’, SMH, 10 July 
1996: 1; Savva N. ‘Crackdown on violent TV films’, The Age, 10 July 1996: 1.
171 SSAA. ‘An urgent message to all gun owners’ (advertisement), Daily 
Telegraph, 10 May 1996.
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prescribed Prozac three weeks previously, shot and killed eight workers, 
seriously wounded 12 others and then shot himself at his workplace 
in Kentucky in 1989,172 the advocates of this theory became obsessed 
with the notion that nearly all mass killers were people on psychoactive 
medication, and that it was doctors who were to blame for prescribing 
these drugs which caused otherwise peaceful gun owners to go berserk.
In Australia, this theory is routinely circulated in gun lobby circles 
and was perpetuated by the Federal Member for Kalgoorlie, Graeme 
Campbell: 
Any pharmacist will tell you that a lot of the mind-altering 
drugs, such as Prozac, which are used to calm people down, 
in 3% of cases have exactly the opposite effect. No one is 
looking at this factor and nobody will look at it. While the 
Government, supported by the Opposition, is prepared to 
hammer ordinary Australians, it will not pull on the multi-
national drug companies.173
On several occasions at the height of the Port Arthur debate, when 
explaining to journalists (usually from rural areas) that few mass killers 
had histories of mental illness, we would be asked meaningfully, ‘Yes, 
maybe, but how many of them were on drugs like Prozac?’
Response: We judged this conspiracy theory to be so bizarre that most 
hearing it would immediately reflect on the motives and bona fides of 
those spreading it about. We felt that many would immediately wonder 
about the implicit message contained in this accusation – presumably 
that many people on such psychoactive medication should be taken off 
it. No one with any credibility advanced this argument in Australia, so 
we pointed this out whenever asked by journalists.
One of the gun lobby’s more recent arguments has been that the 
number of deaths from medical malpractice and misadventure far 
exceeds those caused by guns: 
172 Cornwall J. Power to harm: mind, medicine and murder. Ringwood: 
Penguin, 1996.
173 Australian House of Representatives Hansard for 9 May 1996. 
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I suggest doctors look at the statistics on surgical accidents 
before becoming concerned with gun control. In New South 
Wales in 1992/93, there were 27,337 hospital admissions 
resulting from medical ‘accidents’, abnormal reactions 
or complications. There were only 144 firearm-related 
admissions.174
Another writer cited the same source but put the number of people 
‘injured by surgical procedures’ at 31,701.175 And another: ‘You have 
70 times more chance of dying from a doctor’s malpractice than from 
a gun’176 which suggested a figure of 10,080 deaths from medical neg-
ligence. Despite the slight problem of the fluid magnitude of these 
numbers, this argument sought to paint gun deaths as a relatively minor 
problem compared to medical malpractice, and thereby to discredit 
medical voices from participating in calls for gun control.
Response: We were intrigued about the doctor-consulting habits of 
principals within the gun lobby and waited in vain for an opportunity 
for one leading voice – who had made it known that he was a diabetic 
under medical care177 – to use this argument. We also were ready to ask 
advocates of this position where they believed the injured taken from 
Port Arthur should have been taken for care if not to the Royal Hobart 
Hospital’s doctors and nursing staff.
The AMA’s Dr Keith Woollard told a Sydney rally that doctors had 
been told to ‘butt out’ of the gun debate. He said: ‘It is absolutely and 
unequivocally our business. It is the doctors who are left to clean up the 
mess. It is the doctors who are faced with healing the ripped flesh, the 
ruptured organs and the splintered bones.’178 Another said: ‘The harm 
done to people from medical procedures is at best accidental and at 
174 Gould I. ‘Physicians need to heal themselves’ (letter), The Age, 13 June 
1996: 18.
175 Brown B. ‘Guns and damned statistics’ (letter), SMH, 27 March 1996.
176 Roudenko A. ‘One in 10,000’ (letter), SMH, 8 May 1996: 16.
177 Aiton D. ‘Out for a duck’, The Sunday Age, 21 March 1993: 4.
178 Harvey A. ‘Sydney takes to the streets in anger’, SMH, 29 July 1996: 2.
Over our dead bodies
250
worst negligent; it is not wilful murder. It is ridiculous to use such a 
comparison.’179
Dr Brian Walpole was head of emergency medicine at the Royal 
Hobart Hospital and was in charge of the team that attended the injured 
brought in on the afternoon of the massacre. His face had become one 
of the most publicised symbols of the community’s outrage at the inci-
dent, when he was shown on TV and in the press throughout Australia 
in a tearful embrace with an equally distraught Prime Minister outside 
the hospital.180 Brain Walpole, who had been an active supporter of the 
Tasmanian CGC, was to become a vitally important voice in the advo-
cacy work that followed the massacre.
Walpole’s most obvious interest to the news media lay in his ‘doctor 
in the front line’ role, and in the way that, as one who had tried desper-
ately to save the lives of those critically injured and experienced the grief 
and anger of relatives and friends of the dead and injured, he now stood 
as a passionate advocate for gun law reform. Here was someone whose 
experience could not be denied or somehow argued away by those seek-
ing to make light of the massacre and to prevent it from translating into 
law reform. Here was someone who – in the face of argument from the 
gun lobby about semi-automatics being safe in responsible hands and 
so on – could describe what happens to human flesh when bullets from 
these weapons hit a shoulder, a chest or a stomach.
Walpole understood this very well, and chose to repeatedly empha-
sise the parallel between a quiet Sunday afternoon in Tasmania and a 
war zone: ‘We went to war for a day in Tasmania and we saw on the 
bodies of all those people the havoc the weapons of war can wreak.’181 
Outside Tasmania’s Parliament House, Walpole told a gun control rally 
that Australians should ‘stiffen the spines of those politicians behind us 
who shilly-shallied with this issue for 20 years, to just get it fixed’.
179 Phillips H. Letter, SMH, 30 March 1996: 36.
180 Lee S. ‘Prime Minister on verge of tears’, Daily Telegraph, 2 May 1996: 2.
181 Wright T. ‘A doctor can look forward with hope’, SMH, 11 May 1996.
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The future tasks for gun control
The 10 May 1996 Police Ministers’ meeting marked the end of a major 
first stage of the gun control advocacy response that Port Arthur had 
unleashed. From then on, the goal became one of safeguarding the 
agreement and preventing backsliding in the weeks and months before 
each state would eventually pass its individual legislation and accom-
panying regulations reflecting the APMC agreement. Michael Gordon, 
political editor of the Australian suggested that Howard’s policy victory 
owed much to his having ‘seized the moment’ before the ‘shock, pain 
and outrage of the massacre [had been allowed] to recede.’1 With every 
day that passed, the potential for the resolve caused by Port Arthur to fade 
and for the gun lobby to exploit the incoming tide of apathy increased.
There was widespread concern that as time went by without the states 
implementing their agreed law reforms, and that as the memory of Port 
Arthur receded, with it would go any passionate conviction among the 
community and politicians that urgent law reform was required. Gun 
lobby definitions of the episode as one-off and as something impervious 
to policy reform risked gaining ascendency. One commentator wrote 
‘Recent history . . . suggests that as time passes, the political pressure of 
the gun lobbies intensifies, the fervour of community support for gun 
control wanes the interest of the media diminishes, the nervousness of 
the politicians grows and in the end little gets done.’2
1 Gordon M. ‘Savagery unites an unlikely Coalition’, The Australian, 11 May 1996.
2 Richards M. ‘Keeping guns and mental illness apart from violence’, The Age, 
6 May 1996: 15
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The gun lobby organised many public meetings and rallies to 
oppose the new laws. During the period between the first and the 
second Police Ministers’ meetings (10 May–17 July 1996) these meet-
ings were reported regularly in the media. Most reports framed these as 
signs that the initial resolve was on the edge of fragmenting, particularly 
in rural seats held by National Party members.3
As Rebecca Peters put it on the evening of the agreement, the task 
was to become one of ‘put[ting] the pressure on state governments to 
make sure they don’t try to squirm out of this under pressure from the 
gun lobby’.4
The gun debate presented a dilemma to many rural politicians who 
perceived that they – far more than their city colleagues – were most 
at risk of backlash from angry shooters. On 19 June 1996, two rural 
Labor members of the NSW Government walked out of a party room 
meeting in protest at what they described as a lack of time to consult 
their constituents about the planned new laws.5 The publicised walk-
out bore all the signs of a ritualistic display to signal to the gun lobby in 
their electorates that they had not passively accepted the process of law 
reform. The protest came to nothing, as did the support of 12 NSW rural 
National Party members for a parliamentary amendment moved by an 
independent rural politician opposed to gun registration.6 Knowing 
that their combined vote would go nowhere near to defeating the votes 
in favour of registration, these men may have been seeking to appease 
their gun lobby constituents while knowing that their votes would do 
nothing to upset the NSW Liberal-National Opposition’s broad support 
for the package of reforms. Such gestures allowed them to run with the 
gun control pack and while hunting with the gun lobby hounds.
3 Emerson S, Taylor L, Meade K. ‘Cracks widen in Nats’ gun resolve’, The 
Australian, 5 June 1996: 1.
4 Lawnham P, McGarry A. ‘Shooters will defy new laws, MP warns’, The 
Australian, 11 May 1996.
5 Lagan B, Millett M. Country ‘MPs walk out over State’s laws’, SMH, 20 June 
1996: 1.
6 Chulov M. ‘Nats split over vote’, Sun Herald, 23 June 1996: 13.
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The list of agreements reached at the Police Ministers’ meet-
ing represented, in one swoop, more promise of gun law reform than 
had ever been achieved in Australia’s entire legal history. Despite the 
breadth of the reform, many concerns remained. There was particular 
worry about the gap between the spirit of the new agreement and its 
translation into state and territory law and especially about the extent 
to which its various provisions would be actually implemented. There 
was also concern whether the clause providing exemptions for primary 
producers who could demonstrate ‘genuine need’ to possess low cali-
bre semi-automatics would allow wholesale abuse when implemented. 
Police were to be given authority to assess applications about whether 
the guidelines on ‘genuine need’ were satisfied, and despite the Prime 
Minister’s assurances that ‘you’re not dealing with a group of people 
who are going to lightly tick off applicants’,7 there was concern that in 
many cases, personal friendships with police or cases of police who per-
sonally regarded the guidelines as being too tough, might lead to easy 
access to semi-automatics. In the months to come, data on the number 
of licensed shooters will become available that will resolve whether or 
not government policy and practice has allowed carte blanche rubber 
stamping of existing shooter’s licences, or whether the new criteria have 
been conscientiously applied causing many gun owners to be refused a 
license.
In the months that followed the APMC agreement, all states and 
territories passed legislative acts that embodied the core platforms of 
the agreement. However, along the way to the final passage of these acts, 
many amendments were introduced which fell well short of the spirit 
of gun law reform embodied in the initial APMC agreement. Those 
interested in scrutinising the detail of the new Acts can find them by 
searching AustLII Databases.8 
7 Shanahan D. ‘No blanket access for farmers’, The Australian, 11 May 1996.
8 Available at: http: //www.austlii.edu.au/databases.html.
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Two years on
As was feared, nearly two years after Port Arthur, there have been a 
number of disturbing cracks which opened up following amendments 
to the bills that were introduced following deals with the gun lobby 
in attempts to pacify rural electoral unrest, particularly in vulnerable 
seats. In March 1998, intense media debate on gun control erupted with 
the announcement that the Victorian government planned a series of 
amendments to its gun laws. The Queensland and South Australian gov-
ernments also indicated dissatisfaction with aspects of the laws. While 
the media debate was concentrated on what seemed imminent in these 
states, it highlighted that slippage from the APMC had in fact already 
been occurring in all states. The proposed Victorian changes included: 
•	 Allowing members of clay pigeon target shooting clubs to use 
semi-automatic and pump-action shotguns. The APMC agree-
ment restricts access to semi-automatic (Category C) weapons 
to clay target shooters who are affiliated with the Australian Clay 
Target Association (ACTA). However Victoria, Queensland and 
the Northern Territory amended their legislation to allow licences 
to members of approved clay target clubs using an approved club 
range, regardless of whether they are affiliated with the ACTA. The 
Western Australian government estimates that less than 100 addi-
tional people are affected by this regulation
•	 Granting minors’ permits to allow children to shoot. This is con-
trary to the APMC resolutions, in that the minimum specified age 
for a shooters licence is 18. There is no mention in the APMC res-
olutions of any procedure for children under that age to be granted 
‘junior licenses’ to shoot. Several of the new state gun laws allow 
children as young as 11 to have gun licences if they are supervised 
by adults. As the Victorian changes were being publicaly debated, 
all other states and territories were already breaching the agreement 
by permitting children under 18 to shoot. NSW, South Australia, 
Tasmania, and the ACT permit children from 12 years to have 
legal access to guns via minor’s permits, while in Queensland the 
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minimum age is 11 years. Western and the Northern Territory set 
no minimum age for shooting. Under Australian laws, children 
aged under 18 are considered too young to smoke, purchase or be 
supplied with alcohol, watch violent movies, vote, consent to med-
ical treatment, drive (if under 17), or have sex (if under 16). We 
don’t for example, issue driving learning permits to children under 
16, despite the requirement of a licensed adult driver to be present 
when a young driver of 16 is learning. If as was so often said, the 
national gun control agreement had turned Australia away from 
being a ‘gun culture’, the new laws were an acknowledgment of a sea 
change in community tolerance of casual gun laws. Part of taking 
a less casual approach to guns must be to state clearly that guns are 
not appropriate for children.
•	 Waiving the 28-day cooling off period for the purchase of second 
or subsequent weapons. This was a clear breach of resolution No. 7 
which stated ‘All jurisdictions to establish a 28-day waiting period 
prior to the issuing of all firearms permits.’ Again, Western Australia 
and the Northern Territory were already breaching the agreement 
on this: police there are not required to wait 28 days to issue firearm 
permits.
As the debate increased about the Victorian government’s inten-
tions, on the second anniversary of the Dunblane massacre Walter 
Mikac wrote an impassioned plea in The Age to politicians to stop the 
slide. He wrote 
Have too many years passed since the Hoddle Street and 
Queen Street shootings? Maybe the politicians think it 
cannot happen here again. Has complacency set in so soon 
after Port Arthur? .  .  . In many ways I still feel shock that 
this issue has raised its head again. Like revisiting all those 
emotions . . . Surely it is up to our representatives to provide 
us with a safe community to live in . . . Despite the rhetoric 
of the Police Minister, Bill McGrath, people are perceptive 
enough to see that the amendments in Victoria must weaken 
the uniform national policy. The presentation of the amend-
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ments to the public has been unprofessional, without enough 
consultation and definitely lacked sensitivity. When we met 
McGrath on Tuesday, he admitted that the Premier, Jeff Ken-
nett, had said exactly that to him earlier that morning. These 
amendments are the first erosions to our national policy. 
They could open the floodgates for other states.9
As the drift toward ad hoc amendments appeared to be gaining 
momentum in March 1998, Prime Minister Howard re-entered the gun 
debate, using the occasion of a Premiers’ conference on March 20 to 
bring his concerns to a head. The conference was called in the middle 
of sustained protests from all states about the poor funding promised 
to them for health care by the Federal Government. Howard’s intran-
sigence on this issue caused a walkout by all Premiers before the gun 
issue agenda item was even reached. As they left the room an angry 
Howard reportedly called out: ‘So what you are saying is that you refuse 
to discuss guns? This is very important. What you are saying is that 
I am going to have to address this myself.’ Commentators wrote ‘The 
public wants service at hospitals. They blame both governments when 
they can’t get it. Everyone loses on health, always. But on guns, John 
Howard is on a winner.’10
Days later, Howard acted to ensure that the watered down gun laws 
being passed by the states would henceforth be meaningless. From mid-
night on 24 March Howard banned imports of semi-automatic guns. 
Howard stated ‘with effect from midnight tonight, there will be a ban 
introduced on weapons designated as Category C under the 1996 agree-
ment’. Exemptions for farmers who could produce police guarantees 
they were primary producers, and clay target shooters with the written 
authority of the federal Attorney General were to be allowed. Howard’s 
action meant that should any state liberalise access to Category C guns, a 
person thus newly licensed would have very few opportunities to legally 
9 Mikac W. ‘Heaven on earth is a place without guns’, The Age, 13 March 
1998.
10 Kingston M, Cleary P. ‘They all came, they dined well, they walked out’, 
SMH, 21 March 1998. 
The future tasks for gun control
257
purchase such a gun unless obtaining authorisation from the federal 
Attorney General. Only those guns placed on the market by the limited 
number of persons authorised to have access to Category C guns would 
be legally available to such shooters.
The SSAA’s website quoted correspondence received on this matter: 
On 25 March 1998, Statutory Rules 1998 No. 52 commenced 
operation. It amended the Customs (Prohibited Imports) 
Regulations to restrict the classes of people who are per-
mitted to import self-loading rimfire rifles, self-loading 
shotguns or pump action repeating shotguns or parts) to pri-
mary producers who can pass the ‘police authorisation’ test 
and have permission from the Attorney-General to import 
the articles.
Members of the Australian Clay Target Association who 
owned self-loading shotguns or pump action repeating shot-
guns as at 15 November 1996, or who, for reasons of lack of 
strength or dexterity need such weapons to compete in com-
petition, and who can pass the ‘police authorisation’ test, and 
have permission of the Attorney-General to import either 
self loading shotguns or pump action repeating shotguns (or 
parts) may also import such weapons (or parts).
Finally, licenced firearm dealers may, with the permission of 
the Attorney-General, import limited quantities of self-load-
ing shotguns, pump action repeating shotguns or self load-
ing rimfire rifles. Such weapons (and parts) are to stored with 
customs, and will only be released if the importer can prove 
he or she has sold the weapon to a certified primary producer 
or sports shooter.
Safe storage
As described in Chapter 4, while the new laws specify minimum stan-
dards of storage for guns in homes, there is little evidence that these 
standards are being policed. A 1997 SSAA survey on the buyback 
reported that only 2% of its self-selected respondents had ‘been subject 
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to a search/visit/inspection at your business/home premises by mem-
bers of your State Police in relation to the firearm buyback scheme’11 
Arguments that the sheer number of gun owners precludes any univer-
sal system of inspection prior to granting a licence contrasts with the 
way the state takes seriously building and motor vehicle inspection. Any 
building owner wishing to alter the structure of a building is required 
to allow (and pay for) an inspection of whether the alterations meet 
specifications. If as a community we can endorse the need for user-pays 
building and car inspections (often for reasons of safety), to deny this in 
the case of gun storage is to revert to the laissez faire attitude of the pre–
Port Arthur days. With unsecure home storage of guns contributing to 
the frequency of gun theft from homes and the fortunately less common 
accidental discharges by children, the abject neglect of the implementa-
tion home storage regulations remains a major weakness in Australian 
gun law regulation.
Collector’s licences
The APMC resolutions and the modifications of 17 July 1996, required 
collectors to prove they were ‘bona fide’. Collector’s licences were 
intended to be a very limited category of licence covering existing col-
lectors whose guns had genuine historical value. Because collectors were 
to be allowed to own more guns than other licensees, the need to apply 
stringent tests for this type of licence is obvious. However, collectors 
provisions in all states and territories constitute loopholes that can be 
exploited by those intent on maintaining or building up large stocks of 
guns. The Queensland Act for example, has no criteria for determining 
whether someone is a bona fide collector. The term ‘bona fide’ is absent, 
and there are no requirements to join a collectors’ club or furnish any 
proof of a history of collecting.
11 http: //www.ssaa.org.au/Survey.htm [no longer active, 2013].
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Variable buyback rates
As shown in Table 4.1, the final results of the gun buyback showed great 
per capita variation across the country, ranging from one gun surren-
dered per 41.7 head of adult (15–75 years) population in the A.C.T. to 
one gun per 10.9 adults in Tasmania, the site of the massacre and the 
state that along with Queensland, had previously had Australia’s weak-
est gun laws. These figures though, present a very misleading picture. 
Recalling our argument in Chapter 5 of the domination of gun own-
ership by men, we might well divide the final adult per capita buyback 
figures by two to give a buyback rate per adult (15–75 years) male head 
of population. Nationally, this would result in one semi-automatic or 
pump-action shotgun being surrendered for every 10.4 adult males, 
and in Tasmania, one per 5.5 adult men. While I have been unable to 
obtain data on the mean number of guns surrendered by those coming 
forward, it is known that many handed in many more than one gun.
When the gun buyback ended there were 640,401 fewer semi-
automatic and pump-action shotguns in the Australian community; 
a national system of gun registration had been established on 1 July 
1997; and judging by the numbers of complaints on shooters’ web 
pages, many people applying for shooters licences were being rejected 
as having insufficient reason to own a gun. Moreover, it seemed possible 
that many gun owners may well have decided that their gun ownership 
was at an end. In early 1997, the Victorian secretary of the Firearm 
Traders Association, Robert Brewer said ‘Out of every 100 firearms 
handed in, only eight are being replaced. That means a massive drop 
in the number of firearms.’12 By October, this pattern appeared to be 
well entrenched. In Victoria, only one in 12 shooters surrendering a 
gun purchased a new, legal replacement weapon. In Western Australia, 
the figure was one in six.13 The buyback was the largest ever attempted 
anywhere in the world and by any standard has radically reduced the 
national gun arsenal.
12 Herald Sun, 13 December 1996: 1–2. 
13 Wainwright R. ‘Gun shy’, SMH, 4 October 1997: 33.
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In April 1998, Australia’s biggest firearms distributor, Fuller 
Firearms, announced that it would close at the end of the 1998 financial 
year. Its owner claimed that national sales had fallen by 80% and that 
about only 10% of the money paid in compensation during the buyback 
had been reinvested in legal weapons.14 The Fuller situation appears 
to reflect the national picture. In late April 1998, the Sydney Morning 
Herald reported data compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
showing that the number of firearms imported in the first nine months 
of the 1997–98 financial year fell almost 70%. 
The ABS statistics give weight to assertions by gun dealers 
that the buy-back scheme has forced many companies out 
of business and could result in the collapse of the industry. 
All of the weapons sold in Australia are imported. Between 
July last year and March this year, 20,493 rifles and shotguns, 
valued at $8.9million, were imported, 32 per cent of the 
importations from the comparable period the previous year. 
More than 83,000 rifles and shotguns, valued at $33 million, 
were imported for the 1996–97 year.15
But how many illegal guns remain in circulation? As detailed in 
Chapter 4, the Commonwealth Law Enforcement Board advised 
the Police Ministers prior to the buyback that there were probably 
1,488,000 soon-to-be-illegal guns in circulation before the buyback 
commenced. That would mean that after the surrender of some 631,000 
guns that 857,000 illegal guns remain in the community. True to form, 
John Tingle estimated that in NSW alone, there were 2.5 million ille-
gal guns in circulation16 – meaning that on average every adult male in 
the state would have had 1.1 semi-automatic weapons, not to mention 
legal guns as well! But even if the Commonwealth estimates are reliable, 
such differences speak of massive, widespread and deliberate illegal gun 
14 Wainwright R. ‘Sales drop forces gun company to close’, SMH, 8 April 
1998: 3.
15 Wainwright R. ‘300,000 banned firearms still in circulation’, SMH, 27 April 
1998: 3.
16  Ibid.
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retention, particularly in NSW where rifles were not required to be reg-
istered. NSW’s rate of 30.2 guns surrendered per adult is 1.65 times less 
than the national average (after removal of the NSW figures). So much 
for earnest gun lobby talk about law-abiding shooters.
Australia is now a country where anyone now owning an illegal 
gun or being an unlicensed shooter faces the prospect of large fines 
and/or jail sentences; where near universal awareness exists that semi-
automatic weapons are illegal; and where community support for 
gun control remains higher than practically any other single issue in 
public affairs. Any shooter who has retained such a weapon will need 
to be constantly vigilant to the possibility that if it is being rapidly fired 
within earshot of others, that someone hearing the distinctive sequence 
may call the police. Those who have broken the law and kept these guns 
will also need to keep their mouths shut. It would seem highly likely 
that many neighbours, acquaintances, workmates and family members 
fearful of the potential for these weapons to be used in acts of violence 
may report these owners to the police (see below).
The NSW police have announced that they will commence check-
ing gun dealer’s sales records against the buyback details. This was the 
process used to trace the gun used by the backpacker murderer Ivan 
Milat to a suburban gun shop. In a letter sent to Philip Alpers the New 
Zealand gun control researcher, NSW Police Superintendent Clive 
Small confirmed that the Milat case has caused the police to ‘collate 
importation details from various companies over a period of approxi-
mately 20 years in regard to all weapons of the type used in the murders 
and subsequent inquiries regarding ownership.’ Such a database will be 
an invaluable tool in tracing many guns still in circulation, should gov-
ernments direct police to take this issue seriously.
But – thanks to the previous absence of gun registration – there 
will be thousands of shooters who bought their guns from someone 
privately or down at the pub and will be feeling smug that there is little 
chance of a knock on the door from police checking. Unless Australian 
police are ordered to engage in active rather than passive policing of 
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this issue, most of the illegal gun owners’ complacency will be proven 
justified.
Gun control advocates have repeatedly called for the potential of 
community concern to be channelled into a highly publicised anony-
mous reporting or ‘dob in’ scheme whereby people pass information 
on such gun owners to police. Such strategies are used routinely and 
successfully in the areas of child abuse, paedophilia, drug dealing, and 
environmental pollution and are promoted as examples of civic mind-
edness. If we can give priority to organising anonymous community 
phone-ins for drugs, child abuse and even poor university teaching 
standards, a high profile dob-in campaign is surely an obvious means 
of locating many of these guns. Like Ted Drane who said publicly on 15 
June 1996 ‘I’m not gunna give up any guns that they are going to take 
off me! Are you gunna give yours up?’, many shooters openly declared 
their refusal to hand in their guns. With guns being so central to these 
men’s lives, many will have boasted about their weapons to neighbours, 
workmates and ex-girlfriends. Numbered among these will be many 
who will share the community’s concerns about the stability of people 
willing to risk a jail term to retain a rapid-fire weapon. The Tasmanian 
police have confirmed they will commence raiding homes following tip 
offs from gun owners who have obeyed the law and are resentful of 
those who have refused.17
Reforms welcomed by many sporting shooters
With the exception of the politically motivated end of the gun lobby, 
it seems that many shooters have come to realise that the law reforms 
may actually prove to be good for their sport. With membership of 
an established sports shooting or hunting club being one criterion for 
gun licensing, many clubs have seen booms in membership. Not only 
does this bring new membership fees, but also it holds the potential to 
bring some of the ‘cowboy’ element among shooters under the positive 
17 ‘Tasmanian police to raid homes for guns’, The Advocate (Hobart), 7 May 
1997.
The future tasks for gun control
263
influence of the many responsible sections of the shooting fraternity. 
From the perspective of responsible shooters seeking to change the neg-
ative image of shooting, the new licensing laws hold promise of weeding 
out many ‘weekend Rambos’.
Despite the efforts of many in the gun lobby to portray gun con-
trol advocacy groups like the NCGC as gun prohibitionists, there was 
nothing in the APMC package and nothing in any statement made by 
the NCGCs representatives that could justify this label. The NCGC 
has never advocated prohibition of all guns and fully recognises the 
importance of guns in feral animal control and in farming, and is not 
opposed to target shooting organised under proper controls. Here, it 
is worth quoting at length Philip Alpers’ speech to the United Nations 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice meeting in 
Vienna in April 1998: 
I’m a licensed gun owner. I enjoy target shooting and I have 
no objection to the use of appropriate firearms in pest con-
trol, on the farm and in sport. Given the number of pests 
introduced to New Zealand by colonists, I have little option. 
But it’s also my belief that the regulation of guns is an import-
ant human rights issue.
While a small number of men do claim that they have the 
right to carry a gun, the vast majority of the people on this 
planet insist that they have the right to live in a society free 
of the fear of guns. Some will tell you that the more guns you 
have, the safer you are. If that were truly the case, the United 
States would be the safest nation on earth.
Personally, I don’t need study after study to tell me that the 
more guns you have in a community, the more people are 
likely to get shot. To many of us, it is simply self-evident that 
the availability of firearms is directly related to their subse-
quent use in crime and violence. I have yet to hear of a drive-
by knifing.
So, every nation has a duty to regulate guns. As you’ve seen 
from the excellent United Nations study on firearm regula-
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tion, for many years it’s been the norm in both industrialised 
and developing nations to employ two parallel registers in a 
system similar to that used for automobiles. We license the 
individual – that’s the driver or the gun owner – as a fit and 
proper person, and we register the object – that’s the car or 
the firearm – to make the owner more responsible and per-
sonally accountable for any damage done.
Gun registration in particular is recognised as the corner-
stone of any effective tracking and tracing system for fire-
arms. You will have seen the Secretary-General’s report on 
the regional workshops on firearm regulation.
With regard to some issues, this document is a wish list. But 
on the central issue of licensing each gun owner, supple-
mented by the parallel registration of individual firearms, I 
can assure you that it was the view of the great majority of the 
149 experts from 79 countries who attended, that these two 
measures together constitute our best chance – and perhaps 
our only chance before it’s too late – to control the prolifera-
tion of firearms.
In promoting the regulation of firearms at these UN work-
shops, delegates deserve the thanks of millions of citizens 
who see it as their right to live without having to worry about 
someone else in the crowd carrying a gun . . . There is also 
a growing international recognition that most of the deaths 
in conflict since World War II have been effected, not by nu-
clear weapons, by tanks or by bombs, but by cheap, easily 
accessible, guns.
In coming months the efforts of the United Nations will be 
supported and encouraged by a wide range of NGOs and 
governments who are becoming just as concerned about 
guns as they have been about landmines.
Of course, the pro-gun lobby will oppose all of this. The Na-
tional Rifle Association of America has already coined the 
phrase ‘global gun grabbers’ to describe you and your aims. 
The NRA has become openly distressed at the initiatives pro-
moted by the Crime Commission . . . 
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Now you may think that the reason you’re all here is to discuss 
illicit trafficking in firearms, the reduction of firearm-related 
crime and the public health of your nation.
But in her fund-raising letter Mrs Metaksa [of the US Na-
tional Rifle Association] told millions of Americans that the 
Crime Commission process is the main thrust of what she 
calls ‘the UN’s world-wide anti-gun campaign which threat-
ens the sovereignty of our nation, and [our] personal right to 
keep and bear arms.’ According to the NRA, ‘a multi-national 
cadre of gun-ban extremists is lobbying the United Nations,’ 
demanding a declaration that would include a ‘world-wide 
ban on private firearms ownership.’
That’s worth repeating. Mrs Metaksa claims that you’re here 
today to plot and to promote ‘a world-wide ban on private 
firearms ownership.’ As you know, this is far from the truth. 
You know that this initiative is part of a United Nations ini-
tiative which began in Cairo in 1995.
You know that 138 member nations voted unanimously to give 
this process its mandate. But the National Rifle Association 
campaign targets only one of those 138 countries. They single 
out ‘the Japanese government . . . one of the most anti-gun in 
the world,’ as being both the originator and financier of what 
the NRA calls the UN’s ‘global gun ban scheme.’ The NRA 
letter continues: ‘we can’t give the Japanese and other UN 
gun-banners even half a chance to ban our guns and attack 
our US Constitution.’
Mrs Metaksa then went on to urge NRA members to send at 
least a million protest letters to United Nations headquarters 
in New York. That was last November. Since then, the NRA 
has refused to reveal the extent to which its members have – 
or have not – followed its instructions.
So you can see that your purpose here today has been blown 
out of all proportion by the US gun lobby. In a campaign 
with obvious overtones of racism, the gun lobby is doing its 
utmost to exploit anti-Japanese and anti-United Nations sen-
timent. They’re making a cynical appeal to their own domes-
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tic audience at the cost of the rest of the world. And all of this 
to prop up the gun lobby’s mythical, and dangerous notion 
that there is a so-called ‘right’ to possess unlimited guns.
Ladies and gentlemen, you came here to discuss the seri-
ous business of firearm regulation for the purpose of public 
safety. These antics may seem like a sideshow. And of course 
that’s exactly what the NRA’s campaign amounts to. It’s a 
shameless beat-up of a very normal process. The United Na-
tions Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice has every right – indeed it has an obligation – to discuss 
illicit trafficking in guns, just as it has to co-ordinate world-
wide efforts against drug trafficking, money laundering and 
trans-national car theft.
Guns should not be treated any differently to any other tools 
of crime. The fact that firearms hold a special and romantic 
place in the hearts of a small minority of men in a handful of 
wealthy nations should in no way dissuade you from treating 
guns as just another hazardous consumer product. Guns and 
their owners should never be regarded as somehow exempt 
from regulation.
And now, having spoken at length about the gun lobby, I’m 
going to urge you to treat them as irrelevant. I suggest that 
you’re here to co-operate in finding ways to improve the pub-
lic safety of your nations. The peculiar attitudes of a small 
minority in the United States have little application or rel-
evance outside that country’s borders. Please, proceed with 
the important work of firearm regulation by sponsoring and 
promoting the work of the Crime Commission, and just ig-
nore the sideshows.
I have every confidence that your citizens will thank you for 
doing so. Thank you.18
18 Seventh Session, Vienna, Austria, 27 April 1998, Item 5: Measures 
to Regulate Firearms Statement of Philip Alpers, gun policy researcher 
Auckland, New Zealand.
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The current leadership of the gun lobby remains apoplectic over the 
new laws because of its leaders’ political ambitions and because of the 
involvement in the lobby of importers and dealers who will lose money 
from the restrictions imposed by the new laws. As I showed in Chapter 
4 where I reviewed electoral results since Port Arthur, this end of the 
gun lobby appears not to have the confidence of even a modest pro-
portion of gun owners or indeed even members of the SSAA. Almost 
daily, the guest book on the SSAA’s web site (www.ssaa.org.au) features 
statements from angry shooters saying they will never vote for again for 
either the Coalition or the Labor party, but will support minor candi-
dates who advance shooters interests. The SSAA’s home page has a web 
counter underscored with ‘We are aware of [web site count number] 
who will not vote for John Howard’. Given that people many people 
working in gun control visit the site often more than once a day, this 
‘whistling in the dark’, talking-up self-assurance is revealing of the inse-
curity the SSAA administration plainly feels. 
On 30 September 1997, the final day of the gun buyback, the 
SSAA published an advertisement capital city newspapers highlighting 
‘Responses to an Australian Audit Office requested survey of 80,000 
SSAA members.’19 Such was the apathy among the SSAA’s member-
ship that it received ‘more than 5000 responses’ (say 6.3%) and chose 
to key in only 2,137 (2.7%) respondents from its 80,000 membership. 
Presumably the 93.7% of SSAA non-respondents had more on their 
minds.
Getting guns out of homes
Besides working to address some of the shortcomings of the new laws as 
outlined above, perhaps the Australian gun control’s major policy chal-
lenge for the future is to lobby for laws that require gun owners in urban 
settings to store their guns outside of homes in community armouries. 
Ex-residential storage of all handguns was a key recommendation made 
by Lord Cullen after the Dunblane massacre, and was adopted by the 
19 http: //www.ssaa.org.au/ad.html [no longer active, 2013].
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British government in the interim period before the Blair government 
banned all handguns. Curiously, Cullen’s recommendation for ex-res-
idential storage only applied to handguns, not to rifles and shotguns 
which of course are equally capable of causing the sort of carnage that 
occurred at Dunblane school.20
The main arguments for community armouries are: 
•	 By law, guns cannot be fired in residential settings; hence there is no 
need to have guns in houses in towns and cities.
•	 Self-defence is not recognised as a legitimate reason to keep a gun. 
Therefore any reference to this reason as legitimising home storage 
can no longer apply in Australia.
•	 Guns are regularly stolen by thieves, with homes being the most 
common site for gun theft.21
Removal of guns from homes would eliminate most acciden-
tal firearm discharges by children in the manner depicted in the 
NSW government’s graphic pre–Port Arthur gun amnesty televi-
sion advertisement.
The gap between the impulse to suicide caused by the time 
required to go and check out a gun from an armoury may prevent 
many suicide deaths.
During domestic violence episodes guns could not be grabbed 
and used to threaten family members.
If guns were required to be stored in armouries, with a storage 
fee attached, this would act as a disincentive to many shooters to 
retain guns that they seldom used.
In Australia, ex-residential storage would only be practical for urban 
and town residents because of the distances that often exist between 
population centres. Rural gun owners and those in towns not served by 
a police station should be obliged to store their guns securely in locked 
20 Chapman S. ‘Getting guns out of homes’, British Medical Journal, 1996, 
313: 1030.
21 See http: //www.medfacc.usyd.edu.au/medfac/GunControl/fp_3_2.htm for 
a detailed report on gun theft in New Zealand [no longer active, 2013].
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cabinets as currently required under the new gun laws. As argued, these 
should be inspected at a cost borne by the shooter.
Advocates for community armouries typically suggest that the 
armouries could be licensed gun clubs or police stations. They argue 
that both of these locations are already or could easily be securely for-
tified so as to allow for very secure storage. The gun lobby typically 
responds that community armouries would provide criminals with 
golden opportunities to steal hundreds or even thousands of guns from 
one location. For example Neil Jenkins, a target shooter who is one of 
Australia’s most reasonable spokespeople on guns argues: 
Rifle clubs typically operate on a non profit basis and carry 
only enough funds to pay the electricity bill and the occa-
sional coat of paint. Also, most rifle ranges were built prior 
to World War II and are nothing more than well maintained 
weatherboard rooms with an office an alarm system sitting 
behind a barbed wire fence, hence would need to be rebuilt 
from the ground up to accommodate an armoury. The only 
way this could be financed would be through a second gun 
levy. My club is a typical one that opens one night a week. 
We have enough problems with amateur thieves who think 
we store guns at the club without having to worry about the 
professional ones aware that each rifle may be worth up to 
$5,000 each.22
In the UK after the passing of the Cullen recommendation on 
ex-residential storage, many gun clubs not solvent enough to upgrade 
their security facilities appear likely to close. It seems certain that 
Australia would see a similar scenario should such a policy be adopted 
here regarding storage in clubs. None but the more extreme ends of 
Australian gun control interests are in any way committed to using such 
a pretext to force the closure of target shooting clubs.
However, Danny Walsh from the Victorian Police Association 
offered an obvious solution to the very real points raised by Jenkins. 
On ABC-TV’s Lateline on 9 May 1996 Walsh suggested that licensed 
22 http: //www.alphalink.com.au/~tonka/link4.htm [no longer active, 2013].
Over our dead bodies
270
gun dealers could double as community armouries. Walsh argued com-
pellingly that we already trust gun dealers to securely store guns. Many 
gun dealerships are open seven days a week to service shooters’ needs. 
The argument that gun shops would become targets for thieves already 
applies now. Gun shops are always heavily secured and have not to 
date been frequent targets for robberies in Australia. Certainly, more 
guns are now stolen from homes than from occasional robberies of gun 
shops. Most tellingly, the gun lobby is not on record as arguing that 
they should be closed because they are accessible repositories of guns 
for criminals. Gun dealers would doubtless be strongly supportive of 
such a plan as it would provide them with extra income through storage 
fees as well as customer traffic (many shooters would probably purchase 
shooting accessories when collecting their guns).
The NSW Firearm Dealers’ Association has 400 registered gun 
dealers and predicts that up to 75% of them will go out of business 
because of the tightening of gun laws causing an expected reduction in 
the number of licensed shooters and preventing sales to the many unli-
censed gun owners in the community.23 If governments were to arrange 
for gun shops to serve as armouries, the financial impact on gun dealers 
would be far less, and may well increase their business substantially.
The main problem remaining with gun storage in armouries con-
cerns the duration and frequency that shooters would be permitted to 
check out their guns. Potential difficulties would arise with shooters who 
legitimately wanted to go on weeks’ long hunting trips and with those 
who were determined to beat the system by claiming that they more or 
less continually needed to check their guns out from armouries in order 
to go on one such trip after another – all the time simply returning 
the gun to their home. Challenges in drafting reasonable guidelines to 
address this problem still remain but are not insurmountable.
23 Wainwright, 8 April, op. cit.
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Banning semi-automatic handguns
Thomas Hamilton, the Dunblane killer, used a semi-automatic pistol to 
kill 16 children and their teacher. The sort of weapon used by Hamilton – 
who was a licensed pistol shooter – can be commonly found in the hands 
of licensed shooters in Australia today. As Hamilton demonstrated, 
these guns are capable of hideous, rapid and lethal firepower. It defies 
all logic to argue that Australia was justified removing semi-automatic 
long-arms from all but the few who could demonstrate genuine need 
for them, while continuing to allow handgun weaponry with the same 
rapid-fire capability to be available to shooters.
Compared to long arms (rifles and shotguns), Australian laws on 
handguns have long been much stricter. Handgun (pistol) licences 
are normally available only to members of handgun clubs and those 
employed in the security industry. Doubtless the gun lobby will argue 
passionately that there have been few incidents where semi-automatic 
handguns have been involved in gun violence and that therefore there is 
no need to place further restrictions on their availability. However, the 
facile nature of this argument can be seen by reflecting on what would 
have eventuated had Hamilton and Martin Bryant (respectively) used 
a rifle and a handgun, rather than the other way round. The carnage 
in both cases suggests that the myopia of the Australian law in only 
outlawing semi-automatic rifles and shotguns and not handguns as well 
may well return to haunt our legislators. While we can all hope and pray 
that such a prediction will never come to pass, the failure of even the 
Howard government to go the whole distance on gun law reform shows 
there remains much work to be done.
The lasting legacy of Port Arthur remains the way the tragedy all 
but destroyed the use of gun control as an expedient political bargain-
ing chip that could be used to play one party off against the other. The 
outrage in the Australian community bound all major political parties 
in a common bond to move Australia more toward being a safer nation. 
The glue cementing this multi-party bond appears firm, although by 
no means permanent. For now, the gun lobby appears confined to the 
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largely irrelevant political detritus status it shares with every conceiv-
able shade of right wing extremism. We all must ensure it stays that way 
and keep alive the memory of the Port Arthur 35 by preserving and 
strengthening the laws their deaths finally allowed us to have.
Any man’s death diminishes me because I am involved in mankind 
and therefore never seem to know for whom the bell tolls. It tolls for thee.
John Donne
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Those killed at Port Arthur on 28th April 1996 were: 
Winifred Aplin
Walter Bennett
Elva Gaylard
Zoe Hall
Elizabeth Howard
Mary Howard
Mervyn Howard
Ronald Jary
Tony Kirstan
Sarah Loughton
Chung Soo Leng
Dennis Lever
Pauline Masters
Allanah Mikac
Madeline Mikac
Nannette Mikac
David Martin
Sally Martin
Andrew Mills
Peter Nash
Gwenda Neander
Anthony Nightengale
Mary Nixon
Janet Quin
Glen Pears
Jim Pollard
Royce Thompson
Helene Salzmann
Robert Salzmann
Kate Scott
Kevin Sharp
Raymond Sharp
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Ng Moh Yee William
Jason Winter
Name unknown, India.24
24 ‘35 reasons why our leaders must act’, Daily Telegraph, 2 May 1996: 1
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